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English National Identity in the Middle Age

England is unusual in that it has a football team but not an army. The lack of an English army dates back to 1707, when the Act of Union specified that ‘the two kingdoms of England and Scotland’ were to be ‘united into one kingdom by the name of Great Britain’, with consequent alterations to the national flag, the official name of parliament, etc.. The state then became Great Britain, even if loyalties and identities did not immediately and universally fall into line with the legislation. For, of course, for hundreds of years before 1707 England had been England.

It is generally recognized that England attained an unusually early and deep-rooted national unity. This was a product of its medieval development, and can be explored by historians in many different ways, for instance, by studying the establishment of unitary succession to the throne, the emergence of a kingdom-wide tax system or the birth of a national Parliament. The purpose of the present paper, however, is to look at English national identity in the Middle Ages not through such analysis of politics or institutions but from the point of view of culture. Benedict Anderson famously identified nations as ‘imagined communities’, and those communities are given their psychological reality by such things as names, self-image, language, and patron saints, which are the four topics explored here.¹

The name England

One of the first and most essential components of identity is a name. And England's name was not the starting point for its sense of unity but a slow and, in some ways, surprising development.

Any discussion of the origins of England and Englishness has to begin with the work of the great founding father of English historical writing, Bede. Bede's *Ecclesiastical History* was completed in 731. It both provides explicit evidence for the diversity of the Germanic settlers in Britain and also offers a unifying concept that transcends the differences. In a classic passage Bede describes how, in the year 449, the ‘race of the Angles or Saxons (*Anglorum sive*

¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London 1983.

Saxonum gens)' came to Britain in three longships.² The Germanic newcomers, he says, were from three 'peoples', Saxons, Angles and Jutes. These ethnic divisions were still recognizable in Bede's own day: the Saxons of Britain were divided into South, East and West Saxons (giving the territorial names Sussex, Essex and Wessex, still in use today), the Angles into East Angles (giving the name East Anglia), Middle Angles, Mercians and Northumbrians, these last two being geographical designations, meaning 'those living along the border' and 'those living north of the river Humber' respectively. And some of these divisions were reflected in the political geography. There were kings of the West Saxons, kings of the Mercians, and so on. So the Germanic inhabitants of Britain, who had migrated there from the continent from the fifth century on, neither originated from one place or people nor formed one political unit in their new country.

It might be thought there was little ground here for common group identity. Yet Bede entitled his great history 'The Ecclesiastical History of the English (or Anglian) people (*gens Anglorum*)' and listed the language of the Angles as one of the five languages used in Britain. Hence it seems that, although the Angles are one branch of the Germanic settlers, their name can be used to refer to the whole. This use of 'Angles' for the entire body of Germanic settlers occurs not only in Bede's own writing but also in the letters of Pope Gregory I, some of which Bede cites in his *History*.³ Gregory, who sent Christian missionaries to England in 597, consistently refers to the English (or Anglian) people (*gens Anglorum*) and the 'church of the Angles', while Augustine, leader of the mission, is 'bishop of the Angles'. Pope Gregory never once mentions Saxons. For him, whatever the source of his information, the Germanic settlers of Britain formed one people and were to be organized into one church.

Modern historians have emphasized the importance of this early unifying vocabulary and the subsequent influence of Bede's views.⁴ They point out how early a sense of

² Bede, *Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum* 1. 15, ed. and tr. Bertram Colgrave and R. A. B. Mynors, *Ecclesiastical History of the English People*, Oxford 1969, 50.

³ There are sixteen letters in Gregory's *Register* that mention *Angli*: Gregory I, *Registrum epistolarum* VI, 10, 49, 57; VIII, 29; IX, 213, 222; XI, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 47, 48, 50, 51, 56, ed. Paul Ewald and Ludo Hartmann, *Monumenta Germaniae historica, Epistolae* 1-2, 2 vols., Berlin 1887-99, I, 388-9, 423-4, 431-2; II, 30-1, 198-200, 213-14, 304-5, 305-8, 308-10, 311-13, 314-15, 319-20, 320-1, 322-3, 323-4, 330-1. They range in date from 595 to 601 and include casual references in letters to widely dispersed correspondents as well as letters to the principals, Augustine, Mellitus, Ethelbert and Bertha. *Registrum* XI, 56^a, ed. Ewald and Hartmann, II, 331-43, is not found in the *Register* but is taken from Bede's *Historia ecclesiastica* 1. 27, ed. Colgrave and Mynors, 78-102, and consists of the so-called *Libellus responsionum*, Gregory's advice to Augustine on missionary tactics

⁴ H. E. J. Cowdrey, 'Bede and the "English People"', *Journal of Religious History* 11, 1980-1, 501-23; Michael Richter, 'Bede's *Angli*: Angles or English?' *Peritia* 3, 1984, 99-114; Patrick Wormald, 'Bede, the *Bretwaldas* and the Origins of the *Gens Anglorum*', in *Ideal and Reality in Frankish and Anglo-Saxon Society: Essays presented to J. M. Wallace-Hadrill*, ed. Patrick Wormald, Donald Bullough and Roger Collins, Oxford, 1983, 99-

'Englishness' developed and how little it had to do with political unification, which came only much later. It is an important point that there was available, from the early eighth century, a generic term for all Germanic inhabitants of Britain and that this term pre-dated and was not a consequence of political unification. Given the number of cases where ethnogenesis – the creation of a people – follows the creation of a political unit, the reverse situation in England is worth noting.

When one turns to the period after Bede, the picture is a complex one. Of the three names that Bede applied to the Germanic inhabitants of Britain, that of the Jutes never attained lasting significance but both 'Angles' and 'Saxons' were in widespread use, both as a self-designation and as a designation by others.

Amongst the native inhabitants of Britain, the Celtic peoples, the terminology applied to their Germanic neighbours and enemies was fairly consistent. Gildas, one of the earliest sources, writing in the sixth century, calls the Germanic newcomers Saxons.⁵ The *Historia Brittonum*, a compilation made in Wales in the early ninth century, does likewise.⁶ Asser, who wrote a contemporary Life of king Alfred (871-99) and was himself a Welshman, consistently calls the English language the 'Saxon tongue'.⁷ Modern Welsh '*Saesneg*' descends from this tradition and the Gaelic '*Sasunnach*' likewise shows how persistent the 'Saxon' identity of the English has been, at least among their enemies and victims.

Self-designation in the eighth and ninth centuries showed no simple pattern. Kings, when not describing themselves simply as 'king', used a title referring to the people they ruled over.⁸ Charters of these kings refer to them as 'king of the people of Kent', 'king of the Mercians', 'king of the West Saxons', etc. Occasionally there are grandiose experiments in the royal style. One powerful king of Mercia, Æthelbald, in a charter of 736, even termed himself

129; idem, 'Engla Lond: The Making of an Allegiance', *Journal of Historical Sociology* 7, 1994, 1-24; idem, 'The Venerable Bede and the "Church of the English"', in *The English Religious Tradition and the Genius of Anglicanism*, ed. Geoffrey Rowell, Wantage, 1992, 13-32.

⁵ Gildas, *De excidio Britanniae* 23. 1, ed. Theodor Mommsen, *Monumenta Germaniae historica, Auctores antiquissimi* 13, Berlin 1898, 25-85, at 38.

⁶ *Historia Brittonum*, ed. Theodor Mommsen, *ibid.*, 111-222, at 147, 158, 172.

⁷ Asser, *De rebus gestis Aelfredi Regis*, ed. William Henry Stevenson, *Asser's Life of King Alfred*, Oxford 1904, 7, 19, 20, 37, 50, 58, 59, 62, 68, 75, 94.

⁸ See Barbara Yorke, 'The Vocabulary of Anglo-Saxon Overlordship', *Anglo-Saxon Studies in Archaeology and History* 2, British Archaeological Reports, British Series 92, 1981, 171-200; Anton Scharer, 'Die Intitulaciones der angelsächsischen Könige im 7. und 8. Jahrhundert', in *Intitulatio III: Lateinische Herrschertitel und Herrschertitulaturen vom 7. bis zum 13. Jahrhundert*, ed. Herwig Wolfram and Anton Scharer, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, Ergänzungsband 29, Vienna, etc. 1988, 9-74.

'king of Britain'.⁹ All this shows quite clearly that the adoption of the term 'English' from 'Angle' was not the only historical possibility. England might today be called 'Saxony'.

A very important development with fundamental consequences for ethnic naming was the destruction of all except one of the English kingdoms by the Vikings. In the 860s and 870s Danish armies established their authority in the English kingdoms of the north and east, leaving only the West Saxon dynasty representing the old English regal lines. In 886, according to the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, Alfred, the West Saxon king, was recognized as ruler of 'all English people (*all Angel cyn*) not under subjection to the Danes'.¹⁰ *Cyn* or *cynn* is the origin of modern English 'kin', meaning family, blood-stock or race, and hence *Angelcynn* is the vernacular equivalent of *gens Anglorum*.¹¹

There was now only one native dynasty ruling 'all English people' not under Scandinavian rule and these people included many Anglian Mercians as well as Alfred's West Saxons. The new situation is reflected in experiments that Alfred and his advisors made with the royal style in the 880s and 890s. Alongside the old title, 'king of the West Saxons', we find 'king of the Angles and Saxons' and the composite 'king of the Anglo-Saxons (*rex Angul-Saxonum*)'.¹² This composite term, 'Anglo-Saxon', which has come to be a standard modern usage both scholarly and popular, obviously met the needs of a king whose subjects included both the West Saxons and the unconquered half of the (Anglian) Mercians.¹³ For Alfred and his dynasty it was an umbrella term, covering both new and old subjects.

Over the course of the tenth century, the Wessex kings slowly conquered the territory that had come under Viking control. The political unit that emerged was, in its extent and in its administrative uniformity, something new. The rulers of this new unit had to choose what to call themselves and one can see a range of titles with which they experimented.¹⁴ But the eventual general choice was simple: *rex Anglorum* – 'king of the English'. The first king to style himself 'king of the English' systematically was Athelstan, the title being first recorded in 928.¹⁵ Thereafter this was the most common regal title. It had the advantage not only of simplicity but

⁹ P. H. Sawyer, *Anglo-Saxon Charters: An Annotated List and Bibliography*, London 1968, no. 89.

¹⁰ *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle: a collaborative edition 3, MS A*, ed. Janet Bately, Woodbridge 1986, 53.

¹¹ See Sarah Foot, 'The Making of *Angelcynn*: English Identity before the Norman Conquest', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 6th ser. 6, 1996, 25-49.

¹² See the concise summary in *Alfred the Great: Asser's Life of King Alfred and other contemporary sources*, ed. Simon Keynes and Michael Lapidge, Harmondsworth 1983, 227-8.

¹³ On the term see especially Susan Reynolds, 'What do we mean by 'Anglo-Saxon' and 'Anglo-Saxons'?' *Journal of British Studies* 24, 1985, 395-414.

¹⁴ Harald Kleinschmidt, 'Die Titulaturen englischen Könige im 10. und 11. Jahrhundert', in *Intitulatio III*, 75-129.

¹⁵ Sawyer, *Anglo-Saxon Charters*, nos. 399-400.

also of conformity with the usage in Bede. And now, for the first time, there was a political unit that more or less corresponded in extent with the 'English people'.

If it was the case that the rulers of Alfred's dynasty were kings of the Anglian or English people and that the language the Angles spoke was English, when did these ethnic and linguistic terms generate a territorial designation? At what point did the land take its name from its people? The first territorialization of the name in its wider sense, 'land of the English' was in the form '*Angel cynnes land*' – 'land of the English race or stock', which occurs in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* in entries from 787. It was clearly thus possible to label the land where the English lived, even if this involved a phrase rather than a single word. The emergence of single labels for the land, that is, proper names properly so called, *Anglia* in Latin and *Englaland* in the vernacular, occurs in the late tenth century. The first use of *Anglia* appears to be in the *Chronicle* of Æthelweard, a Latin version of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, produced, unusually enough, by an English lay magnate, Æthelweard, in the years 978-988.¹⁶ The author was fond of new terms and *Anglia* seems to have been one of them. In precisely those same years, the 980s, there is mention of *Anglaland* in letter of archbishop Dunstan.¹⁷ *Englaland* occurs for the first time in that form soon afterwards in the treaty between Æthelred II and the Vikings concluded in 994.¹⁸ It is remarkable that the new terminology arose in such a narrowly dateable period.

This new usage survived and spread. Beginning in 1014, references to 'England' in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* are common and the seizure of power by the Danish dynasty of Swein and Cnut in 1014-16 reinforced rather than disrupted this development.¹⁹ While the Danish conquests of the ninth century resulted in a division of the country, those of the eleventh century did not. Cnut declared himself 'king of all England (*ealles Englalandes cyning*)', the first king to do so.²⁰ So by the eleventh century 'England' and 'English' were both in use with much the same referents as today.

¹⁶ Æthelweard, *Chronicon*, ed. A. Campbell, London 1962, 9.

¹⁷ Sawyer, *Anglo-Saxon Charters*, no. 1296; *Councils and Synods with Other Documents relating to the English Church 1, 871-1204*, ed. D. Whitelock, M. Brett and C. N. L. Brooke, 2 vols., Oxford 1981, I, 170, no. 35. II.

¹⁸ II Æthelred 1, ed. Felix Liebermann, *Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen*, 3 vols., Halle 1898-1916, I, 222, there dated to 991; references to England in Skaldic verse may be earlier, and possibly influential on English usage, but there are major problems in dating the material.

¹⁹ Apparent earlier references in the E version, *sub anno* 675 and 785, are either certainly or probably interpolations: *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle: a collaborative edition 7, MS E*, ed. Susan Irvine, Cambridge 1984, 31-2, 41.

²⁰ I Cnut, prologue, ed. Liebermann, *Gesetze*, I, 278.

The process by which England came to be the name of England extended over a long period. With the strong impetus of Bede's *History*, but also perhaps through early general vernacular usage, the name of one of the constituent Germanic peoples (Angles) was generalized as a name for them all. With the extinction of all English dynasties except one, members of this dynasty, after various experiments, came to call themselves 'kings of the English', even though they were originally kings of the West Saxons. Its speakers called the Germanic language spoken in Britain 'English'. If the people were 'English', the kings 'kings of the English' and the language 'English', it became natural to call the country 'the land of the English' – England.

Self-image: the English and the barbaric Celts

A sense of identity involves a sense of others. Who we are is defined by who we are not (and, often, whom we hate). One of the important developments of the period 1050-1200 was England's colonial expansion into other parts of the British Isles. As a consequence, the English faced the Welsh, the Scots and the Irish in a new way: they were now in continual and close contact, but often as rulers and ruled, conquerors and conquered. In this environment, the English created a self-image of cultural and moral superiority.

One of the earliest writers to express this sense of the superiority of the English over their Celtic neighbours was the monastic historian William of Malmesbury (himself of mixed English and Norman descent). Writing in the 1120s, he claims that

The soil of Ireland produces nothing good, because of the poverty or rather the ignorance of the cultivators, but engenders a rural, dirty crowd of Irishmen outside the cities; the English and the French, on the other hand, inhabit commercial cities and have a more civilized way of life.²¹

Turning to Scotland, William makes a condescending exception to his generally negative characterization when he discusses King David I, who had intermarried with the Norman aristocracy and spent much time in England: 'He had from boyhood been polished by contact and fellowship with our people, so that he rubbed off all the rust of Scottish barbarism.'²²

This is only the beginning of a wave of powerful negative characterizations of the Welsh, Scots and Irish as poor, rural, backward, brutal and irreligious. In part these comments are to be explained by the simple fact that England is richer agriculturally than the other parts

²¹ William of Malmesbury, *Gesta regum Anglorum* 5. 409, ed. R. A. B. Mynors, R. M. Thomson and M. Winterbottom, 2 vols., Oxford 1998-9, I, 738.

²² *Ibid.* 5. 400, ed. Mynors et al., I, 726.

of the British Isles, and the English observers were noting a real economic difference, but they also had a clear political function. The colonial expansion could be justified as part of a 'civilizing process'. When Henry II obtained papal support for his expansion into Ireland, the pope explained that he was giving his approval to the venture 'so that that barbarous nation may by your efforts become endowed with a more pleasing way of life'.²³

This colonization process meant that, from the late eleventh century, there were English who left the kingdom of England to settle in Wales or Ireland. They and their descendants were not part of the kingdom of England, because the very important decision was made, or assumed, that this colonization was not to involve an extension of the boundaries of the kingdom of the English. Although the king of England claimed overlordship of Wales and, from 1171, of Ireland, he did not claim that Wales and Ireland were part of the same political territory as England. This only occurred in the Acts of Union of 1536, in the case of Wales, and 1801, in the case of Ireland. But the settlers who went from England to Wales and Ireland in the Middle Ages, and their descendants, even if they were not inhabitants of the kingdom of England, certainly saw themselves as English. Both in Wales and Ireland harsh racial divisions existed. The new lordships established by Anglo-Norman aristocrats and settled by immigrant English farmers and townsmen, erected social and legal barriers between themselves and the native population. Many lordships in Wales were divided into 'Englishries' and 'Welshries', occupied by the two different groups and with different legal systems, while in Ireland 'the English born in Ireland' were to be a vocal political group down the centuries.²⁴

In a sense there is nobody more conscious of their identity than travellers, expatriates or exiles. They are outside their own community of birth and upbringing and nothing is more likely to make them sensitive to the differences between themselves and the people around them. In Ireland and Wales the English settler populations tried to hedge themselves around with legal protections designed to maintain and secure their cultural identity. The legislation of the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, which prescribed that the English born in Ireland should have English names, speak English and have haircuts in the English style, provides a

²³ Gerald of Wales (Giraldus Cambrensis), *Expugnatio Hibernica* 2. 5, ed. A. B. Scott and F. X. Martin, Dublin 1978, 146.

²⁴ R. R. Davies, *Conquest, Coexistence and Change: Wales 1063-1415*, Oxford 1987 (reissued as *The Age of Conquest: Wales, 1063-1415*); idem, *Domination and Conquest: The Experience of Ireland, Scotland and Wales 1100-1300*, Cambridge, 1990; Robin Frame, "Le Engleys Néés en Irlande": The English Political Identity in Medieval Ireland', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 6th ser. 3, 1993, 83-103.

useful list of the main cultural markers of ethnicity in the Middle Ages (name, language, hair-style, etc.) but also points to a deep anxiety about loss of identity.²⁵

Language

Language was widely recognized in the Middle Ages as an important badge or marker of ethnic identity. Lists of the defining features of a people usually included it, alongside such things as dress, legal customs, and methods of waging war. This assumption, that a people could be identified by its language, sat somewhat awkwardly with the fact that most of medieval Europe was, in one sense or another, multi-lingual.

Like most of the rest of Europe, Anglo-Saxon England was familiar with more than one language, since Latin was employed for ecclesiastical and some official purposes. However, one of the distinctive things about Anglo-Saxon England was the extent to which the vernacular was used: for poetry, history, sermons, law-codes, will and charters. This came to a dramatic end after the Norman Conquest of 1066. For several centuries English, while still the native tongue of the vast majority of the population, was in a period of shadow.

The language of the ruling class was French. Henry II, who ruled England for 45 years (1154-89), spoke only French and Latin.²⁶ Around 1200 an educated cleric could refer to French and Latin as 'languages which, for us, surpass all others'.²⁷ Some authors writing in Latin were even unwilling to mention English place-names, lest it give a barbarous taste to their prose. Yet, despite this, English survived and re-emerged as a language of literature and, eventually, of power.

The tension between the high cultural status of French and Latin, on the one hand, and the fact that English was the almost universal mother tongue, on the other, can be seen reflected in a ruling from the General Chapter of the Benedictines of northern England in 1290. The monastic leaders were worried that 'those who are accustomed to chatter in English, and often are sent to the great men on the business of their monastery' might be shamed by 'their

²⁵ Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change 950-1350*, Harmondsworth 1993, 239; idem, 'Symbolic Meanings of Hair in the Middle Ages', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 6th series, 4, 1994, 43-60, at 45-6.

²⁶ Walter Map, *De nugis curialium* 5. 6, ed. M. R. James, revised by C. N. L. Brooke and R. A. B. Mynors, Oxford 1983, 476.

²⁷ Gerald of Wales (Giraldus Cambrensis), *Speculum Duorum*, ed. Yves Lefèvre and R. B. C. Huygens, Cardiff 1974, 132.

lack of good language' and instructed all the monks to use French or Latin in public.²⁸ They obviously felt that those who represented them to the aristocracy should be conversant with the high-class languages, not with 'English chatter', although they assumed that the latter would be common.

In one sense the Middle Ages was the great period of English internationalism. England was more multi-lingual in the years 1100-1400 than in any other period of its history. Latin, French and English were all spoken and written, in their differing social and cultural contexts. The royal court looked to its French lands, and to French ladies - most of the queens of England in the medieval period were French. For a period of 398 years (1066-1464) there was in fact not a single queen who had been born in England. But this did not seem to suffocate a sense of English national identity.

Sometimes there were curiously paradoxical results. In the 1250s opposition to the king and some of his policies was led by Simon de Montfort, earl of Leicester. One of his main avowed motives was hostility to the 'aliens' who seemed to dominate the court. His supporters praised him as a champion of the English comparable to Moses, the champion of the oppressed Israelites. His army fought 'for England'.²⁹ Like the heroes of the Old Testament, 'Simon de Montfort raised himself up for England'.³⁰ Yet Simon de Montfort was born in France and was about 25 when he first visited England. He himself was sometimes disillusioned with his English supporters. 'I have been in many countries', he is reported to have said, 'but among no people have I found such disloyalty and deception as I have experienced in England'.³¹ This champion of England was not himself English. One of his outspoken advocates saw the curious paradox:

He was no traitor but a most devout servant and a most faithful protector of the church in England, the shield and defender of the kingdom of England, the enemy and expeller of aliens, although he was one of them by birth.³²

'An expeller of aliens, although one of them by birth' – a French-speaker who was regarded at the time, and by many in subsequent generations, as a patriot and champion of English liberty.

²⁸ 'Documents illustrating the activities of the General and Provincial Chapters of the English Black Monks, 1215-1540', ed. William A. Pantin, *Camden Third Series* 45, 1931, 260.

²⁹ *The Song of Lewes*, ed. C. L. Kingsford, Oxford 1890, 3-4.

³⁰ Walter of Guisborough, *Chronicle*, ed. Harry Rothwell, *Camden Third Series* 89, 1957, 185.

³¹ *The Chronicle of William de Rishanger of the Barons' Wars*, ed. James Orchard Halliwell, *Camden Original Series* 15, 1840, 17-18.

³² *Chronicle of Melrose*, ed. A. O. Anderson and M. O. Anderson, London 1936, 195.

Saints and national identity

Dynastic or community identity could be expressed through the adoption of a particular saint. England provides an interesting example of how national saints could change over the course of time. In the Anglo-Saxon period there were saints whose cults transcended regional boundaries, or who came to transcend them. The Church tried hard to promote the cults of pope Gregory the Great and Augustine of Canterbury, who had initiated the Christian mission to the Anglo-Saxons, and in 747 a council headed by the archbishop of Canterbury ruled that 'the feast-day of the blessed pope Gregory and also the day of burial of St Augustine the archbishop should be celebrated with honour by all, as is fitting'.³³ These ecclesiastical saints, however, did not win a wide popular following. Gregory's cult remained 'primarily a liturgical cult fostered by a clerical elite'.³⁴

The saints who gained the most prominent following in later Anglo-Saxon England included several of those murdered kings who made up a distinctive feature of the sanctity of eastern and northern Europe: Edmund, king of the East Angles, killed by Vikings in 869, and Edward 'the Martyr', king of England, murdered, probably as a result of a dynastic dispute, in 978. Their cults received official backing. Early in the eleventh century the royal council decided that the feast of Edward, King and Martyr, should be celebrated on 18 March 'over all England'.³⁵ After the Norman Conquest of England in 1066, the last ruler of the house of Wessex, Edward 'the Confessor', joined this list of national saints. His reign was romanticized as a time of good rule – in 1100 Henry I promised his subjects 'the law of King Edward' – and in 1161 Edward became the first English saint to be canonized.³⁶

Throughout the years 1100-1400 these English royal saints continued to be an expression of both royal and national identity. When English crusaders helped to capture the city of Damietta in Egypt in 1219, a mosque in the town was converted, in their honour, into a church dedicated to St Edmund the Martyr.³⁷ Depictions of Edward and Edmund in paintings, illuminated manuscripts and other media were common. Their Englishness was no bar to their veneration by Norman and Angevin rulers whose horizons and ancestry were largely French.

³³ *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents relating to Great Britain and Ireland*, ed. Arthur West Haddan and William Stubbs, 3 vols. in 4, Oxford 1869-78, III, 368.

³⁴ Alan Thacker, '*Peculiaris patronus noster*: The Saint as Patron of the State in the Early Middle Ages', in *The Medieval State: Essays presented to James Campbell*, ed. J. R. Maddicott and D. M. Palliser, London 2000, 1-24, at 19.

³⁵ V Aethelred 16, 1 Canute 17. 1, ed. Liebermann, *Gesetze* I, 240-1, 298-9.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 522; Frank Barlow, *Edward the Confessor*, London 1970, 256-85.

³⁷ Walter of Coventry, *Memoriale*, ed. William Stubbs, 2 vols., *Rolls Series* 1872-3, II, 242.

Henry III of England (1216-72), whose four grandparents had all been born in France, nevertheless had a deep devotion to St Edward the Confessor, rebuilding the abbey church of Westminster around his shrine, translating his bones to a grand new shrine and naming his eldest son Edward (and his second son Edmund). In this way these Anglo-Saxon personal names, which had been eclipsed after the Norman Conquest, re-entered the lexicon of high-status names.

England thus had revered and long-established native saints. What is rather remarkable is that a new and definitely non-native saint eclipsed them in the later Middle Ages and early modern period. St George began as an entirely fictional martyr saint in the eastern Mediterranean region in the fifth century, the account of whose sufferings was so fantastical (he is executed and miraculously resurrected three times) that it was included in the earliest papal condemnation of apocryphal literature. Yet by the later Middle Ages he was widely regarded as 'special protector and advocate of the kingdom of England'. Unlike many things attributed to the influence of the crusades, the rise of the cult of St George really does seem to be explained by western crusaders encountering this very popular eastern saint and making him their own patron. It was Edward I, the last English king to go on crusade, who decreed that his troops should wear the red cross of St George as their uniform.³⁸

The fourteenth century was a transitional period in the history of the national saints, symbolized by the fact that when Edward III of England repulsed a French attack on Calais in 1349, he enheartened his men with the calls 'Ha Saint Edward! Ha Saint George!', invoking both the older and the newer heavenly patron.³⁹ When he founded the Order of the Garter, its patrons included both Edward the Confessor and George, although the latter grew to overshadow the former. There is still some parity between the old saints and the new in the reign of Edward III's grandson, Richard II. The most famous artistic product from Richard's reign, the Wilton Diptych, shows the young king kneeling before the Virgin Mary, with his saintly sponsors behind him. They are Edmund, King and Martyr, Edward the Confessor, and John the Baptist. Yet the Ordinances of War that were drawn up for Richard's Scottish campaign of 1385 prescribe that every soldier in his army 'should bear a large badge of arms of St George, before and behind' and that any of the enemy wearing such a badge, presumably to disguise themselves, were to be killed.⁴⁰

³⁸ Jonathan Good, *The Cult of St George in Medieval England*, Woodbridge 2009, 53, citing PRO E 101/3/15.

³⁹ Thomas Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, ed. H. T. Riley, 2 vols., Rolls Series 1863-4, I, 274.

⁴⁰ *Monumenta Juridica: The Black Book of the Admiralty* I, ed. Travers Twiss, Rolls Series 1871, 456.

Eventually St George's position became undisputed. The great English victory of Agincourt in 1415 was won under the invocation of the names of Jesus, Mary and George.⁴¹ In January 1416 the Archbishop of Canterbury decreed that the feast of St George, who is described as 'special patron and protector of the English nation', be celebrated at a higher level of solemnity throughout the province of Canterbury.⁴² Thereafter George's position as the national saint of England was assured, even beyond the great chasm of the Reformation. Elizabethan playgoers could thrill to the war-cry in Shakespeare's *Henry V*: 'God for Harry, England and St George!'

The earlier national saints, Edmund, King and Martyr, and Edward, King and Martyr, were rulers who had suffered an innocent death, while Edward the Confessor was revered for his perpetual virginity. None had a reputation as a winner in war. This is perhaps what St George provided. Although technically a martyr, George was uniformly portrayed as a knight, fighting dragons and saving maidens. That is what the martial classes of later medieval England seem to have wanted.

So these are my four perhaps paradoxical conclusions:

- 'Englishness' pre-dated 'England'; national identity helped shape the political unit rather than being simply a consequence of it.
- A sense of English superiority was created during the colonial expansion of the English in the British Isles, even though this was after the English themselves had been subjected to a foreign aristocracy.
- English national identity developed strongly in the very period when the English language was at its lowest ebb in terms of social prestige and literary production.
- The English replaced their own native patron saints with an imported and originally exotic patron saint, largely because of his martial reputation.

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⁴¹ *Gesta Henrici quinti* 12, ed. Frank Taylor and John S. Roskell, Oxford 1975, 84.

⁴² *The Register of Henry Chichele, Archbishop of Canterbury, 1414-1443*, ed. E. F. Jacob, 4 vols., Canterbury and York Society 42, 45, 46, 47, 1938-47, III, 8-10; *Gesta Henrici quinti* 18, ed. Taylor and Roskell, 132.

*Wills of Cutlers in Fifteenth-Century London**

Crafts and trades in late medieval London have attracted the attention of historians since the beginning of the twentieth century. The main historical sources used have been city documents concerning crafts and trades, and administrative records within the organizations of crafts and trades, such as ordinances and accounts.¹ Other sources for the study of medieval crafts and trades include the wills of individual craftsmen and merchants. In particular, a few wills which contain direct information on the crafts and trades such as bequests to the guild have been used. In fact, as some recent studies have proved, the research on all surviving medieval wills of one particular craft or trade can reveal the structure of said craft or trade and how it changed through the ages.² In addition, the study of widows in medieval London has shown that wills can reveal the individuals and groups with whom the testators maintained good relationships.³ It is very likely too that the wills of craftsmen and merchants can portray their lives, both inside and outside their crafts and trades. Thus, to understand the crafts and trades and the people who practiced them, wills are a valuable source, not only when we do not have other sources of information, but even when a number of administrative records of the organization are already available.

This article focuses on the wills of cutlers in fifteenth-century London, paying particular attention to their lives both inside and outside their crafts. Although the findings from this study cannot be easily applied to every craft and trade, the cutlers' case presented in this article can be compared with the cases of other crafts and trades and can be a trigger for further studies.

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¹ B. W. E. Alford and T. C. Barker, *A History of the Carpenters Company*, London 1968; George Unwin, *The Gilds and Companies of London*, London 1908; Elspeth M. Veale, *The English Fur Trade in the Later Middle Ages*, Oxford 1966.

² Jessica Lutkin, 'The London Craft of Joiners, 1200-1550', *Medieval Prosopography* 26, 2005, 129-64; Pamela Nightingale, *A Medieval Mercantile Community: The Grocers' Company and the Politics and Trade of London, 1000-1485*, New Haven 1995; Anne F. Sutton, *The Mercery of London: Trade, Goods and People, 1130-1578*, Aldershot 2005.

³ Caroline M. Barron and Anne F. Sutton, eds, *Medieval London Widows 1300-1500*, London 1994.

There have been several studies on cutlers, but the study by Charles Welch published in 1916 and 1923 has been almost the only substantial research.⁴ A few other scholars studied the history of the Cutlers' Guild before and after Welch, yet their research added little to Welch's study, at least as far as the medieval period is concerned.⁵ Welch's work, which examines evidence such as city documents, litigation records, wills and deeds, cannot be underestimated, but he tended to focus only on the economic activity of the Cutlers' Guild and the cutlers' occupations, and not on the lives of individual cutlers. While he utilized wills and included the bibliography of each cutler in medieval London, the information contained in the wills was not fully exploited. In other words, there is room for further study concerning various aspects of the lives of individual cutlers. Moreover, the meaning and role of the Cutlers' Guild can be examined through the wills of cutlers, not only from the accounts of the Guild, on which the previous studies have relied.

Sources for this study are sixty wills of fifty-eight London cutlers written between 1400 and 1497, either in Latin or in English (See Table). These wills are analysed with particular attention paid to the dwelling place and burial place of each cutler, the recipients of bequests, and the executors and overseers of the wills. Yet we should be cautious when using wills as sources because those who appear in wills merely represent part of the testators' relationships with other people and groups.⁶ Moreover, the movables and immovable mentioned in the will are not necessarily an accurate reflection of the testators' wealth; the testator may have made further bequests, either orally or in separate documents. Another problem is that the collected wills of one particular group do not necessarily include every rank within that group. With regard to the cutlers, at least twenty-four of the fifty-eight cutlers served as governors of the Cutlers' Guild; they were described as either masters or wardens elsewhere.⁷ This implies that the findings from wills may represent the lives of prominent and successful cutlers, not those of the rank and file. Nevertheless, taking into account the fact that not many sources are

⁴ Charles Welch, *History of the Cutlers' Company of London: And of the Minor Cutlery Crafts: With Biographical Notices of Early London Cutlers*, 2 vols, London 1916-23, I: *From Early Times to the Year 1500*, 1916, II: *From 1500 to Modern Times*, 1923.

⁵ R. J. Cheeswright, *A Historical Essay on the Livery Companies of London, with a Short History of the Worshipful Company of Cutlers of London*, Croydon 1881; Tom Girtin, *The Mark of the Sword: A Narrative History of the Cutlers' Company 1189-1975*, London 1975; Dudley Hayton, *The Worshipful Company of Cutlers of London: A Brief History*, 2nd edn, London 1980; Worshipful Company of Cutlers of London, *The Worshipful Company of Cutlers: A Miscellany of its History*, London 1999.

⁶ Clive Burgess, 'Late-Medieval Wills and Pious Convention: Testamentary Evidence Reconsidered', in *Profit, Piety and the Professions in Later Medieval England*, ed. Michael Hicks, Gloucester 1990, 14-33.

⁷ The title of the governors of the Guild before 1416 varied. Welch, *The Cutlers' Company of London*, I, 3-4, 121-2, 242-5.

available which reveal the lives of individual craftsmen, it is meaningful to examine wills in order to broaden our understanding of medieval urban society.

Cutlers in Late Medieval London

Cutlers were those who were engaged in making or selling tools for cutting, such as knives and swords. It is said that they were already active in twelfth-century London and had come together in 1328 at the latest, when seven cutlers who were elected by their colleagues swore before the mayor and aldermen to govern their craft.⁸ The oldest extant ordinances of the craft were the ones approved by the mayor and aldermen in 1344, which applied to craft-related matters such as apprenticeships and working hours.⁹ The cutlers' association also had a religious function, as is obvious from the ordinances of 'la Fraternite de Cotellers' submitted to the Chancery in 1388-9 in response to royal writs issued for investigation into the guilds.¹⁰ According to the ordinances, this 'Fraternite' was founded to offer up two tapers to the church of the Annunciation of Our Lady in 1370. This church had become the conventual church of the Charterhouse probably when the monastery was founded in 1371, but the offering of tapers to the church by the cutlers continued to the end of the fifteenth century at least. The surviving accounts of the Cutlers' Guild between 1442 and 1497 records expenses concerning this activity such as payment for new 'lights'.¹¹ The patron saints of this 'Fraternite' are unknown from the extant documents, but it is believed to have been dedicated to the Holy Trinity, since the ordinances of the 'Fraternite' note that the election of the masters of the Guild should be conducted on the first Sunday after Trinity.¹² The ordinances of the 'Fraternite' reveal that the Guild had a social function as well, such as support for injured cutlers.¹³ Thus, the cutlers' association had religious, social, and economic functions from the fourteenth century. Although the 'Fraternite' is said to have been established in 1370, it is clear that cutlers had come together as a group before then. In this article, this association of cutlers is referred to as the Cutlers' Guild.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1-10, 120-3.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 4-6, 237-9.

¹⁰ The National Archives, C47/42/215; Jan Gerchow, 'Guilds and Fourteenth-Century Bureaucracy: The Case of 1388-9', *Nottingham Medieval Studies* 40, 1996, 109-48; Welch, *The Cutlers' Company of London*, I, 249-54.

¹¹ London Metropolitan Archives (LMA), CLC/L/CL/D/001/MS07146/001-036 (Wardens' Account Rolls). I would like to acknowledge the City of London, London Metropolitan Archives for the use of manuscripts for this study.

¹² Welch, *The Cutlers' Company of London*, I, 18-9.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 249-54.

In 1416, the cutlers received their first charter from Henry V. In the charter, the Cutlers' Guild was granted the right to hold lands and tenements, and since then, the Guild has been governed by a master and two wardens who are elected by the members of the Guild annually.¹⁴ The cutlers built a hall in the early fifteenth century in the parish of St Michael Paternoster Royal, and used for events such as the elections of masters and wardens, and annual feasts.¹⁵ It is difficult to know how many cutlers were engaged in the craft of cutlery, but the list drawn up by Welch which was based on the extant thirty-seven annual accounts of the Guild for the years between 1442 and 1498 mentions approximately 180 different names of masters who themselves had 360 or more registered apprentices.¹⁶ The number of liverymen among the cutlers, namely the skilled and prominent master cutlers, can be estimated at around forty each year based on the accounts of the Guild, although the estimation of the number of cutlers differs among researchers.¹⁷ The cutlers' craft can be regarded as relatively small or of average size in terms of its membership, compared to other London crafts and trades in the medieval period.¹⁸

As mentioned above, the cutlers' craft in fifteenth-century London was under the control of the Cutlers' Guild. So, what role did the Guild play in the lives of its members? What types of relationships existed among the cutlers? Was there more to the cutlers' lives than simply being cutlers? The analysis of the wills of cutlers will provide us with clues which may help us to answer these questions.

The Cutlers' Guild and Fellow Cutlers

The cutlers' relationships with the Guild and their fellow craftsmen, namely other cutlers, can be seen from the cutlers' wills.¹⁹ Some of the cutlers seem to have remembered their Guild when writing their wills. While the wording may vary, for example there are references to 'commonalty of cutlers', 'craft of cutlers', and 'fellowship of cutlers' and so on, it is plausible to

¹⁴ Ibid., 120-2.

¹⁵ Ibid., 159-62.

¹⁶ Welch's list of registered apprentices includes the information from the account of 1498, but its account does not survive now. Ibid., 354-71.

¹⁷ For example, Sylvia Thrupp estimates the number of liveried cutlers as twenty-two and the 'total membership' as forty-three in 1462, based on 'paid-up quarterage accounts' for the year, which amounted to 44s. But this calculation is unconvincing. Sylvia L. Thrupp, *The Merchant Class of Medieval London, 1300-1500*, 2nd edn, Ann Arbor 1976, 46; Girtin, *The Mark of the Sword*, 66.

¹⁸ Caroline M. Barron, *London in the Later Middle Ages: Government and People 1200-1500*, Oxford 2004, 215; Thrupp, *The Merchant Class*, 43, 46.

¹⁹ Hereinafter, a bracketed figure after the name of a cutler corresponds with the number placed beside every cutler in the Table.

assume that they refer to the Cutlers' Guild, the association of cutlers. Fifteen out of fifty-eight cutlers made bequests to the Cutlers' Guild. Of the fifteen, eleven left small goods such as tableware and cloth, and another two left cash.²⁰ Richard Twyford (3) left one third of his goods and chattels to the Guild in the event that his children died before they became of age or got married, while John Amell (48) requested that certain lands and tenements should be left to the Guild on the death of his sister.²¹

One of the reasons for the bequests to the Guild may have been that the testators hoped that the members of the Guild would pray for their souls. For example, John Fordham (37) left a mazer to the Guild and requested that his name be inscribed on it so that the members would remember him in their prayers. The Guild responded to this request, as 16s. was paid to repair the mazer in 1470.²² This bequest seems to suggest that the Guild was one of the places where cutlers could request that their souls be prayed for, so it is possible to assume that other cutlers felt the same way as John Fordham.

Of the fifty-eight cutlers who made bequests, seven remembered their poor colleagues.²³ Of those seven, four left money or goods to the needy, such as the poor in their own parish or inmates of hospitals, in addition to poor cutlers.²⁴ One of the four, John Amell (48), made special provisions for the poor cutlers; he left lands and tenements especially to the Guild and requested that the profit from them should be distributed among the poor cutlers. In another three wills, bequests to the poor were made only to the poor of their craft.²⁵ In particular, Thomas Brokman (26) and Robert Pykmere (54) also made bequests to the Cutlers' Guild, which may imply that they had a stronger attachment to their craft than to other institutions, at least judging from their wills. However, it would be rash to assume these bequests to poor cutlers were simply acts of charity, because it is difficult to know whether these bequests were actually passed on to the poor cutlers. Moreover, what was important for the testators may have been that those poor cutlers would pray for their souls in exchange for a bequest; Richard Wodecok (51) asked the poor to attend his obit in the church of St Martin Ludgate to pray for his soul. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the relationships created

²⁰ Wills nos. 9, 23, 28, 33, 37, 38, 44, 54, 56, 57, 58 left small goods. Thomas Calys (20) left 3s. to the 'common box' of the Cutlers' Guild, and Thomas Brokman (26) left 12s. to pay for a new tapestry for the cutlers.

²¹ Welch, *The Cutlers' Company of London*, I, 96-7, 119, 195-6.

²² LMA, CLC/L/CL/D/001/MS07146/018. A similar request was made by Thomas Barette (38).

²³ Wills nos. 19b/c, 26, 44, 48, 49, 51, 54. William Haydore (44)'s bequest to the poor cutlers is conditional.

²⁴ Wills nos. 19b/c, 44, 48, 49.

²⁵ Wills nos. 26, 51, 54.

within the craft prompted some cutlers to remember their poor colleagues when making their wills.

The majority of the wills which contain the bequests to the Guild and to the poor cutlers were written in the latter half of the fifteenth century. Before 1450, four out of twenty-four testators made bequests to the Guild and one to the poor cutlers, while after 1451, eleven out of thirty-four made bequests to the Guild and six to the poor cutlers. This might suggest that the Guild's importance and its influence on its members grew during the fifteenth century and consequently cutlers came to pay more attention to their poor colleagues than before. However, further study is required to find out why this change came about.

These wills also tell us of the relationship between masters and apprentices at the end of the masters' careers. Of the fifty-eight cutlers, twelve mentioned one or two of their male apprentices in their wills.²⁶ Many of these twelve left goods or cash to their apprentices. Four cutlers exempted their apprentices from the rest of the term of their training, usually a period of one or two years, and one asked his wife to train his two apprentices till the end of their terms.²⁷ Tools for the craft were left to apprentices; two left their tools to their apprentices, and one gave his apprentice priority over others in buying his tools.²⁸ These provisions for apprentices indicate that cutlers tried to fulfil their responsibility as masters when considering their own death or retirement from their craft.

Cutlers may have left their tools to their colleagues' apprentices. John Haverill (15) bequeathed to Marion Lynden, an apprentice of Thomas Donyngton, the tools that Marion needed for his craft. There is no indication in either the will or other sources as to what craft or trade the said Thomas Donyngton and his apprentice Marion practiced. We only know that Thomas Donyngton was one of John Haverill's executors. But given that John Haverill was a cutler and left his tools to Marion, it seems likely that Thomas Donyngton was a cutler as well and that his apprentice Marion was learning the craft of cutlery.²⁹ It appears that, as John Haverill did not have an apprentice of his own at the time that his will was drawn up, he left his tools to a fellow cutler's apprentice. Haverill's will reveals one of the patterns of the succession of the tools of the craft to the next generation.

Wills tell us about relationships among cutlers as well. It is possible to see the ties that existed among the cutlers in their choice of executors and overseers, since the tasks of the

²⁶ Wills nos. 6, 23, 33, 36, 37, 38, 41, 44, 46, 47, 56, 58.

²⁷ Exemption from the remaining terms, wills nos. 33, 44, 46, 47; training by his wife, will no. 56.

²⁸ Wills nos. 23, 38, 47.

²⁹ For this reason, Thomas Donyngton is regarded as a cutler.

executors and overseers had to be carried out by trustworthy people.³⁰ Of fifty-eight cutlers, twenty-three nominated their fellow cutlers as one of the executors of their wills, and nine nominated their fellow cutlers as overseers of their wills. Of these, three nominated cutlers both as executors and overseers.³¹ In other words, twenty-nine, half of the fifty-eight cutlers, chose their fellow cutlers as either their executors or overseers, or both.³² It is not easy to make a clear link between the choice of colleagues as executors and overseers and the bequest pattern of the cutlers' wills. Yet fourteen cutlers of the twenty-nine who nominated their fellow cutlers as executors or overseers made craft-related provisions such as bequests to the Guild or to the poor cutlers, or made some sort of provisions for their own apprentices. As the Table shows, of the fifteen cutlers who made bequests to the Cutlers' Guild, nine nominated cutlers as executors or overseers, and of the seven cutlers who made bequests to their poor colleagues, four did so. Of the twelve cutlers who mentioned their own apprentices in their wills, nine chose cutlers as executors or overseers. Thus, it may be possible to assume that if provisions of the will related to their craft, testators relied on their fellow cutlers, who must have understood the testators' craft-related provisions better than anyone else.

A relationship of trust among cutlers can also be observed in other ways, such as guardianship of their colleagues' children and bequests of goods to their colleagues. For example, William Lucas (13) asked Thomas Belgrave to act as custodian of his son, while John Hichecok (43) requested that another cutler, William Haydore (44), give 10 marks to Hichecok's servant when he married, which suggests that William Haydore was supposed to look after the money.

Closeness among cutlers may have been strengthened by the fact that they lived near one another. The wills reveal that there were three popular dwelling areas for fifteenth-century London cutlers. One was the area near the river Fleet including the parishes of St Bride Fleet Street and St Martin Ludgate, where twenty-seven of the cutlers whose wills survive seem to have lived. The other areas that attracted cutlers were near London Bridge, especially the parish of St Magnus the Martyr, where eight cutlers seem to have been parishioners, and the parishes of St Lawrence Jewry and St Mildred in Poultry near the Cheapside, which were home to seven cutlers.

³⁰ *The Register of Henry Chichele: Archbishop of Canterbury, 1414-1443*, ed. E. F. Jacob, 4 vols, Oxford 1938-47, II, 1938, xxii-v; Michael M. Sheehan, 'English Wills and the Records of the Ecclesiastical and Civil Jurisdictions', *Journal of Medieval History* 14, 1988, 3-12.

³¹ They are 39, 54, and 58, but in all cases the executors are family members.

³² Of these twenty-nine testators, six testators include people who were cutlers and were also family members as their executors or overseers. They are Richard Twyford (3) (father), John Twyford (7) (daughter's husband), John Bulle (39) (son), Thomas Clarence (42) (wife's father), Robert Pykmere (54) (cousin), and William Hertwell (58) (daughter's husband).

Some cutlers may have belonged to the same parish guild. Two parish guilds in the aforementioned popular residential areas are mentioned in the wills of more than two cutlers in the 1470s and the 1480s: the fraternity of St Mary in the parish church of St Bride Fleet Street was mentioned by John Robertson (47), John Catour (50), and Robert Pykmere (54), and the fraternity of the Penny Brotherhood in the parish church of St Lawrence Jewry by William Haydore (44) and John Dey (49).³³ This probably strengthened the relationship between these cutlers. But considering that these two parish guilds only received bequests from cutlers who were parishioners there, and that the Cutlers' Guild was far more popular, being mentioned in the wills of fifteen of the fifty-eight cutlers, it is unlikely that the link between cutlers and these parish guilds had developed to the extent that many London cutlers were connected through the same parish guild. Of course, this speculation may be distorted by the small number of surviving wills compared to the estimated number of active cutlers. Moreover, the fact that parish guilds are not mentioned in the wills does not necessarily mean that the cutlers felt no affection for them. But a comparison with the case of joiners provides us with a key to understanding the relationship between the craft and the parish guild. According to Lutkin's study on joiners based on their wills, the popularity of the parish of St James Garlickhithe as a residential area among joiners coincides with their preference for the parish guild there, the fraternity of St James Garlickhithe, throughout the fifteenth century.³⁴ Thus, the fraternity of St James Garlickhithe provided joiners with the foundation for their association, whereas the focal point for cutlers was the Cutlers' Guild, and not their local parish guild, at least in the fifteenth century. Moreover, it is also notable that the Charterhouse, where cutlers established their 'Fraternite' in 1370, is mentioned in only four wills.³⁵ Many cutlers may have been more attached to the people in the Guild than to the physical place where the Guild had its religious base.

Families, Relatives, and Non-Cutlers

Cutlers' lives were not confined to their lives as cutlers. Their relationships with families, relatives, and non-cutlers will be focused on here. As is usual with the wills of male testators

³³ William Haydore's will only says that he made a bequest to the altar known as the Penny Brotherhood in the parish church of St Lawrence Jewry, but it seems plausible to assume that he had some connection with the fraternity of the Penny Brotherhood.

³⁴ Lutkin, 'Craft of Joiners', 140-6.

³⁵ Wills nos. 10, 48, 57, 58.

in medieval London, their wives were chosen as executors, either alone or with other people.³⁶ Forty-five cutlers clearly had wives who were still alive when they wrote their wills, and of this forty-five, forty-three nominated their wives as executors.³⁷

For some cutlers, the relationships with their families and relatives had some sort of craft-oriented aspect. John Bulle (39) had a cutler son and bequeathed his tools for cutlery to that son, and John Twyford (7)'s son Richard (3) was also a cutler.³⁸ John Fordham (37) hoped that his son Thomas would become a cutler. In his will, written in 1466, John Fordham requested that his son Thomas stay with his mother until he became twenty-four years old, but if Thomas was 'cunning' and 'made of my crafte freman', Thomas could leave his mother two years earlier. John entrusted this request to his executors, including Thomas Pope (45), his fellow cutler, and the request seems to have been carried out, at least partly; Thomas Fordham was registered as an apprentice to a cutler John Calker in 1469.³⁹ Only these three were found as examples of cutlers who mentioned their cutler sons in their wills. It may indicate that the succession of children to the craft of cutlery was uncommon, as in the case of merchants in medieval London, but findings from wills are inconclusive.⁴⁰ What is revealed here is the fact that there were some families who were connected with the craft of cutlery down through the generations. The succession to the craft of cutlery by family members could also involve sons-in-law. Three cutlers, John Twyford (7), Thomas Pope (45), and William Hertwell (58), had daughters whose husbands were cutlers.

The cutlers' relationships outside their family and their craft should not be neglected; twenty-nine cutlers chose people who were not cutlers as one of their executors or overseers.⁴¹ The occupations of these non-cutlers varied; there is no particular occupation which especially stands out among the wills of the cutlers. Although in many cases it is impossible to know how the relationships between these cutlers and non-cutlers came about, it is certain that at least three cutlers asked their fellow parishioners to be their executors, judging

³⁶ Barron and Sutton, *Medieval London Widows*, xxxi-ii; Jacqueline Murray, 'Kinship and Friendship: The Perception of Family by Clergy and Laity in Late Medieval London', *Albion* 20, 1988, 369-85 at 376-7.

³⁷ The will of John Howes (25) does not clearly say the executor 'Emot' is his wife. However, it seems reasonable to regard Emot as his wife since a woman called 'Emot Howys' received a pension from the Cutlers' Guild between 1461 and 1475. Female recipients of this pension were mainly the wives and widows of cutlers. Therefore, John Howes's will is included in the number of the wills in which wives are chosen as executors. LMA, CLC/L/CL/D/001/MS07146/011-022.

³⁸ Although John Bulle (39) does not describe his son as a cutler, it is possible to regard him as a cutler. Welch, *The Cutlers' Company of London*, I, 205.

³⁹ LMA, CLC/L/CL/D/001/MS07146/017.

⁴⁰ Thrupp, *The Merchant Class*, 223.

⁴¹ 'People who were not cutlers' only includes those whose occupations are specified by the testators. Those whose occupations are not referred to by the testators are excluded because they may have been cutlers.

from the executors' wills.⁴² Two of John Boydon (30)'s overseers are designated as parishioners of the parish of St Magnus the Martyr, where Boydon seems to have been a parishioner as well.

In addition, some testators made bequests to poor people in various institutions. Seven cutlers requested that their money be distributed among the poor in the parishes where they lived, or where they had some connections.⁴³ Not only parishes but also parish guilds were recipients of bequests; seven cutlers made bequests to the parish guilds.⁴⁴ It is hard to generalize with regard to the intended recipients of the bequests. But by examining wills, we can see a few aspects of a wide range of cutlers' relationships with others.

Conclusion

The analysis of cutlers' wills has revealed the wide relationships of cutlers and what each cutler could expect to request from individuals and groups. Cutlers in fifteenth-century London developed relations of trust through their craft. This can be seen from the fact that some of the testators asked their colleagues to deal with craft-related matters. Moreover, friendship among cutlers enabled each cutler to rely on other cutlers with regard to various tasks after their death, such as the disposal of the movables and immovable and the provision of care for loved ones. Another notable finding from this study is that cutlers could expect their Guild to pray for their souls. It could be argued that the religious role of the Cutlers' Guild, which is stated in the ordinances, actually functioned for some of its members.

It is also important, however, that cutlers' lives were not taken up with their craft alone. By examining the wills, it is possible to recognize the cutlers' good relationships with family members, relatives, and fellow parishioners. For some cutlers, parish guilds in their residential areas may have been places to which they were equally or more attached to than the Cutlers' Guild.

Findings from this study certainly illustrate a part of the lives of medieval London craftsmen, yet the cutlers form only a tiny part of the world of London crafts and trades. The analysis of wills of other craftsmen and merchants may provide us with a different picture, as the comparison between cutlers and joiners has shown, or, it may be that we are provided with

⁴² Philip Waltham (9), nominating Hugh Harlewyne (Harlewyne's will: LMA, DL/C/B/004/MS09171/004, fol. 3r.), John Heglyngton (18), nominating John Newenham (Newenham's will: LMA, DL/C/B/004/MS09171/006, fol. 164v.), and William Haydore (44), nominating John Abraham (Abraham's will: LMA, DL/C/B/004/MS09171/006, fol. 338r.).

⁴³ Wills nos. 5, 19b/c, 20, 29, 33, 44, 49.

⁴⁴ Wills nos. 29, 44, 47, 49, 50, 54, 58.

a similar one. In either case, the study of wills will definitely broaden our understanding of 'everyday-medieval-life'.

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*Dutch Commercial Networks in Asia in Transition toward
the Age of the Pax-Britannica, 1740-1830**

In the autumn of the year 1808, a vessel sailing under a Dutch flag called at Nagasaki. At that moment nobody in Japan could have expected that the arrival of this vessel would bring about the serious result of the *seppuku* (*harakiru*) suicide of the Japanese governor of Nagasaki.

On 4th October 1808 (15th August 1808 on the Japanese calendar), a vessel entered the bay of Nagasaki. Two Dutch officials approached it for a regular inspection on a small boat together with Japanese officers from the island of Deshima, where the Dutch trading office was maintained. As the two Dutch officials came to a boat from the vessel, both were seized by armed sailors and taken on board. At the same time, the vessel suddenly raised a British ensign. Everything became clear when one of the captured officials returned to the Dutch office in Deshima bringing a letter from Captain Fleetwood Pellew. The vessel was not a Dutch merchant vessel but a British frigate, the HMS *Phaeton*. The *Phaeton* had been around East Asian waters in order to capture Dutch vessels sailing from Batavia to Nagasaki for trade. Failing to capture any, the *Phaeton* entered the bay of Nagasaki firstly to make sure Dutch vessels in the harbour and secondly to procure foodstuffs and water.

Since the second half of the seventeenth century, Japan adhered to the principle that no political and commercial contacts with the British should be allowed. Should a British vessel enter the bay of Nagasaki, the local authorities were to drive it out as soon as possible. When the British requests were not accepted immediately they run amok around the port of Nagasaki, and the local authorities were unable to take any effective countermeasures, as they were faced with a shortage of troops and equipment. The city of Nagasaki was under the direct control of the Tokugawa shogunate and its governors had been appointed by the *shoguns* as direct vassals since the seventeenth century. In spite being directly under the shogunate, defence arrangements for the area around the bay of Nagasaki were charged to the domains of Saga and Fukuoka, under the general control of the governor of Nagasaki. At the time in question, the domain of Saga was in charge of such arrangements, yet because the Japanese had experienced peace in Nagasaki over a long period of time they did not suppose that full defences were necessary. Lacking sufficient military power, the Japanese authorities had to

* This is a revised article of my previous discussion paper: Ryuto Shimada, 'Dutch Commercial Networks in Asia in Transition, 1740-1830', in *The British Empire and Asia in the Long Eighteenth Century*, ed. Tomotaka Kawamura, Osaka 2010, 29-40 (Global History and Maritime Asia Working Paper Series No. 17, Graduate School of Letters, Osaka University).

accept the British demands in the end. After obtaining a supply of foodstuffs and water, the frigate left Nagasaki on 17th August 1808. Although peace was restored, the Japanese, especially the governor of Nagasaki, thought that this incident had harmed the dignity of the shogunate. Indeed, the Nagasaki authorities did not win any concessions from the British and had to accept all their requests. Hence, the so-called Phaeton incident ended with the suicide of Matsudaira Yasuhide, the governor of Nagasaki.¹

Beyond a direct analysis of this Phaeton incident, what kinds of background events led to the incident of 1808 in Nagasaki? That is a central question of this article. It aims to provide information about historical transition in terms of the business activities in Asia of the Dutch East India Company (*Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*: VOC) before the Phaeton incident. First, the article investigates Dutch trading activity in Asia. By and after this investigation, the article makes clear not only the development of the Asian trade of the VOC but also sheds light on structural changes in the sources of its profits, which were somewhat hard to see, when the Dutch Company was faced with the growth of the commercial activities of the English East India Company (EIC) in Asian waters. Second, the article surveys the structural changes in Dutch business in Asia during the period of political and economic transition around 1800 both in Europe and in Asia.

Throughout the article, the study is chiefly based on the Dutch documentation kept in the National Archives of the Netherlands (*Nationaal Archief*) such as the Archives of the Bookkeeper-General in Batavia, 1700-1801, (*Archief van de Boekhouder-Generaal te Batavia: BGB*) and the Archives of the G. J. C. Schneither, 1788-1835 (*Archief van G. J. C. Schneither: Collectie Schneither*).

The VOC's Asian trading business in the eighteenth century

Recent studies on the Dutch East India Company have revealed the fact that the VOC still had great power even in the mid-eighteenth century.² A unique point of the Dutch Company was its success in being engaged not only in trade between Europe and Asia, but also in intra-Asian trade. Among several trading lines of the VOC, the one between Japan and India was exceptionally significant. The VOC imported Javanese sugar into Japan and in return received huge amounts of Japanese copper, which were carried on Dutch vessels to Dutch trading posts on the Indian subcontinent, such as those in the regions of Coromandel, Bengal and

¹ Hideo Matsutake, 'Féton Gō Jiken to 19 Seiki Shotō no Kaiun Zyōsei [A Study of the 'His Majesty's Ship Phaeton' Incident and the Maritime Situation in the Beginning of the nineteenth Century]', *Tonan Ajia Kenkyu Nenpo*, Nagasaki University 33/34, 1992, 1-52 at 24-39.

² Femme S. Gaastra, *Geschiedenis van de VOC*, Zutphen 2009, 181-2.

Gujarat. In exchange for Japanese copper, the VOC obtained cotton textiles, which were shipped on Dutch vessels to the markets in Europe as well as in Java. This intra-Asian triangular trade between Java, Japan and India was formed in the first half of the eighteenth century, although by then the VOC was already relying on another triangular trade in Asian waters between Siam, Japan and India which had been established in the mid-seventeenth century.³ In both of these trades, Japanese copper played an important role, contributing high Asian profits to the VOC. Copper from Japan was sold by the VOC in several places mainly in South Asia. Their locations are shown in Table 1.⁴ In general, the Japanese copper was sold near the production areas of cotton textiles. Differently from other European companies, the Dutch Company had many trading posts in South Asia. In the case of the Coromandel Coast, this characteristic is obvious. Moreover, the Dutch trading posts under the control of the Dutch authorities in Colombo had two types in terms of location. One type is exemplified by the posts on Ceylon Island, where copper was not sold on a large scale. On the other hand, at the other type of post such as those along the Fishery Coast on the south-eastern tip of the Indian subcontinent, large volumes of Japanese copper were sold annually. These are indicated by asterisks (*) in Table 1. In any case, the VOC had the best network of the trading posts in South Asia, compared to the other European trading company, and this regional network contributed to the well-functioning of the intra-Asian trade and the Euro-Asian trade in the points of the sales of Japanese copper and the purchase of Indian cotton textiles. According to research by the author, profits on the sales of Japanese copper in South Asia accounted for 12.1 per cent of the total gross sales profits of the VOC in all its Asian trading posts in 1701/02, 13.6 per cent in 1741/42 and 10.1 per cent in 1771/72.⁵

³ Ryuto Shimada, *The Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper by the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century*, Leiden 2006, 17-8.

⁴ Table 1 is based on the data collected from the Archives of the BGB, NA.

⁵ Shimada, 2006, 142.


Table 1 South Asian establishments of the VOC ranked by the annual average amounts of Japanese copper sold, 1700/01-01/02, 1740/41-41/42 and 1775/76-76/77
(Dutch pounds)

(1) 1700/01-1701/02						
	1 - 2,000	-5,000	-10,000	-50,000	-100,000	over 100,000
Bengal		Patna				Hooghly
Ceylon	Colombo; Jaffna; Mannar; Bataloa			Tuticorin*; Alwar- tirunagarai*; Manapadu*	Kilakkarai*	
Coromandel		Pulicat	Palakollu	Draksharama; Conjemere; Porto Novo	Nagappattinam; Bimlipatam	Masulipatam; Sadras
Malabar				Quilon	Cochin; Cannanore	
Gujarat						Surat
(2) 1740/41-1741/42						
	1 - 2,000	-5,000	-10,000	-50,000	-100,000	over 100,000
Bengal						Hooghly
Ceylon	Galle; Matara; Mannar; Cape Comorin*; Trincomalee; Bataloa; Kalpitiya		Colombo; Jaffna; Alwar- tirunagarai*; Manapadu*	Tuticorin*; Kilakkarai*		
Coromandel				Kakinada; Porto Novo	Pulicat	Nagappattinam; Masulipatam; Sadras; Bimlipatam
Malabar	Quilon			Cannanore		Cochin
Gujarat						Surat
(3) 1775/76-1776/77						
	1 - 2,000	-5,000	-10,000	-50,000	-100,000	over 100,000
Bengal						Hooghly
Ceylon	Galle; Matara; Mannar; Tuticorin*; Kilakkarai*; Trincomalee; Bataloa; Kalpitiya	Jaffna		Colombo		
Coromandel			Pulicat	Bimlipatam	Sadras	Nagappattinam; Jagannathapuram
Malabar						Cochin
Gujarat						Surat

[Note] The establishments in Ceylon added the asterisks (*) were located on the Fishery Coast in the Indian Subcontinent opposite the island of Ceylon. The data on Coromandel in the period from 1775/76 to 1776/77 was based on records of the book year 1774/75. 1 Dutch pound = ca. 0.494 kg.

[Sources] Ryuto Shimada, *The Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper by the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century*, Leiden 2006, 88-9 (NA: BGB 10751, 10752, 10772, 10773, 10792, 10793).

Figure 1 Copper outflows from Japan (VOC) and Europe (EIC), 1650-1800 (tons)



[Sources] VOC: Ryuto Shimada, *The Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper by the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century*, Leiden 2006, 198-9; EIC: British Library: OIOC IOR L/AG/1/1/16-28.

While the VOC enjoyed profitable conditions in its trading business in Asia, it experienced two significant changes during the eighteenth century. One concerned the inflows of British copper into India and the other the change in the composition of the sources of profits.

Around the 1730s, British copper began to be imported into India, with the background of the growth of the British copper mining industry. This trade in a European product was conducted by the English East India Company (EIC). Figure 1 indicates the outflows of British copper from London into Asia, and the table also shows the annual exports of Japanese copper to Asia by the Dutch East India Company (VOC). Until the 1750s, the export volumes of British copper never exceeded those of Japanese copper carried by the VOC, except for one year in the 1740s. The 1760s was the decade in which the competition between Japanese and British copper became palpable. Copper inflows from Britain then amounted to 600 tons per year. Around 1775, British copper inflows definitely exceeded those of Japanese copper. During the fourth quarter of the eighteenth century, the annual outflow of British copper was around 1,500 tons, and in some years it exceeded 2,000 tons per annum. Thus, in terms of volume the Japanese copper trade conducted by the VOC was less significant than that in British copper by the EIC by the end of the eighteenth century.⁶

⁶ Shimada, 2006, 78.

Table 2 Asian gross profits of the VOC, 1701/02 and 1751/52

	Sales of European products			Sales from Asian products			others	total
	Currency	Commodity	Company's use	Currency	Commodity	Company's use		
1701/02	160,710	135,708	20,407	24,833	2,689,610	18,522	232,325	3,282,114
(%)	4.9	4.1	0.6	0.8	81.9	0.6	7.1	100.0
1751/52	1,184,928	184,351	51,321	91,303	3,505,785	65,528	1,341,709	6,424,926
(%)	18.4	2.9	0.8	1.4	54.6	1.0	20.9	100.0

[Note] Asian heavy and light guilders are adjusted to the accounting procedure in the Dutch Republic.

[Sources] NA: BGB 10752, 10776.

Despite the large inflows of British copper into India, Japanese copper was preferred in the Indian market for minting as regards quality. In fact, the English Company attempted to increase the export trade in British copper by producing imitations of Japanese bar copper in terms of quality and shape, yet due to the additional costs of producing such imitations the business was still unprofitable,⁷ although there is no doubt that the huge copper market in India attracted the interests of copper producers in Britain, while the VOC's high commitment to Japanese copper could have caused it critical difficulties in the event of any British success in reducing production costs.

The second important change in the business of the VOC during the eighteenth century was a compositional change in the source of profits. In the early eighteenth century, each trading post gained large gross profits through sales of trading commodities. Table 2 shows the gross profits of the VOC realised in Asia. In 1701/02, the VOC earned around 3.3 million guilders as gross profits. Of these, the sales profits of Asian products, i.e. profits from the intra-Asian trade, accounted for 81.9 per cent. However, in the mid-eighteenth century, about 20 per cent of the total gross profits were from other business, largely gains from land tenure. Indeed, as shown in Table 3, in the trading posts, where the VOC established colonial rule such as Batavia and Ceylon, gross profits from the category of "others" occupied large shares of the gross profits. In this way, the VOC was making a step from trading company to colonial powers in the course of the eighteenth century.⁸

⁷ Shimada, 2006, 125-7.

⁸ Regarding the detailed analysis of Tables 2 and 3, see Ryuto Shimada, '18seiki Zenhan niokeru Oranda Higashi Indo Gaisha no Ajiakan Bōeki [The Intra-Asian Trade of the Dutch East India Company in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century]', *Seinan Gakuin Daigaku Keizaigaku Ronshū [The Economic Review of Seinan Gakuin University]* 43(1/2), 2008, 37-62 at 54-8.

Table 3 Asian gross profits of the VOC in 1751/02

	Sales of European products			Sales of Asian products			others	total
	Currency	Commodity	Company's use	Currency	Commodity	Company's use		
	(fl.)							
Batavia	1,158,250	13,267	35,899	61,506	880,881	0	421,463	2,571,266
Ceylon	26,678	11,128	1,058	0	203,339	19,498	172,975	434,677
Malabar	0	15,009	978	0	178,073	2,669	47,725	244,453
Bengal	0	20,550	0	0	226,145	0	133,430	380,124
Coromandel	0	5,510	19	29,797	656,271	24	65,280	756,901
Gujarat	0	20,887	1,084	0	450,178	150	159,121	631,419
Mocha	0	23	0	0	40,847	291	9,161	50,321
Persia	0	0	0	0	5,370	0	783	6,153
Basra	0	13,747	0	0	92,653	0	99	106,499
Japan	0	16,161	0	0	71,558	0	114,534	202,253
Siam	0	0	0	0	3,255	0	25	3,280
Malacca	0	1,047	1,877	0	13,169	477	13,655	30,224
Padang	0	3,544	836	0	66,279	4,223	11,091	85,972
Palembang				N.A.				
Banten	0	151	0	0	5,235	0	12,786	18,173
Semarang	0	23,997	2,321	0	25,728	13,509	62,332	127,887
Cirebon	0	1,302	60	0	10,046	113	488	12,008
Jambi	0	814	0	0	2,912	0	36	3,762
Ambon	0	297	1,285	0	36,205	1,845	30,436	70,069
Banda	0	480	2,410	0	9,105	3,843	23,574	39,411
Ternate	0	669	1,326	0	28,516	4,113	17,532	52,156
Timor	0	0	189	0	3,983	0	2,009	6,182
Maccasar	0	732	1,981	0	24,139	14,774	40,336	81,962
Banjarmasin	0	110	0	0	17,161	0	244	17,516
China	0	34,926	0	0	454,737	0	2,593	492,257
total	1,184,928	184,351	51,321	91,303	3,505,785	65,528	1,341,709	6,424,926

[Notes] The data of Mocha is that in 1750/51. Asian heavy guilders are adjusted to the accounting procedure in the Dutch Re
 [Source] NA: BGB 10776.

Visible transition toward colonizer

The Dutch Company was confronted by several serious incidents from the 1780s. First of all, Dutch commercial power was severely damaged by the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War between 1780 and 1784. In this war, the Dutch Company was seriously attacked by the British, and as a result, the VOC lost many merchant vessels and trading posts in South Asia. For example, the VOC lost the trading post in Negappattinam in 1781, and other trading posts in India such as that at Chinsura in Bengal were captured by the British. After the war, these posts were returned to the Dutch Company, but in Negappattinam, the Dutch headquarters on the

Coromandel Coast and the major commercial centre for the Dutch export trade in cotton textiles was ceded to the British according to the final Treaty of Versailles of 1784.⁹

The second stroke also came from Europe. As soon as the French revolutionary armies invaded the Netherlands in January 1795, William V of Orange, who was the Stadtholder of the Dutch Republic, fled to England and the Batavian Republic was established in the Netherlands. At Kew in London, William V signed a document to inform all the employees of the VOC in Asia that all overseas property of the Dutch Company should be placed under British control.¹⁰

Following this instruction of William V, several Dutch trading posts were surrendered. In Malabar, the trading posts of Cochin and Quilon were transferred to the British in 1795. Dutch trading posts under the Dutch authorities at Colombo on the island of Ceylon fell to British hands in 1796. In Bengal the trading post in Chisura was again surrendered to the British.¹¹ Hence, the Dutch Company lost all its trading posts in South Asia by 1796, which meant that it became absolutely impossible for the VOC to conduct the export trade in cotton textiles from India for European and Asian markets.

In the home country, the States-General of the Batavian Republic had ordered the restructure of the governance system of the VOC by abolishing the Gentlemen XVII, the supreme decision-making body of the Dutch Company, and by launching the Committee for the Affairs of the East India Trade and Possessions (*Committee tot de zaken van Oostindische handel en Besittingen*) in 1796.¹² In the Batavian Republic, liberalistic policies were introduced by mainstreamers of the Republic, called Patriots (*Patriotten*), under the strong influence of French revolutionary thinking. For example, Dirk van Hogendorp drew up a liberalistic plan to reform affairs in East Indies to permit free trade, liberty of cultivation and free sales of agricultural products in the Dutch colonial territory.¹³ On the last day of the year 1799, privileges to the VOC were stopped according to the schedule drawn up in 1798 and the Council of Asian Possessions and Establishments (*Raad van Aziatische Bezittingen en Etablissementen*) succeeded to the management of Asian affairs in 1800.¹⁴

⁹ Gaastra, 175; Jos Gommans *et al.* eds. *Dutch Sources on South Asia, c. 1600-1825*, Vol. 1 (New Delhi, 2001, 301, 335.

¹⁰ Shimada, 128.

¹¹ Gommans, 179, 221-3, 301.

¹² Gerardus Cornelius Klerk de Reus, *Geschichtlicher Ueberblick der administrativen, rechtlichen und finanziellen Entwicklung der Niederländisch-Ostindischen Compagnie*, Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen 47(3), 1894, XLVI.

¹³ F.W. Stapel, *Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indië*, Amsterdam 1943, 196-7.

¹⁴ F.S. Gaastra, 'The Organization of the VOC', in *De archieven van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (1602-1795)*, ed. R. Raben and H. Spijkerman, 's-Gravenhage 1992, 11-29 at 28.

After Louis Bonaparte, a younger brother of Napoleon Bonaparte, took the throne of the Kingdom of Holland in 1806, he appointed Herman Willem Daendels to post of governor-general of the Dutch East Indies. As shown in his military and Patriot career, this appointment aimed to defend revolutionary French influenced Java, and especially Batavia against the British in the same way as the homeland, and as British threats against the Dutch increased, the Phaeton incident occurred in Nagasaki in 1808. It is well known that Daendels made efforts to construct roads on the island of Java and to reconstruct the defense system of Batavia.¹⁵ Yet, while France annexed the Kingdom of Holland in 1810, the high government of Batavia surrendered to the British in 1811 and Thomas Stamford Raffles was appointed lieutenant-governor. After a short occupation of Java by the British, thanks to the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814 (the Convention of London), which was realized after Napoleon's defeat and the establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1813, Java was returned to Dutch control in 1816.

Table 4 Ships sent by the High Government of Batavia to Nagasaki, 1795-1817

year	ship's nationality	year	ship's nationality
1795	1 Dutch	1807	1 chartered American, 1 chartered Danish
1796	0	1808	0
1797	1 chartered American	1809	1 Dutch, 1 chartered American
1798	1 chartered American	1810	0
1799	1 chartered American	1811	0
1800	1 chartered American	1812	0
1801	1 chartered American	1813	2 British
1802	1 Dutch, 1 chartered American	1814	1 British
1803	1 chartered American	1815	0
1804	2 chartered Dutch	1816	0
1805	1 chartered Dutch	1817	2 Dutch
1806	1 chartered American, 1 chartered Bremer		

[Source] Madoka Kanai, *Nichiran Kōshōshi no Kenkyū* [*Studies in Dutch-Japanese Historical Relations*], Kyoto 1986, 237.

During the years of political confusion in Batavia as well as in the homeland, the Dutch intra-Asian trade based in Batavia was seriously damaged. The most critical point was that the Dutch Company lost its Indian links. From the seventeenth century the VOC enjoyed the fruitful intra-Asian triangular trade between Japan, India and South-East Asia, as shown before. The South Asian trade of the Dutch Company in particular was so significant in procuring cotton textiles for the European as well as the Southeast Asian market throughout the eighteenth century that the loss of the trading posts in South Asia could only result in cutting off the lifeblood of the VOC as a trading company. In fact, due to the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in

¹⁵ E.S. de Klerck, *History of the Netherlands East Indies*, Vol. 2, Amsterdam 1975, 13-27.

the 1780s, the political changes in Europe and the rise in the British military power in Asian waters after 1795, the Dutch had to give up many of their trading posts in Asia and transfer them to the British authorities. Without question, disappearance of trading posts meant that the Dutch could no longer engage in the intra-Asian trade.

In response to the loss of Dutch merchant vessels and trading posts in South Asia as well as the threat of the British navy, the Dutch high government of Batavia attempted to continue the intra-Asian trade by chartering private ships from neutral countries. Many American private ships in particular were hired for the Dutch trade in Asian waters. Table 4 indicates ships from Batavia calling at Nagasaki for trading business on the financial account of the VOC or of the high government of Batavia. As may be seen, in 1795 one Dutch vessel called at Nagasaki but in the next year no ship visited from Batavia. Between 1797 and 1809, 17 ships called at Nagasaki only two of which belonged to the Dutch high government of Batavia, while the others were chartered private ships, many American. During the period of the British occupation in Batavia, three British ships called at Nagasaki, sent out from Batavia following the new plan of Thomas Stamford Raffles concerning British trade with Japan.

In the second year of the British occupation of Batavia, Raffles decided to undertake a Japan trade, although he had to postpone it because the British authorities failed to collect merchandise suitable for the Japanese market. However, in 1813 the British authorities in Batavia sent out two vessels to Japan. But in Nagasaki Hendrik Doeff, the chief of the Dutch trading post there since 1803, refused the surrender of the post to the British, threatening the commissioner of the British authorities of Batavia with possible attack on the British vessels by the Japanese, because trade with the British was prohibited in Japan at that time. Yet in 1814 the British authorities in Batavia again sent a vessel to Japan, but the project was in vain as in the previous year.¹⁶ Afterwards, the British decided to abandon the Japan trade from Batavia.

The reasons why the British gave up the Japan trade after the two trial projects are concerned not only with the tough refusal by the Dutch representative in Nagasaki, but also with the fact that Japan did not have any other export than copper. It is true that Japanese camphor had also been imported into India, yet without question copper had been the single most important product for the VOC to continue the Japan trade with ease throughout the eighteenth century. Once the VOC could purchase copper from Japan, the Dutch Company was able to gain huge amounts of sales profits in India. On the other hand, Japanese copper was a competitive or harmful product to the British, especially from the point of view of British industrial interests. Britain had had a highly developed copper production industry since the eighteenth century, and the British authorities had to take care of the interests of copper

¹⁶ Hendrik Doeff, *Herinneringen uit Japan*, Haarlem 1833, 189-246.

producers and exporters in Britain. In fact, from the first half of the eighteenth century, the EIC had been engaged in selling huge amounts of British copper on the Indian market. Large inflows of Japanese copper had been a great menace for British copper industry. When the British defeated the Dutch authorities in Asia, they had to take measures to obstruct the inflows of Japanese copper into India.¹⁷

Even after Batavia was returned to Dutch control in 1816, the Japan trade was not as successful as in the eighteenth century. The Dutch high government of Batavia annually resumed sending one or two vessels to Japan. By this annual trading project, the high government still continued to purchase copper from Japan, but it was already difficult to reship it to India from Batavia. Although Japanese copper was sent to India by chartering American vessels for a while, it became absolutely difficult for the Dutch to gain large profits from the sales of Japanese copper in the Indian market due to the final loss of the Dutch trading posts in 1825. In place of the Indian market for copper, Japanese copper was demanded in Java. Japanese copper was used for the production of copper coins under the Dutch colonial authorities in Java to meet the demand for small change.

Apart from trading business in Asian waters, the Dutch turned in another direction, namely colonialism. Certainly, some trading posts in South Asia were returned to the Dutch due to the agreement of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814. For example, the British authorities returned the trading post in Bengal to the Dutch in 1817 and the one on the Fishery Coast in 1818. Nevertheless, there was no great opportunity for the Dutch to conduct trading business by themselves because of the shortage of Dutch merchant vessels. Indeed, in the year 1819, the number of ships calling at Batavia amounted to 171. Among them were 62 British and 50 American ships, yet Dutch ships amounted to no more than 19.¹⁸ Thus, it is not so surprising that the Dutch went to give up their remaining trading posts in South Asia.

Instead, the Dutch set up a series of new managerial measures. While the VOC had generally increased its dependency on colonial rule as a source of profit from the mid-eighteenth century as shown before, it was not until the second half of the 1810s that the Dutch really undertook to establish colonial rule and new trading patterns between the colony and the homeland with accepting the British hegemony as a precondition. In 1816 Godert van der Capellen was appointed governor-general of the Dutch East Indies and he gradually turned down liberalistic policy in terms of international trade and cultivation for export such as sugar and coffee in Java. Dutch shipping activity recovered as seen the case of 1823, when 90

¹⁷ Thomas Stamford Raffles, *Report on Japan to the Secret Committee of the English East India Company*, Kobe 1929, 160-4.

¹⁸ Takashi Shiraishi, *Umi no Teikoku: Ajia o Dō Kangaeruka [Maritime Empire: How to consider Asia]*, Tokyo 2000, 70.

Dutch ships called at Batavia where the British ships amounted to 50 and the American ships 31.¹⁹ The Netherlands Trading Society (*Nederlandsche Handel- maatschappij*) was founded in 1824 to promote trade between the Netherlands and Java, and was later to be engaged in the export trade in cotton textiles from the homeland, and the Bank of Java (*Javasche Bank*) was established in 1828 as a central colonial bank with the privilege of issuing colonial bank notes.²⁰ Moreover, in 1830 J. Graaf van den Bosch was appointed governor-general to push ahead with the so-called cultivation system (*cultuurstelsel*), while Singapore grew as a centre for intra-Asian and global trade.

Conclusion

This article investigated the transition of the Dutch overseas power between 1740 and 1830. By the mid-eighteenth century the VOC enjoyed large profits from its intra-Asian trade. However, the general characteristic changed since the mid-eighteenth century. On the first phase of the transition the change was a sort of invisible one. An example can be observed in the copper trade. The Dutch Company had been engaged in the Japanese copper trade for the Indian market since the seventeenth century and it still pocketed large profits from this trade in the eighteenth century. However, the VOC was confronted with huge inflows of British copper into India brought by the EIC since the mid-eighteenth century. Another example concerns the source of profit. The profit from land tenure became larger already during the first half of the eighteenth century.

The second phase of the transition began with the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War from 1780. Afterwards, the crisis for the Dutch became clear. Through the wars against the British, the Dutch lost the maritime commercial networks in Asian waters: it lost ships and trading posts in South-Asia. Finally, the Dutch found a way to concentrate on the colonization activities in the Indonesian archipelago, particularly in Java, with accepting the British hegemonic presence in Asian waters.

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¹⁹ NA: Collectie Schneither 64.

²⁰ Jan Luiten van Zanden and Arthur van Riel, *The Strictures of Inheritance: The Dutch Economy in the Nineteenth Century*, Princeton 2004, 117-8; De Klerck, 135.

Two Kinds of Collectivism in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Britain: Conservative Collectivism and Socialist Collectivism*

The general impression of nineteenth century Britain is that the country was at the zenith of its prosperity. Britain emerged as a world factory after the Industrial Revolution with the empire expanding continuously.

But as the end of the century approached Britain was riddled with various problems. The social research conducted by Charles Booth about the state of poverty in London in 1889 and the other research conducted by Seebohm Rowntree on York's social state in 1899 showed that almost one third of the urban population was suffering from chronic poverty. The London dock strike of 1889 which was led by unskilled workers revealed that the labour problem had reached a serious stage. Problems on the land were also shown in *Progress and Poverty* by Henry George which criticized the system of land ownership in Britain.

Some people retained the laissez-faire doctrine, arguing for individual responsibility and claiming that all the problems could be resolved naturally. Lord Wemyss who represented the Liberty and Property Defense League insisted on this kind of argument.

But actually various opinions which endorsed intervention were suggested by major political factions.¹ The political parties like the Conservatives, the Liberal-Unionists, the Liberals and the multifarious socialist groups all came up with such ideas. These opinions were sometimes all generalized as socialist ideas. But such a generalization dismisses the differences of the political background of the parties as well as the differences in the theoretical dimensions. Thus it would be more proper to describe these views as collectivism that embraces socialism.

Although collectivistic alternatives were suggested the concrete proposals were all different on the questions such as 'who is to intervene?' and 'how to intervene?' In spite of such differences these alternatives came to be gradually related to the diverse institutions and policies which would be regarded as social welfare. In this article the collectivism based on conservatism and the other collectivism based on socialism are examined in relation to state

* This paper was written on the basis of my articles ('The Collectivism of F. E. Smith', *The Korean Journal of British Studies*, 6, 2006; 'The Consumer Democracy of Fabian Socialism', *The Western History Review*, 39, 1992). Some parts were revised and new contents were added. I thank Professor Minoru Takada for reading and commenting on my paper at the 4th Korean-Japanese Conference of British History.

¹ The idea of state intervention is related to the growth of political democracy in Britain.

intervention and social reform. And the elements of historical continuity in these ideas will also be taken into consideration.

Conservative Collectivism

(1) The Unionism of F. E. Smith

It was F. E. Smith, who led the Unionist Social Reform Committee, which came up with conservative collectivism. His influence was so decisive as to lead to the observation that the Unionist Social Reform Committee was more socialistic than Lloyd George.² F. E. Smith was even suspected to of being a social democrat.³

F. E. Smith' collectivism was rooted in so-called Unionism. He argued that the Conservative Party should adopt Unionism as its ideology just as the Labour Party championed socialism.⁴ He contrasted Unionism with other ideologies. Firstly he refuted individualism.⁵ The logic of individualism was regarded as a queer mixture of Rousseau, Bentham and Darwin. Natural man was perfect. And the established church and central government should be abolished according to such logic. The restriction on free competition should be removed while the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people was encouraged. Governmental support should not be allowed to the losers in free competition.⁶

F. E. Smith dismissed this kind of logic as resting on unreasonable assumptions. Rejecting the concept of natural man he did not regard the existence of human beings as one of fighting each other. He argued that the human being is equipped with the capacity for combination and sacrifice as well as the disposition of self-help. The social instinct of combination and association functioned as a strong force organizing church and state in the historical process of creating tribe, city-state, kingdom and empire.⁷

Secondly, F. E. Smith refuted the logic of laissez-faire which was the economic base of individualism. Although the doctrine of laissez-faire maintained that the unfit would be eliminated through the process of the struggle for survival, he argued, it was vulnerable to contradiction. He questioned the denial of the existence of the unfit. Laissez-faire was just aggravating social problems placing heavy burdens on prisons, hospitals, asylum, police,

² Jane Ridley, 'The Unionist Social Reform Committee, 1911-1914: Wets before the Deluge', *The Historical Journal*, 30:2, 1987.

³ John Campbell, 'F. E. Smith: Tory Democrat or Social Democrat? ', *History Today*, 32, May 1982.

⁴ John Campbell, *F. E. Smith First Earl of Birkenhead*, London 1983, 348.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 357.

⁶ F. E. Smith, *Unionist Policy and Other Essays*, London 1913, 26.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 28.

outdoor relief etc.⁸

F. E. Smith suggested that intervention would be preferable to the heavy costs incurred by these bodies.⁹ Proper and reasonable intervention was desirable even to achieve competitiveness and efficiency. The unfit could be recovered by wise assistance whereas absolute poverty would just destroy all motivations for labour. He argued that enterprise and the individual could recover competitive power provided that they were given a fair start and adequate expectation. Smith juxtaposed *savoir-faire* against *laissez-faire*. He defined the policy of *savoir-faire* as a policy of cultivating civilian creativity and granting a chance to civilians to contributing to national finance.¹⁰

Thirdly, he compared his unionism with socialism and radicalism. He argued that his idea was in opposition to socialism and radicalism rather than synchronizing with them.¹¹ Several reasons were enumerated. Those ideologies demanded the intervention of the nation in every matter and attempted to intervene improperly,¹² intended to break the continuity and security of nation, and pursued a policy of class hostility and confrontation.¹³ The most serious mistake of socialism and radicalism was the class-based intervention of the nation and the attempt to demolish national continuity despite their stress on the role of the nation.

Unionism stood between an individualism that ignored cooperation and sacrifice and a socialism that ignored the desire for competition.¹⁴ Unionism occupied the middle ground, as follows: 1) National union was emphasized. The nation transcended the mere aggregate of conflicting individuals. The nation should be preserved at all costs. Thus dynasty, church and the House of Lords were upheld on the basis of this principle.¹⁵ 2) The logic of national continuity and security permeated social reform. The essence of Unionist reform was not discontinuity but a connection of past, present and future on the basis of existing institutions.¹⁶ 3) The view of human beings was different from those of individualism and socialism. Human beings were not created in a well-suited existence according to prefabricated doctrine but

⁸ Ibid., 35.

⁹ The attitude of the people for state intervention itself is an interesting subject. At first, state intervention was unpopular as it was involved in compulsory education and temperance. Martin Pugh, 'Popular Conservatism in Britain: Continuity and Change, 1880-1987', *Journal of British Studies*, 27, July 1988, 278.

¹⁰ Smith, *Unionist Policy*, 38-39.

¹¹ Campbell, *F. E. Smith First Earl of Birkenhead*, 357.

¹² Smith, *Unionist Policy*, 25.

¹³ Ibid., 12,31,32,242.

¹⁴ Ibid., 30.

¹⁵ Campbell, *F. E. Smith First Earl of Birkenhead*, 352.

¹⁶ Smith, *Unionist Policy*, 40

created as in existence as acting and behaving according to complex motivations such as enterprise, self-interest, patriotism, self-sacrifice, daring and prudence.¹⁷

(2) Collectivistic Policy and the Unionist Social Reform Committee

The collectivism of F. E. Smith opposed the internal policy of laissez-faire and the overseas policy of free trade. The opposition to free trade materialized in the concrete proposal of tariff reform. Tariff reform was advocated as a measure for securing and protecting the British market. Furthermore it was regarded as constituting a part of broad policy that would solidify the empire and promote imperial unity.

Tariff reform would directly benefit labourers. F. E. Smith's logic was this. If imports were restricted by tariff, British manufacturers would be equipped with more security. This would attract capital which would have otherwise been invested overseas. The increase of internal investment would lead to lower prices and more production. Thus Britain could compete in the overseas market in more favorable conditions. As a result the demand for labour would increase and workers would get better wages.¹⁸

Furthermore, tariff reform policy was linked with the management of empire. Tariff reform policy would find a proper balance between securing British interests and a preference policy which would pursue the imperial interest. F. E. Smith insisted that the tariff policy was an imperial policy in a real sense. In addition, tariff reform would be organically connected to national matters by influencing social reform. It would open a new source of revenue for the costs of social reform. Poor law reform, housing reform, and financial assistance to local government could be all implemented as a result of the tariff reform policy.¹⁹

F. E. Smith thought that the principle of laissez-faire should also be revised. This principle was applied to competing individuals while the principle of free trade was applied to competing industries.²⁰ The protection of trade and the protection of society were a complementary expression of the same principle. This kind of concerns was revealed in his attitude towards the labour unrest. His position was that rural and industrial workers should not be exploited. Government should intervene in labour relations recognizing the importance of their labour for the preservation of state.²¹

The necessity of government intervention in strikes was also emphasized. Laissez-

¹⁷ Ibid., 31,44.

¹⁸ Ibid., 203.

¹⁹ Ibid., 17,202.

²⁰ Campbell, *F. E. Smith First Earl of Birkenhead*, 357.

²¹ Smith, *Unionist Policy*, 246.

faire brought on not only low wages but also the trade disputes. As low wages could be adjusted by government intervention, the strike could also be conciliated by government. The method of intervention was compulsory arbitration. F. E. Smith expected that compulsory arbitration would spread from one trade to another after its first success.²²

The proposals of the Unionist Social Reform Committee show a more concrete policy of conservative collectivism towards social problems. The Unionist Social Reform Committee drew up reports on six fields of social policy responding to the labour unrest. They comprised poor law, agriculture, industrial unrest, housing, education and health.²³ The reforms suggested by the Unionist Social Reform Committee show that F. E. Smith demanded social reform beyond tariff reform. His support for the program of old age pensions, health insurance and unemployment insurance proposed by Lloyd George did not come from tactical opportunism.²⁴ The Unionist Social Reform Committee believed that tariff reform would result in a failure if the Unionist Party would not take a positive stance on the matter of social problems.²⁵

Hills' report on the poor law was similar to the famous Minority Report on the problems of poverty. It suggested that the patients would be supported by the public health authority of the county council with the poor law being abolished. The health service based on the present poor law would be replaced by a new public health service system. This meant that patients would get medical services according to their needs.²⁶

Turner's report on agriculture imposed the compensation for the wage increase of agrarian labourers on the landlord as well as on the industrial bourgeoisie. Freedom of contract was reinterpreted in this process. Freedom of contract could be protected in so far as it was desirable from a national viewpoint. The government could intervene in the matter of agricultural wages where the policy of laissez-faire produced harmful results.²⁷ In other words, freedom of contract could be restricted when it caused an undesirable consequence to the state.

The report on the labour problem regarded the interference of government in labour disputes as a responsibility and obligation of the state for the protection of the social interest.²⁸

²² Ibid, 251.

²³ Ridley, 'The Unionist Social Reform Committee, 1911-1914', 395.

²⁴ Campbell, *F. E. Smith First Earl of Birkenhead*, 362.

²⁵ José Harris, 'The Transition to High Politics in English Social Policy, 1880-1914', in *High and Low Politics in Modern Britain*, ed. Micheal Bentley and John Stevenson, Oxford 1983, 65.

²⁶ J. W. Hills and Maurice Woods, *Poor Law Reform, A Practical Programme*, London 1912, 30.

²⁷ *A Unionist agricultural policy* by a group of Unionists, London 1913, 11.

²⁸ J. W. Hills, W. J. Ashley and Maurice Woods, *Industrial Unrest, A Practical Solution*, London 1914, 3.

Two ways of intervention were suggested. One was compulsory arbitration and the other was to increase the present arbitration procedure. It was also suggested that the minimum wage would be set in particular industries by the wage board.²⁹ The general tendency of the report was on the side of labour. Philip Snowden observed that the report did not contain contents which would be opposed by the labour movement or trade unionists.³⁰

But F. E. Smith expressed anxiety about the labour movement as it had a tendency to campaign politically against the state. He was against the syndicalist movement and indicated his opposition thus.

'No nation commits suicide readily, and if Syndicalist attempts at a General Strike were pushed to their logical conclusion, only one of two things could happen: either the strikers would become the masters of the nation, or the nation would assert itself in drastic fashion by organizing itself against the dominance of a particular industrial clique'.³¹

The nation stood above trade unions and the national interests preceded the interests of the trade unions. Trade unionism should be confined in the nation. It was not permitted for Labour to become the most superior body in the nation.³² The argument of F. E. Smith focused on one point when he opposed the principle of free trade and laissez-faire and demanded the intervention of government in poverty, agriculture and labour. That was the maintenance of the nation and the national interest. Social reform led by the nation was an antidote to socialism.³³ His collectivism could be viewed as moving towards communitarianism with the nation at its core.

The Collectivism of Fabian socialism

The collectivism of Fabians proceeded on a more elaborate theoretical foundation. Fabians held the view that various social problems including poverty were grounded in British capitalism. And at the core of the problem existed "rent".³⁴ For Fabians the concept of rent was constituted from the theory of surplus value. It occurred in the normal structure of the capitalist market economy. Fabians posited that rent could not be eliminated from the process of production. So they sought to find a way to redistribute rent justly. This process of

²⁹ Campbell, *F. E. Smith First Earl of Birkenhead*, 364.

³⁰ Ridley, 'The Unionist Social Reform Committee, 1911-1914', p.408.

³¹ Campbell, *F. E. Smith First Earl of Birkenhead*, 364.

³² *Ibid*, 365-7.

³³ E. H. H. Green, 'The Conservative Party, the state and social policy, 1880-1914', in *The Conservatives and British Society, 1880-1990* ed. Martin Francis, Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Cardiff: University of Wales Press 1996, 232, 237.

³⁴ The concept of Rent by Fabians includes not only the rent of land but also the rent of capital and labour.

redistribution demonstrates the unique collectivism of the Fabians. Fabians regarded the nation as a vital agent in the process of the implementation of collectivist social reform. But the difference between conservative collectivism and Fabian collectivism is that the former regarded the nation as an integrating entity transcending individuals while the latter regarded the nation as only a functional body that plays a role in redistributing rent. Thus conservative collectivism laid stress on symbolic institutions like monarchy, church, Parliament and the military whilst Fabian collectivism saw the nation just as an instrumental body for individual welfare.

Fabian collectivism redefined the subjects of redistribution. Fabians came up with the fact that people have three different positions of producer, consumer and citizen in the industrial society. Among these different positions the status of consumer was counted as the most important one. So naturally rent should be redistributed to the people as consumers. Fabians picked out three institutions as agency of redistributing rent to consumers: the co-operative, the municipality and the state were expected to redistribute rent to consumers with fairness and equity.

(1) Co-operation and Collectivism

Co-operation was characterized as a voluntary consumer organization by Fabians and was an industrial organization of a new type based on the production for use not for exchange.³⁵ Beatrice Webb put that 'it was in the constitution and activities of the consumers' co-operative movement, as developed by the British working class, with its production for use, and its elimination of the profit-maker, that I perceived a possible alternative to modern business enterprise.... the essential feature in the co-operative movement was not the advantages that it brought in the way of economical housekeeping and the thrifty accumulation, but the invention of a new type of industrial organization'.³⁶

The co-operative movement emerged in various forms in eighteenth century England and the initial experiment of a co-operative flour mill and bakery dated back to 1767.³⁷ The Webbs indicated that 400 co-operatives had already appeared between 1815 and 1833.³⁸ Then in 1844 the flannel-weavers of Rochdale started the co-operative movement.³⁹ The Rochdale Pioneers unconsciously organized the industry on the side of consumers and

³⁵ Webbs, 'Special Supplement on the Cooperative movement', *New Statesman supplement*, 30 May 1914, 1.

³⁶ B. Webb, *My Apprenticeship*, London 1938, 441.

³⁷ Webbs, 'Special Supplement on the Cooperative Movement', 2.

³⁸ Webbs, 'State and Municipal Enterprises', *New Statesman supplement*, 8 May 1915.

³⁹ Webbs, 'Special Supplement on the Cooperative Movement', 2.

produced the merchandise for use not for exchange. The co-operative movement expanded into wholesale, retail and even manufacturing fields.⁴⁰

The co-operative body was different in its process of making capital and distributing profits from the entrepreneur. It started when several hundreds of consumers combined as members. A shop would be set up by investments from these members and a manager would be employed.⁴¹ After deducting all the costs, the profits would be returned to the consumers in exact proportion to the amount of purchase. This way of dealing with the profits differentiated the co-operative from the joint-stock company. Fabians dubbed it 'dividend on purchase'.⁴²

Beatrice Webb argued that the co-operative movement was a real consumer democracy. It realized the customers' democracy by dividing the profits among the customers. It was an open democracy which would accept newcomers regardless of class and sex.⁴³

The co-operative that the Fabians described as a consumer organization was independent from the state. Whilst most collectivist policies entailed the intervention of state, the activities of the co-operative movement were performed voluntarily although it took a form of collectivism.

(2) The Municipality and Collectivism

Fabians regarded the municipality and the state as compulsory consumer organizations.⁴⁴ The reason for such a generalization was that the citizens of whom these two bodies consisted were utilizing the municipality and the state as consumers. Especially in the field of industry where the consumption is universal, the citizen was identified as almost the same as the consumer. For example in the case of water, gas and postal service citizens were all consumers of these goods and services. So the municipality could become a consumer organization. Fabian collectivism saw the municipality and the state as institutions for supplying commodities by considering these bodies as consumer organization. Their reason for emphasizing nationalization and municipalization lies in this assumption.

Fabians put more emphasis on the role of the municipality than the state. Beatrice Webb argued that the "city council is a better platform from which to bring about collectivism than Parliament."⁴⁵ Bernard Shaw was of the same opinion that the municipality was far more

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Webbs, *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, London 1920, 6.

⁴² Webbs, 'Special Supplement on the Cooperative Movement', 3.

⁴³ B. Webb, *My Apprenticeship*, 430.

⁴⁴ Webbs, *Problems of Modern Industry*, London 1920, 200.

⁴⁵ M. Cole, *The Story of Fabian Socialism*, London 1961, 84.

important than the state by pointing out the superiority of a county council to Parliament.

The municipality encompassed various fields of industry from gas and water to all kinds of recreation like cricket, golf, gymnasia, boating, concerts and even dance parties.⁴⁶ The municipality took responsibility not only in the physical environment but also in the entire cultural realm including music, arts and drama.⁴⁷ In one chapter of *Fabian Essays*, the spheres which would be administered by municipality were enumerated over two pages.⁴⁸ The fields of municipal activities would be extended without limit.⁴⁹ The following quotation phrase shows well how much of a role the municipality would take in a society envisioned by the Fabians.

'The Individualist Town Councilor will walk along the municipal pavement, lit by municipal gas and cleansed by municipal brooms with municipal water, and seeing by the municipal clock in the municipal market, that he is too early meet his children coming from the municipal school hard by the municipal hospital, will use the national telegraph system to tell them not to walk through the municipal park but to come to the municipal tramway, to meet him in the municipal reading room, by the municipal art gallery, museum and library'.⁵⁰

Here municipality meant the lesser administrative units of London as well as the metropolitan city of London itself. S. Webb pointed out: 'London is often supposed to be governed, as far as municipal affairs are concerned, by the County Council. This is a mistake. The greater part of the municipal administration of London is carried on not by the County Council but by the forty-three District Councils known as Vestries or District Boards of Works. Every year the County Council spends nearly two million pounds. But the forty-three Vestries and District Boards spend annually over two and a half million pounds'.⁵¹

These district councils would be responsible for public baths, wash houses, public libraries and streets.⁵² S. Webb suggested that the work relating to streets and parks should be arranged by the district authority rather than the city. On the contrary services such as water supply, tramways and gasworks should be dealt with by the city.⁵³

Fabians held central government to be another consumer organization. They assumed that the function of the contemporary state had changed compared to the old state. The contemporary state was an institution that managed households on the national scale. The state should run services such as the post, railways, telegraphs, telephones, banking,

⁴⁶ Webbs, 'State and Municipal Enterprises', 7.

⁴⁷ Webbs, *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, 238.

⁴⁸ S. Webb, *Fabian Essays*, London 1889, 79-80.

⁴⁹ Webbs, 'State and Municipal Enterprises', 32.

⁵⁰ S. Webb, *Socialism in England*, London 1890, 116-117.

⁵¹ Fabian Tract 60, 3.

⁵² *Ibid*, 9.

⁵³ *Ibid*, 13.

insurance and canals as a consumer organization. In these areas the state functioned as an association of consumers.⁵⁴ The state acted with the purpose of helping the consumers as far as possible and in this respect the state was regarded as a kind of extended co-operative.⁵⁵

The necessity of central government came from the fact that some industries possessed advantages when they were managed nationally.⁵⁶ This was in the case of the post in which the services should be nationally identical, or in the case of the mines in which the resources should be collectivized and distributed nationally, nationalization was more desirable.⁵⁷

Although Fabians recognized the significance of central government, the municipality was regarded as the more important body, because it was the main place where people lead their daily lives. The Webbs explained their reasoning thus:

There are, it is clear, obvious reasons why many industries and services have to be municipalized rather than nationalized. The case for a local administration of industries and services rests primarily on the consciousness among inhabitants of a given area, of neighborhood and of common needs, differing from those of other localities; and on the facility with which neighbors can take counsel together in order to determine for themselves what shall be their mental and physical environment, and how it can be maintained and improved.⁵⁸

Fabians thought that most parts of our lives were carried out in the municipality. Thus the role of municipality should be seen as directly influencing the lives of inhabitants who live in this space.

After all the collectivism of Fabians intended to offer the necessary services of modern life through consumer organizations such as the co-operative, the municipality and the state. Each consumer organization respectively corresponded to the different goods and services of the modern world.

Collectivism and Continuity

Conservative collectivism and socialist collectivism were both alternatives dealing with the social problems of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although they were modern prescriptions for modern problems, historical continuity also existed in their arguments

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Webbs, 'What is Socialism ? VIII', *New Statesman*, 31 May 1913, 236.

⁵⁶ Webbs, *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, 238.

⁵⁷ Webb, *Towards Social Democracy*, London 1915, 37.

⁵⁸ Webbs, *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, 213.

to some degree.

The clue to historical continuity in conservative collectivism could be found in the fact that it was grafted onto attributes of conservatism. Although the status of conservatism as an ideology has often been doubted, it has been argued that conservatism has some meaningful historical characteristics. Traditionalism, disapproval of abstract theory and an organic view of society can be seen as core concepts for conservatism.⁵⁹ Conservative collectivism reveals these attributes.

Conservative collectivism rejected laissez-faire doctrine as it was grounded in an abstract theory such as natural right. Conservatism continued in conservative collectivism as the political theory of Rousseau and Bentham was denied and the idea of adjusting social structure according to abstract political theory was refuted.

A touch of historical continuity could be also found in the understanding of human beings. Conservative collectivism did not share the assumption of liberalism that the human being is rational and calculating, arguing that the human is a complicated being and one that does not allow easy and simple definitions.

Conservative features could be also detected in the emphasis on the state. The state was considered as a transcendental body that stands above the individual and embraces all individuals. The state functioned as a focal point for dissimilar individuals and a foundation for the daily lives of the people. Here the trait of social organicism is distinct.

Traditionalism is immanent in that support for the existing institutions like Monarchy, Church, Parliament and the military was advocated. Existing institutions and practices should be cherished and respected. The emphasis was placed especially on preserving and solidifying the state.

Traditionalism, rejection of abstract theory, social organicism, denial of rational human being all lay at the base of conservative collectivism which supported the historical continuity of the idea despite its interest in modern social reform.

The difficulty of finding historical continuity in socialist collectivism can be easily assumed as socialism is a production of the modern world. But continuity is also alive in this form of collectivism. Fabians traced the collectivism of the municipality back to the early period in English history before the Industrial Revolution. The Webbs discovered the origins of consumer organizations in English local history. The roots of local government dated back to the later seventeenth century.⁶⁰ The Webbs found that the origins of English local government were complicated and vague and intermingled with the past. After the end of Stuart age the

⁵⁹ E. H. H. Green, *The Crisis of Conservatism*, London 1995, 314.

⁶⁰ Webb, *Towards Social Democracy*, 37.

central government withdrew from intervention in local problems.⁶¹

Then the Webbs discovered that the particular functions which local governments took on originated from the voluntary consumers' association which emerged for the purpose of providing new services.⁶² The first case appeared in the form of the voluntary association for the purpose of protecting life and property.⁶³ When the inhabitants of Tower Hamlets were suffering from the thieves and pick-pocketing, they themselves acted as members for the local organization for reform and indicted 2000 criminals.⁶⁴ In 1777 the farmers at Norfolk organized themselves to arrest and indict the horse-thieves.⁶⁵

From mid eighteenth century these voluntary associations began to ask Parliament if they could be transformed into compulsory associations. As a result all inhabitants who resided in the same district came to belong to these associations. In addition to this, new services were necessitated as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution. And consumer organizations developed accordingly⁶⁶ Crime prevention, road maintenance, street cleaning were the most conspicuous ones as the residential areas extended with increasing population.⁶⁷ The Webbs pointed out that: 'We find these voluntary societies, in fact, transforming themselves, by special Acts of Parliament, into the various bodies of road, or harbour, or street, or lighting, or watching, or Town Improvement Commissioners, which levied compulsory rates and acted in the name not of this or that exclusive group, but of all the local residents. It is these bodies of Commissioners, not the ancient municipal corporations, which have been in England the real parents of modern local government'.⁶⁸

The Webbs argued that the new form of local government had been gradually developed by consumer organizations by showing the beginning of the most important functions of local government in the hundreds of documents about repairing, cleaning, lighting, and street-watching.⁶⁹ The recognition that consumers represented the whole residents while the producers comprised just a minority became a distinct argument.⁷⁰ When county councils offered schools and teachers for the needs of community and supplied gas, water, electricity

⁶¹ Webbs, *English Local Government*, vol.i , London 1907, vi.

⁶² B. Webb, *My Apprenticeship*, 442.

⁶³ Webbs, *English Local Government*, vol.iv, 439.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 400.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 441.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Webbs, 'State and Municipal Enterprises', 2.

⁶⁹ Webbs, *English Local Government* ,vol.iii, vi.

⁷⁰ Webbs, *English Local Government* ,vol.iv, 444.

and tramways for the health of population, all these enterprises were implemented not for profits but for the benefits of the residents in which the municipality acted as a consumer organization.⁷¹

Although the municipal collectivism was advocated by the Fabians in the later nineteenth century this alternative was actually rooted in the history of English local administration dating hundreds of years back. So the idea of organizing industry by municipality showed affinity with British radicalism in the nineteenth century. Municipal collectivism had already appeared in some cities like London and Birmingham from radicals such as J. F. B. Firth and Chamberlain.⁷² So when the *London Programme* was announced, *The Speaker* wrote 'S. Webb is writing like radicals... all the reforms that he is advocating are included in the programs of radicals and liberals.'⁷³

Conclusion

Conservative collectivism and socialist collectivism both suggested solutions for social problems posed by the modern age. Both raised objections to laissez-faire and endorsed public intervention in social problems. But conservative collectivism rejected abstract political theory and adhered to traditional institutions such as Church and State whilst socialist collectivism was equipped with a more sophisticated theoretical framework and urged that the existing institutions should be made accountable by democratic procedure. Although both forms of collectivism demanded public intervention in social problems, it must be noted that the background to their ideas was different.

Both alternatives were involved in modern reform and interwoven with the process of social reform leading to the twentieth century welfare state. In spite of this modernity these ideas do show aspects of historical continuity. Conservative collectivism adhered to the basic foundations of conservatism and socialist collectivism grounded the origin of the municipality as consumer organization in the period before industrialization. In this way, various assumptions of collectivist ideas which broke the basic principles of nineteenth century laissez-faire were not all created as new ideologies.

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⁷¹ Webbs, *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, 213

⁷² E. Pease, *The History of Fabian Society*, London 1916, 82.

⁷³ *The Speaker*, 3 Oct. 1891.

NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

Memories and Communications in the Medieval Irish Sea World

Under this title I would like to consider communications and memories of the kings of Man and the Isles, whose kingdom was in the Irish Sea world, and who came to use charters and to have their own historiography in the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries under the English influence. I would also like to compare the case of the Irish Sea world with that in the East China Sea, especially around the kingdom of Ryukyu.

First of all, I would like to make sure on the geographical setting of the 'Man and the Isles'. The Isle of Man situates in the middle of the Irish Sea, in the nearly equal distance from England, Wales, Ireland, and Scotland. On the other hand, 'the Isles' are called the Hebrides today, and situate in the western part of modern Scotland. Next, we turn to the history of these islands.¹ We have more informations from about the ninth century onwards. It was the age of the so-called Vikings, and there appears the title 'toiseach Innsi Gall', that means 'lord of the Isles', in an Irish chronicle called *The Annals of the Four Masters* in 853. Whose bearer, Godfrey, seems to have had lands also in the northern Ireland and Scotland.² Afterwards, a son and a grandson of the Norwegian king Bearn seemed to be the lord of the Isles. Latter was also the king of Dublin.³

In 914, there was a sea battle off the shore of the Isle of Man, and its winner, Ranaid seem to have been the ruler of the Isle of Man. He was the king of the Danes and the

¹ For a general history of the Isle of Man, see A. W. Moore, *A History of the Isle of Man*, 2vols, London 1900, and R. H. Kinvig, *The Isle of Man*, 3rd edn, Liverpool 1975. For a medieval period, or a history of the more limited years in it, there are articles and books of R. A. McDonald: *The Kingdom of the Isles*, East Linton 1997; 'Dealing Death from Man: Manx Sea Power in and around the Irish Sea, 1079-1265', ed. S. Duffy, *The World of the Galloglass*, Dublin 2007, 45-76; *Manx Kingship and its Irish Sea Setting 1187-1229*, Dublin 2007; 'Man, Ireland and England: the English Conquest of Ireland and Dublin-Manx Relations', ed. S. Duffy, *Medieval Dublin* 8, 2008, 131-149. There are also important contributions from S. Duffy, C. Downham and W. D. H. Sellar (see notes below). I have already published two articles concerning the medieval Man and the Isles: 'Chusei Airisshu-kai Fuunroku' [Turbulent period in the Medieval Irish Sea], in *Chusei Yoroppa wo Ikiru* [Living in Medieval Europe], ed. Takashi Jinno and Koichi Horikoshi, Tokyo 2004, 15-32; 'Shima no Sosiabirite' [Sociability in the Isles], in *Sosiabirite no Rekishiteki Shosou* [Aspects of Sociability in History], ed. Hiroshi Sakamoto, Hirokazu Tsurushima and Yoshihiko Ono, Tokyo 2008, 135-148.

² McDonald, *The Kingdom of the Isles*, 30; *Early Sources of Scottish History, A. D. 500 to 1286*, ed. A. O. Anderson, revised impression, Stamford 1990, 267, 284.

³ Ibid. 306n. 1, 308.

Norwegians in Ireland, and became the king of York in 919.⁴ In 974, Maccus or Magnus seemed to be a political leader of the Isles. Depending on the Worcester Chronicle, *The Chronicle of Melrose* describes him as the 'king of very many islands'.⁵ He was succeeded by his brother Godfrey. His title in the Irish chronicles is 'the king of the isles of the foreigners'.⁶ For the Irish people, he was a foreigner. We would like to note that he sent his army to Anglesey, an island in north-western Wales.⁷ He was succeeded by his son Reginald, 'the king of the Isles'.⁸

From these facts, we can see that the kingdom of the Man and the Isles already had cohesion to some extent in these years. And it had political connections with Ireland, Britain, and Scandinavia. Until the later eleventh century, the history of the Isles becomes somewhat obscure. It seems that the power of the earls of Orkney extended southwards, at least to the Hebrides.⁹ But the Isle of Man probably was under the kings of Dublin. Recent studies by Professor Seán Duffy and Dr Clare Downham try to reconstruct the more detailed genealogy, and seem to succeed in doing so.¹⁰ Here I will not repeat them, but the supposed connection between Olaf Cuarán, famous king of Dublin in the tenth century, and Godfrey Crovan seems to be sure.

From 1079, we have a rather different, more detailed picture of this area. It is largely due to the fact that we have a historical narrative called *Chronicles of the Kings of Man and the Isles*.¹¹ It was written in the middle of the thirteenth century, and concerns mainly the deeds of the kings after 1079. In this year Godfrey Crovan came to the Isle of Man and became its king. Afterwards he also subjected Dublin and much of Leinster in eastern Ireland. He was dead in the Isle of Islay in 1095.¹² Another chronicle tells of him as the king of Dublin and the isles of the foreigners, and it seems certain that he was a ruler of the maritime kingdom including Man,

⁴ *The Annals of Ulster (to A. D. 1131)*, ed. S. Mac Airt and G. Mac Niocaill, Dublin 1983, 362-3; F. M. Stenton, *Anglo-Saxon England*, 3rd edn, Oxford 1971, 333; Moore, *A History of the Isle of Man*, I, 90.

⁵ *Early Sources of Scottish History*, 478-9.

⁶ Seán Duffy, 'The Royal Dynasties of Dublin and the Isles in the Eleventh Century', ed. Duffy, *Medieval Dublin* 7, 2006, 51-65 at 54.

⁷ *Brut y Tywysogyon: Peniarth MS. 20 Version*, ed. T. Jones, Cardiff 1952, 8-9; *Brut y Tywysogyon: Red Book of Hergist Version*, ed. T. Jones, 2nd edn, Cardiff 1973, 14-7.

⁸ *The Annals of Ulster*, 434-5.

⁹ Moore, *A History of the Isle of Man*, I, 95; G. Broderick, 'Irish and Welsh Strands in the Genealogy of Godred Crovan', *Journal of the Manx Museum* 8, 1980, 32-38 at 33.

¹⁰ Seán Duffy, 'The Royal Dynasties'; C. Downham, *Viking Kings of Britain and Ireland: The Dynasty of Ivarr to A. D. 1014*, Edinburgh 2007.

¹¹ *Chronicles of the Kings of Man and the Isles*, ed. and tr. G. Broderick, Douglas 1995.

¹² *Chronicles*, fols 32v.-33v.

the Hebrides and a part of Ireland.¹³ On the other hand, his original power base before 1079, the direct reason why he came to Man, and the ruling system in his kingdom—all remain obscure.

In 1098, King Magnus Barefoot of Norway came through the Orkneys and the Hebrides, to the Isle of Man, and became its ruler. Afterwards he also made successful expedition to Wales, Ireland and Galloway, which was not yet ruled by the Scottish crown.¹⁴ This episode of King Magnus reminds us again of the strong Scandinavian connections that might be established with the Irish Sea world. In the negotiations with the Scottish crown, King Magnus seems to have established his lordship over the kingdom of Man and the Isles.¹⁵

Ten years after King Magnus died, Olaf I, the youngest son of Godfrey Crovan, became the king of Man and the Isles. Before returning to this island in 1103, he was a member of the court of Henry I, king of the English. He established friendly and peaceful connections with the neighbouring rulers.¹⁶ He founded Rushen abbey in the Isle of Man, and later, the above mentioned *Chronicles of the Kings of Man and the Isles* was written there.¹⁷ We see religious influence from England in this foundation.

Peaceful Olaf was ironically slaughtered by his nephews who came from Dublin. And returning from Norway, Godfrey son of Olaf became king and killed them in turn.¹⁸ We can see again Manx connections with Dublin and Scandinavia. On the reason why Godfrey went to Norway, Ian Beuermann made a hypothesis.¹⁹ According to him, Godfrey went to Norway because he attended the meeting which put the bishopric of Sodor, that is, the bishopric of Man and the Isles, under the archbishop of Nideros in Norway, in order not to be affected politically from Dublin which recently had established its own archbishopric. Certainly the connection with Dublin might become dangerous for Manx kingship as the above mentioned bloody episode on the uncle and his nephews suggests, but the religious ties with Nideros was not so strong at least in these early days, for the bishops of Sodor sought consecrations from the archbishop of York in the latter half of the twelfth century.²⁰

¹³ *The Annals of Inisfallen*, ed. and tr. S. Mac Airt, Dublin 1988, 250-1.

¹⁴ *Chronicles*, fols 33v.-35r.

¹⁵ W. D. H. Sellar, 'Hebridean Sea Kings: The Successors of Somerled, 1164-1316', in *Alba*, ed. E. J. Cowan and A. McDonald, Edinburgh 2000, 187-218 at 191.

¹⁶ *Chronicles*, fol. 35v.

¹⁷ Kinvig, *The Isle of Man*, 62.

¹⁸ *Chronicles*, fols 36r-v.

¹⁹ I. Beuermann, *Man amongst Kings and Bishops: What was the Real Reason for Godred Olafsson's Journey to Norway in 1152/53?*, Oslo 2002.

²⁰ Beuermann, 243-4.

The reign of Godfrey was in one sense the turning point in the history of Man and the Isles, for he fought with his stepbrother, Somerled of Argyll, and lost the half of the Hebrides for ever. And in this rivalry with Somerled, Godfrey had to ask for help and protection from both the English and the Norwegian kings.²¹

The last episode concerning Godfrey. He was married to a kinswoman of an Irish king by the papal legate from Rome.²² We can see this area was more and more deeply in the influence of the Roman Catholic Church. Godfrey's son Ranald succeeded his father. Ranald had John de Courcy as his half brother, who had once been a powerful ruler in Ireland but afterwards lost his power there. King Ranald supported John de Courcy but in vain.²³ Later this Ranald became a vassal of King John, doing homage and having a land in Ireland from him.²⁴ On the other hand, the king of Norway also seemed to have forced Ranald to do homage.²⁵ The overlordship over the king(s) of Man and the Isles thus became accurately and ritually expressed. It is interesting that we know these facts on the subjugations from English administrative records and there is no indication of them in *Chronicles of the Kings of Man and the Isles*.

Ranald was a illegitimate son of his parents, and this may be one of the reasons why he did homage to these powerful kings, in the face of his brother Olaf, a legitimate successor of King Godfrey. Ranald died in the struggle with his brother Olaf, who became a king in turn.²⁶ King Henry III of England made Olaf defend the coasts of Ireland and England for corn, wine and forty marks.²⁷ Next king was Harold son of Olaf. But refusing the overlordship of Haakon, the king of Norway, he was deposed. After the reconciliation with the Norwegian king, he again ascended to the throne and was married to a princess of Haakon. But soon he was dead in 1248.²⁸

In 1252 Magnus son of Olaf became king. With Haakon he fought Alexander III, king of the Scots, who tried to expand his power westward. Haakon defeated and dead, Magnus

²¹ Kinvig, *The Isle of Man*, 62-3.

²² *Chronicles*, fols 39v.-40r.

²³ *Ibid.* fol. 41r.

²⁴ *Monumenta de Insula Manniae*, ed. and tr. J. R. Oliver, II, Douglas 1861, 35- 6.

²⁵ Kinvig, *The Isle of Man*, 64.

²⁶ *Chronicles*, fols. 44v-46v.

²⁷ *Monumenta*, 72-3.

²⁸ Kinvig, *The Isle of Man*, 65.

reconciled with Alexander, doing homage and accepting to rule the Isle of Man only. He died without a legitimate heir in 1265, and Man and the Isles came to be ruled by Alexander.²⁹

Thus we can trace the history of the kingdom of Man and the Isles, which had strong connections with neighbouring regions, especially with Dublin, and later with England, Norway, and Scotland. Its rulers were themselves kings, but at the same time were in the stronger influences and overlords of the English, the Norwegian and the Scottish kings, doing homages and being knighted by them.

In the Eastern Asia, we can see some resemblances with the kingdom of Man and the Isles in the case of the Ryukyu kingdom, that extended nearly equal to Okinawa Prefecture of Japan today.³⁰

Around the eleventh and the twelfth centuries, there appeared fortifications or castles called Gusuku, and after the three-cornered contest in the fourteenth century, there appeared the kingdom under the unified rule in the fifteenth century, of the first and the second Sho dynasties. This state-formation process had deep connections with the tributary trades begun in the fourteenth century with Ming dynasty in China. The kings in Ryukyu sent tributes to China and showed loyalties to the emperors, while the emperors acknowledged them as kings and rewarded abundantly. On the other hand, under the Edo shogunate the army of the feudal lord Shimazu attacked Ryukyu early in the seventeenth century, capturing the king and his ministers. From that time onwards Ryukyu was also under the Japanese rule, and this regime of Ryukyu having two overlords in China and Japan lasted until it was completely absorbed into modern Japan in the nineteenth century.

The kingdom of Ryukyu prospered from the trades with surrounding regions. The reasons why China and Japan tried to put Ryukyu under their rule were that they sought the profits, both in terms of the goods and the informations, for there were not always stable diplomatic and commercial connections between China and Japan. On the other hand, these two countries influenced Ryukyu not only politically as indicated above, but also culturally. For example, from the thirteenth century, many Japanese Buddhist monks went to Ryukyu, and the

²⁹ Ibid. 66.

³⁰ The following paragraphs are based upon Kurayoshi Takara, *Ryukyu Oukoku* [*Ryukyu Kingdom*], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 1993; *Ryukyu- Okinawa-shi no Sekai* [*The Historical World of Ryukyu-Okinawa*], ed. Kazuyuki Tomiyama, Tokyo: Yoshikawakoubunkan 2003; Mamoru Akamine, *Ryukyu Oukoku* [*Ryukyu Kingdom*], Tokyo: Koudansha 2004; *Ryukyu- Okinawa to Kaijo no Michi* [*Ryukyu- Okinawa and Routes on the Sea*], ed. Kazuyuki Tomiyama and Kurayoshi Takara, Tokyo: Yoshikawakoubunkan 2005;

Shinto shrines also were begun to be built there.³¹ And in the sixteenth century, after the establishment of the powerful dynasty of Ching in China, its influences on Ryukyu became stronger.³² Ryukyu's state rituals were changed in the Chinese styles, and its main palace, the Shuri-jo castle was built in the Chinese fashion. But the Japanese authorities also ordered that the ambassadors from Ryukyu should wear the Chinese clothes in Japan, to show that the state having the exotic Chinese culture was also under the Shogunate of Japan, and to stress its strength.³³

This brief look at Ryukyu leads us to the comparisons with the kingdom of Man and Isles. First we see communications, especially those with commerce. Geographical position in the East China Sea gave Ryukyu its importance as a centre of international trades, and in turn its political (semi-)independence.³⁴ The Isle of Man also situated at the centre of the Irish Sea, and there remain some evidences to show its commercial importance. They are hoards of coins from the eleventh century, and include many coins from the surrounding regions. Also coins were minted in the Isle of Man itself sometime from about 1025 to 1065, under the influence of Dublin.³⁵ But the kings of the Crovan dynasty seem not to have minted coins themselves, and there are no coin hoards from their reigns. So there remain some obscure relationships between economic prosperities and political stabilities. And in England, the ability to mint coins was one of the prerogatives of the crown. There may be some hints concerning the difference between the English kingship and the Manx here.

Next we turn to the political communications of the kingdoms. In the case of the kingdom of Man and the Isles, those with England and Norway were more and more well-defined, using the rituals of homages and knightings, and also through written words in the writs and letters. Interestingly, the Manx kings themselves issued writ-charters, from King Olaf I of the twelfth century.³⁶ He must have learnt the use of the writ-charters in the court of Henry I of England. Along with his foundation of Rushen abbey under the order of Savigny and then of the Cistercians, and his giving of the right to elect the bishop of Sodor (Man and the Isles) to Furness abbey in England, he put his kingdom to have strong political and religious

³¹ Mamoru Akamine, *Ryukyu Oukoku*, 61.

³² Ibid. 114-27.

³³ Ibid. 115-6.

³⁴ For example, Ibid. 50-82 for the situations in the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries. Fusaaki Maehira, 'Ryukyu Boueki no Kouzou to Ryutsuu Nettowaku' [Structure of Trade in Ryukyu and Distribution Network] in *Ryukyu- Okinawa-shi no Sekai*, ed. Kazuyuki Tomiyama, 116-66, deals the topics from the seventeenth- to the nineteenth-century.

³⁵ D. M. Wilson, *The Vikings in the Isle of Man*, Aarhus 2007, 105-16; Alison Fox and Kristin Bornholdt Collins, 'A Viking-Age Silver Hoard from Glenfaba, Isle of Man', *Viking Heritage Magazine*, 1/2004, 3-5.

³⁶ *Monumenta de Insula Manniae*, 1-3.

communications with England.³⁷ But concerning other political communications, especially within the Manx kingdom, we know almost nothing in the written form. Ryukyu kingdom, on the other hand, issued 'Jireisho', that is formal letters of appointments to offices, and we can reconstruct the official system and the local governance of the kingdom from them.³⁸ The forms and languages are also interesting, for before the seventeenth century these letters of appointments were written using Japanese letters and the Chinese dating system. Afterwards, they began to be written wholly in Chinese letters.³⁹ We can see strong 'Chinalization', mentioned above, in this topic too.

Lastly, we see the topic of commemoration. In the middle of the seventeenth century, *Chuzanseikann* 中山世鑑, the official historiography of the Ryukyu dynasty, was composed in Japanese. Within a hundred years, it was translated and revised in Chinese. There appeared many other books on history, diplomacy, old songs and topography in these years. After the turbulent years of the early seventeenth century, Ryukyu kingdom tried to look back its past to establish its own identity.⁴⁰ On the other hand, we have seen that the kingdom of Man and the Isles also had a semi-official historiography called *Chronicles of the Kings of Man and the Isles*. It was written at Rushen Abbey, founded by the Manx crown in the twelfth century under the English influence. The chronicle seems to have been composed in the thirteenth century, on the occasion of founding the church there, commissioned by King Magnus.⁴¹ In the same century, Manx kings were in the increasing pressures from both the kings of England and Norway. Also there was a period of instabilities arising from the struggle for the crown. After that, king Magnus was acknowledged and welcomed both by the English and the Norwegian kings and succeeded in establishing the peaceful times. We may be able to think that he intended to justify his lineage and regime by making the historiography of his dynasty. Interestingly, the homage of king Magnus or his predecessors to the English or the Norwegian crowns was not clearly written in *Chronicles of the kings of Man and the Isles*. Concerning such omission in the historiographies, on the Ryukyu case we must add that the historiographies written in Ryukyu kingdom lack informations on the Amami islands, which situate between Kyushu and Okinawa islands, and had been in the Ryukyu kingdom until the seventeenth century but incorporated afterwards into Japan. This fact may have some influence on the geographical framework when we think about Ryukyu before the seventeenth

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Kurayoshi Takara, *Ryukyu Oukoku*, 114-73.

³⁹ Ibid. 128-30, 172-3.

⁴⁰ Masayuki Dana, 'Ziritsu eno Mosaku' [Groping the way toward the Independence], in *Ryukyu- Okinawa-shi no Sekai*, 184-190.

⁴¹ *Chronicles*, i.

century.⁴² And Ryukyu historiographies are said to mention rarely to Shimazu. It was too sensitive a topic to allude to.⁴³ Now going back to the Isle of Man, and about sixty years before the Manx historiography, the then king Ranald was praised by a poem composed in Gaelic.⁴⁴ We suppose that Gaelic culture was still influential in his court. *Chronicles of the Kings of Man and the Isles* was composed in Latin, the universal language of the intellectuals in the Middle Ages. Why does this chronicle tell mainly the deeds of Godred Crovan and his descendants? I think the royal line descends from Crovan to Magnus resembles like those of many other European royal lines at that time, succeeded mainly from fathers to elder sons and omitting the bastards as far as possible. It is rather contrasting to the royal lines before Crovan, rather complicated and reminding us of the Gaelic tanistry system.⁴⁵ So King Magnus seemed to insist that his kingship was legitimate and met the European standard at that time. Recently Professor Andrew McDonald stresses that *Chronicle* spends many folios to the struggle between Ranald and Olaf in the early thirteenth century. Until the middle of the same century, the descendants of Ranald and Olaf struggled to obtain the crown. So the supremacy of Olaf's line over Ranald's might be more urgent theme to be stressed.⁴⁶

I think it is interesting that both kingdoms continued to exist in the midst of the superpowers, being deeply influenced politically and culturally from them, but trying to have or shape their own independences and identities. The kingdom of Man and the Isles disappeared after it lost legitimate successor to the throne, but it might be worthwhile to think that the kingdom could have continued to exist. On the one hand, in the course of the Middle Ages many small kingdoms in Ireland and Wales were disappearing. Also Man and the Isles lacked its own archbishops. On the other hand, at least the Isle of Man is not in the United Kingdom now, and as the Crown Dependency retains powers to govern itself to some extent. For further consideration I have to trace the history of the Irish sea of the later Middle Ages and afterwards, but it is another topic to be dealt with.

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⁴² *Ryukyu- Okinawa to Kaijo no Michi*, 243.

⁴³ Masayuki Dana, 'Ziritsu eno Mosaku', 186.

⁴⁴ B. Ó Cuív, 'A Poem in Praise of Ragnall, King of Man', *Eigse* 8, 1957, 283-301.

⁴⁵ See the table on page 53 in Duffy, 'The Royal Dynasties'.

⁴⁶ McDonald, *Manx Kingship and its Irish Sea Setting 1187-1229*, 98-100.

PERSPECTIVES

A Mapping of the Ideological British Historiography in Korea: A Story

Forging the Liberal Nation: The Birth of Liberal Orthodox

The first generation of Korean British historians were of the same faith that Britain was the best model for Korean people to follow both politically and socio-economically. Their Britain was 'the immortal commonwealth' which accomplished through her history the most stable representative democracy and the well-developed capitalism with social welfare system.¹ They not only influenced strongly Korean historians in general but also had an intellectual authority as opinion leaders among the enlightened citizenry during the period of democratization and industrialization (c. a. 1960's to 1970's). Those were the days for Korean British historians.

Although they depicted (England)/Britain as they thought of respectively according to their subjects, their 'forging the nation' was grounded upon the same belief in modernization. A Tudor political historian estimated England as the first modern state which overcame the private system of government and established the principle of rule by statute by introducing G. R. Elton's thesis of 'Tudor revolution in administration'.² For an socio-economic historian, R. H. Tawney's thesis of the rising gentry was much more meaningful because it was able to provide Korean historians searching desperately for the germs of self-modernization and capitalism in Korean history with a useful frame of interpretation.³ Influenced by this, a famous Korean agricultural historian proudly proclaimed that he at last *discovered* Korean rising gentry in seventeenth century Chosun dynasty to name it 'rich farmers of managerial type' or just 'large-scale farmers'.⁴

Simultaneously Stuart historians did agree with Christopher Hill that the great upheaval was not a rebellion but a revolution that changed English society into a new kind one to necessarily come. However, they did reject Hill's Marxist interpretation. They read the

¹ Young Suk Lee, "Yungkuksa Yunku Banseki" ("Research Trends of British History for the Last 50 Years in Korea") *Suyangsalon (Western History Review)*, vol. 95 (Dec.2007), pp. 339-345.

² Jongil Na, *Yungkuk Keundaesa Yunku (Studies of Modern English History)* (Seoul, 1979), pp. 3-33.

³ Hyunmo Ghil, "Jentri Nonjaing kwa irobotuh Jekidoen Jemunje" ("The Debate of Gentry and It's Problems") *Yuksahakbo (Korean Historical Review)*, vol.10 (1958)

⁴ Yongsup Kim, *Josun Hooki Nongeopsa Yunkoo (A Study of Agricultural History of the Latter Period of Chosun Dynasty)* (Seoul, 1970)

revolution only in bourgeois version which firmly asserted that capitalist liberal democracy was the end of history and the revolution was necessary to overthrow both feudal privilege system and one man rule. In this context Levelers were discussed and narrated as extraordinary heroes of liberty and equality.⁵ This reflected Korean situation at that time when April Revolution in 1960 which had expelled Seungman Rhee did not bear fruit and Junghee Park's severe military rule since 1961 coup forced Korean people to be obedient in the name of patriotic modernization.

One of the founding fathers of British historiography in Korea, originally Stuart and socio-economic historian Hyunmo Ghil, eventually appeared on the stage of resistance as an influential disputant arguing that industrialization without democratization was not genuine modernization achieved by Western countries such as Britain. Here it is important to remember that he himself, as his colleagues, was not a radical or left-wing intellectual but just a liberal who believed firmly in capitalist liberal democracy. In his paper about the debate of population problem and living standards during the Industrial Revolution, the premise was his sympathy with F. Hayek who criticized vehemently the anti-capitalist inclination of Western intellectuals.⁶ In this background Ghil's generation despised 68 and Tokyo University affair as an indiscreet riot and advised their students to struggle with discipline only to achieve an ordered liberal democracy. They affirmed that those European and Japanese students were just aberrant 'reds' with whom Korean students should never align themselves. This reflected their mental trauma experienced during the Korean War which they believed the satanic ambition of North Korean communists had incurred.

Thus it was very ironical that Ghil translated pro-soviet historian E. H. Carr's *What is History?* into Korean which came to be the first best seller in the sector of Western history books.⁷ While this book made a position as a must book for students, Crane Brinton's *A History of Civilization* warning students of Carr's pro-soviet interpretation was the standard text book with which Ghil taught my generation. I am sure Ghil (mis)took Carr's conception of

⁵ Sukhong Min, "Sipchilseki Yungkukhykmyungui Haesuke kwnhan Myutkagi Munjae" (Some Problems of the Interpretations of Seventeenth-Century English Revolution), *Asea Hakbo (Journal of Asian Studies)*, vol.1 (1965); *idem.*, "Chungkyodohyukmyungki Supyungpae itsusuui Jayoowa Pyungdeungui Kaenyum" (Leveller's Conception of Liberty and Equality in the Era of Puritan Revolution") *Choimoonwhan Baksa Choonyum Nonmoonjip (A Memorial Essays to Dr. Choi Moon Whan)* (Seoul, 1975); Jongil Na, "John Lilburnekwa Oliver Cromwell" ("John Lilburne and Oliver Cromwell") *Yuksahakbo (Korean Historical Review)* vol, 74 (1977)

⁶ Hyunmo Ghil, "Saengwhalsoojonnonjaengui Uuiwa Moonjaejum" ("The Significance and Problems of the Debate of Living Standard") *Chouisulbaksa Whanryukkinyum Nonchong (A 60th Anniversary Commemorative Essays to Dr. Cho Ui Sul)* (Seoul, 1967); "Sanuphyukmyungsidaewi Inkoomoonjae" ("The Problem of Population in the Era of Industrial Revolution") *Sogangdaeinmoonkwahakyunkunonjip (Sogang University Humanistic Studies)*, vol.1 (1968)

⁷ Hyunmo Ghil, *Yuksaran Mooutinka? (What is History?)* (Seoul, 1966)

progress for what was like Fukuyama's thesis of end of history. Anyway the book came to be a certain marker by which Korean C. I. A and police distinguished the anti-government students. Of course my generation was almost all the anti-government.

Liberalism Moralized: The Case for Gladstone

This liberal orthodox was to be looked away by the later generation of Korean British historians in 1980's when Thatcherite liberalism exposed a cruel face and E. P. Thompson appeared as a torchbearer of 'moral' history. The 'great' things belonging to Britain shaded away except for some good old songs of Beatles among Korean people as well. Especially for the newly emerging combatant labor movement sector and anti-American left-wing students and intellectuals Tory's Britain was no longer attractive as Reagan's country was. In this situation it was inevitable that British history became unpopular among history students and intellectuals as well. At the same time French history came rapidly to substitute for the position British history had held.

However, a different kind of liberal interpretation survived. Kisoong Kim, a political historian of Victorian Britain, was eager to make a hero of Gladstone who he believed deserved to be a clear mirror in which Korean politicians had to reflect themselves. Let me speak of him, because E. H. Carr indoctrinated me that we had to know of historians themselves before reading their works. Kim, as his colleagues of the second generation Korean British historians, started his study with anger and despair with Korean situation in early 1980's when the military junta of Park's successors committed a crime of massacre in Kwangju, his native home town, and captured the whole country. But he did not align himself with the newly emerging movement of left wings. He was by nature a liberal who did not give his heart to any communitarian or collectivist social imaginations. His first paper was about J. S. Mill's mild program of reform. All he expected was probably that a great politician of good calibre might emancipate country. When he got down to his job of writing papers on Gladstone in the last decade of last century, a critic once remarked somewhat sarcastically that what Kim was really talking about was the very politician Daejoong Kim, a democratic opposition leader at that time.

Let me talk about Kim's Gladstone.⁸ It is very simple. Gladstone was a heroic statesman. Gladstone was not an opportunist politician of high politics who pursued power after power by using the party organization and compromising with rivals strategically. He was

⁸ Kisoong Kim, *Sinnyumkwa Bijunui Jungchika Geuledstun (A Statesman of Faith and Vision, Gladstone)* (Seoul, 2007)

a champion of people who appealed only to people's moral power without which he believed firmly his political ideals and visions were not to be realized. Here Kim's originality appeared. He suggested an extraordinary concept of 'rational charisma' to understand Gladstone's peculiar charismatic leadership. According to him, Gladstone's charisma was formed during the Midlothian campaign in 1880 not by people's irrational and blind trust of him but through the rational communication between him and people. It was possible because he was capable to argue logically with strong grounds for his policy and there were fully politicized rational electors who had ears to listen to him. And the electors were working class whom Gladstone thought of as the valuable members of citizenry. His charismatic leadership was that of *Tribunus* who could restore the community of equal citizens damaged by Tory's pro-landlord policy.

Therefore Kim rejected the blasphemy that Gladstone was responsible for the demise of Liberal Party because he adhered to the ideal policy such as Irish home rule without sober attempts to reform the socio-economic situations. At that time, he asserted, for working class (political) community was prior to (socio-economic) class. It was only the first World War that killed Liberal Party. Gladstone's policy for Irish home rule was another example of his moral politics.⁹ His 'fatal courage' against public petitions of anti-Home Rule Bill was based on his conviction that his home rule policy could assimilate Irish politics to liberal parliamentary democracy and reestablish British identity as multi-national state morally superior to the oppressive Empire ruled by one nation. Kim concluded that Gladstone's struggle had 'true and profound' meanings the petitioners could not see. He also despised the intellectuals who strongly opposed Gladstone's home rule policy as myopic and shortsighted ones who could not be free from the prejudice of the Establishment to betray the good cause. He used to advise younger generation not to be such intellectuals without insight. Although Kim published two books of Gladstone's political leadership and Irish home rule policy respectively, he is now busy writing a biography, which someone call an *Acta Sanctorum*, of Gladstone.

Here it is important to note that Kim's liberalism is deeply different from that of the first generation. As mentioned above, while the first generation did believe in bourgeois liberalism, Kim preferred liberalism in more broad sense without class interest which deserves not to be called a reactionary one. For him liberalism means the universal moral code according to which free and equal individuals should live their own lives as Gladstone did. Kim emphasized that Gladstone asked us to be independent individuals with respectability who are able to consider at once economic interests and moral goods. Thus Kim affirms that Gladstone's definite distrust of paternal reform was not an expression of class-biased false consciousness.

⁹ Kisoan Kim, *Geuledstunkwa Aillend (Gladstone and Ireland)* (Chuncheon, 2009)

He was sure that Gladstonean and his liberalism was not a bourgeois ideology.

The discrepancy of Kim's liberalism appeared clearer when he agreed on Quentin Skinner's neo-Roman or republican conception of liberty as absence of arbitrary domination in reviewing Korean version of *Liberty before Liberalism* translated by me.¹⁰ It means he does not agree on arch-neoliberal Berlinean and Hayekian conception of liberty as an absence of actual interferences by others, which the first generation bore in their minds as only true liberty. A mere absence of interference is not sufficient for individuals to be free. Individuals are free only when they are valued as equal members of citizenry as Gladstone did believe. However, he does disagree on the dichotomy of liberalism versus republicanism. Gladstonean liberalism shows that they are two faces of the same token, on which Eugenio Biagini recently discoursed positively.¹¹ Liberalism alone is good enough for Kim. But my thesis is that republicanism has some communitarian elements antagonistic with individual liberalism.

Liberalism Collectivized: The Case for 'Liberal Socialisms'

At the nearly same time when Kim made a hero of that noble Gladstone, a historian appeared for whom Gladstonean liberalism was not good enough at all. Myunghwan Kim, a political historian of Edwardian Britain, asserted that such a liberalism based on lofty moral individualism was just an ideology of immoral ruling class imputing the social problems such as general poverty for which they had to answer to the responsibility of poor individuals of lower class. Therefore he argued that in Britain democracy had never been pursued truly until collectivism such as Fabian socialism and Guild socialism appeared to solve the social problems in other way than individual liberalism did. In this context he tolerated even conservative collectivist reform programs such as that of the Unionist Social Reform Committee initiated by F. E. Smith and Oswald Mosley's fascism with qualifications.¹² The so called British liberal representative democracy was only a myth to be deconstructed.

This reflected the changing situation in the end of last century when the fanatic illusion of incessant high speed economic growth shattered to result in the disastrous IMF's control of Korean economy and for the first time Korean light wing ruling party lost power for the middle-

¹⁰ Kisoan Kim, "Supyung, kwentin Skinuui Jayoojui ijunui Jayoo Choseungrae Omkim" ('Review of Ouentin Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism* (1998) tr. by Seungrae Cho (2007)), *Kaenyumkwa Sotong (Concept and Communication)*, no.4 (2009)

¹¹ Eugenio F. Biagini, "Neo-Roman Liberalism: "Republican" Values and British Liberalism, ca 1860-1975", *History of European Ideas*, vol.29, no.1 (2003), pp.55-72.

¹² Myunghwan Kim, *Youngkukui Wikiwa Jwaupai Daeandeul, Sahwajuui, Bosujuui, pasizm 1880-1930 Nyundae (The Crisis of Britain and Left/Right Alternatives, Socialism, Conservatism, Fascism, 1880's-1930's)* (Seoul,2008)

left wing opposition party to come into office only to pursue neo-liberal policy unavoidably. In this situation progressive intellectuals like Kim searched for some alternatives which they estimated could cure the pathological crisis of Korean capitalism. Kim made eagerly his job of reviving the good old cause of Fabian socialism and Guild socialism, through which he ardently insisted that democratic control of capitalism was vital for individuals to really be free.

Here we have to note that Kim was of extraordinary opinion that liberalism and collectivism was not antagonistic each other in that both of them were principally for individual's freedom. He argued that collective intervention of state for majority did not defame the spirit of liberalism to secure individual's freedom. The laissez-faire liberalism should be rejected because of its class-biased illusion. He asked us to liberate liberalism from the monopolistic use of it by the monopolistic capitalists and their allies exclusively. (There are some progressive Korean intellectuals adhering to the term of liberalism which they lament was robbed by reactionaries such as neo-liberals.) In my opinion in this point liberalism might mean what was like New Liberalism, but I am not sure because Kim did not remark about it at all. Anyway for Kim that noble British socialisms were 'liberal socialisms' for democratic reform of society.

Although Kim used to compare two 'liberal socialism', his preference was on Guild socialism.¹³ He deserves to be the first researcher of Guild socialism in Korea. He asserted that Guild socialism could see what Fabian socialism failed to notice. The problem of democratization of economy could not be solved only by shouting that the present economic power was arbitrary one and it should be controlled by democratic political power. Guild socialism was exactly right to attend to the fact that economic power was making not in civil society but in industrial sector of which members were not political citizens but producers. Therefore to democratize this sector it was necessary that economic power should be made by producers. Political power originated from the different space could not democratize the industrial sector. It was participation and consent of producers to the decision making process in industrial sector that could do it. Thus we could be free only when we are autonomous being in both sector of politics and economy.

Kim was right to see that it was the then combatant laborer's syndicalism that stimulated Guild socialists to search for the workshop democracy ordinary Fabian socialists could not imagine. However, he distanced himself from the ultra radical combatant movement of British laborers in the era of 'labor unrest'. He posed a critical stance against syndicalism because it overweighted laborer's position exclusively without considering consumer's one. He

¹³ Myungwhan Kim, *Yungkukui Wiki sokesu Naon Minjujuui, Gild Sahwajjuui: Nosamin Hapuiui Minjujuui 1900-1920 Nyundae (Democracy Originated from the Crisis of Britain, Guild Socialism: Democracy of Consensus between Laborers, Employers and Citizens 1900's-1920's)*

estimated that Guild socialism was worth being reminded because it aimed at neutralizing this unbalance for consumers who was as important elements of society as laborers.

It means that he did regard Guild socialism as more of a program for cooperation than an ideology for struggle which he believed was necessary for community to survive in crisis. It is needless to say that he affirmed that cooperation was possible only through mutual understanding and accommodating interests democratically between producers and consumers, employers and laborers, and among citizens. This reflected his deep concern about the critical situation of Korea when social dissension grew sharper and sharper. His firm conviction that socialism without democracy and liberal values such as soviet socialism could never emancipate us made his voice for the British 'liberal socialisms' louder and louder.

Beyond Liberalism: The Case for Republicanism

Let me start my own humble story. I am an intellectual historian of long eighteenth-century Britain with strong ideological inclination as two Kims above mentioned. I was sure that studying history was an act of faith for progress. My generation's hard experience of the arbitrary rule of the right wing military regime required most of us at first to be at least critical intellectuals with drastic social consciousness before being technical historians. As social conflicts which resulted from economic unbalance grew deeper and deeper, I, let alone my colleagues here, was always depressed by the voice from inside asking myself where I was and what I was doing at that time when poor laborers were imprisoned, tortured and even killed.

In this background I have made up my mind to be a Marxist and tried eagerly to search for a John the Baptist of Marx. I was very much delighted to find out ultra radical agrarian land reformers such as Thomas Spence and Charles Hall through reading that inspirational saint E. P. Thompson. (How lucky I was to meet professor Harry T. Dickinson in 1987 who kindly gave me his edition of Thomas Spence's writings!) Simultaneously I was reading an Arendtian republican historian J. G. A Pocock, who gave me invaluable knowledge that before Marx there did 'the universe of discourse' exist in which the emerging capitalist liberalism was defined and criticized as inhuman mode of thought destroying the community of equals. And this reading made me imagine that it was possible to interpret the precursors not yet discussed by Pocock and his allies as republicans of this kind. I was very proud of my job of baptizing them as virtuous republicans who had tried to establish *res publica* of equal citizens institutionalized to prevent unbalance of property owning.¹⁴ As real socialism in Eastern Europe collapsed, civic republicanism was automatically to be more attractive to me.

¹⁴ Seungrae Cho, *Kukkawa Jayoo (State and Liberty)* (Cheongju, 1998)

However, I failed to persuade my liberal teachers and their loyal disciples only to be ostracized as a smattering outsider who was doubtful enough to be suspected to be a totalitarian. Of course this could never discourage me. I entered into the job of hunting the monster of neo-liberalism by criticizing both Isaiah Berlin's theory of negative liberty and F. A. Hayek's theory of spontaneous order which I ascertained backed up the market logic of limitless free competition incurring the devilish polarization. I, as a trained technical historian, evidenced my thesis by quoting really glittering eighteenth-century British authors such as Richard Price and Adam Ferguson who desperately appealed and designed to restore republican values such as civic virtue in danger of perishing by overwhelming wave of commercialization. Especially for the case of criticizing Berlin, I owed it very much to Quentin Skinner that I was able to be sure that I was not a lonely hunter.¹⁵

Briefing shortly, while Berlin, as Hobbes and Bentham before him, asserted that liberty meant just the absence of actual interference of others, Richard Price questioned whether a subject was free only because his benevolent despot did not interfere him at all. Berlin replied yes by insisting that liberty could be enjoyed regardless of the personal status and the constitutional character of state. He affirmed that even under the despotic rule people could be free in so far as the despot had no mind of interfering or hindering them not to live their own lives. However, as Skinner argued rightly, republicans from Roman republic to early modern Britain have been insisting that a slave who was not interfered by his master was still a slave because he had always to censor himself to invoke his master's good will which could be precarious. People could be free only when they got the status of equal citizen without discretionary power above them. Thus people could be free only in a free and popular state, namely in republic in its genuine meaning, where any arbitrary power could not exist even potentially. So to be free people should not forget their civic duty to be vigilant always against their potential superiors. Richard Price suggested to institutionalize this by enacting agrarian law and organizing citizen militia.

But liberals and neo-liberals such as Berlin, Hayek and my teachers suspect that such laws and institutions only interfere and hinder individuals not to plan their own lives. Once Skinner criticized John Rawls by insisting that civic duty to keep vigilant to any power which was capable to dominate us anytime they like to should precede individual right to hide in private shelter to pursue private interest. As Pocock affirmed earlier, we are free only when we are ardent participants to civic and public sphere to realize common good at first. This mode of thought, I am sure, has nothing to do with totalitarianism. Rather it is liberal hegemony which does not hesitate to keep taming us to be obedient subjects that deserves to be called

¹⁵ Seungrae Cho, *Konghwakukeul Wihayu (For Res Publica)* (Seoul, 2010)

totalitarian. I have heard recently that *Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung* interviewed Skinner to ask a scornful question if he thought we were slaves according to his logic to be answered yes. Are a retired republican regius professor who rejected to receive the title of sir waiting for a Spartacus ? This is the same kind of question that I am asked from time to time. Questioners scorn me that I am waiting for just a Godot.

Coda

Youngsuk Lee, the leading scholar of my generation, once advised me that this sort of ideologically oriented story seemed to be the story we had better not tell anymore because it had only few audience. I wish I were the last teller. What I hope is only that this story should not be forgotten. What makes me pleasant is that among younger generation of Korean British historians are competent treasure hunters who are able to tell more interesting stories such as those of pseudo-science, physiognomy, leisure, hobbies, gender, sexuality, masculinity, religion, education, commerce, Britishness, empire etc. without losing social consciousness.¹⁶ They are now enlarging the horizon of British historiography. This is progress which I think we have to ride on.

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¹⁶ Heasim Sul, *Oncheonui Moonhwasa (English Spas: A Cultural History)* (Seoul, 2001); *idem.*, *Jaekukjuuiwa Namsungung, Sipkuseki Yungkukui Jendu Hyungung (Imperialism and Masculinity, Gender Formation in Nineteenth Century Britain)* (Seoul, 2004); *idem.*, *Jido Mandeuneun Saram, Keundae Cho Yungkukui Kukto, Yuksa, Jungchesung (The Mapmakers: Territory, History, and Identity in Early Modern England)* (Seoul, 2008); Sungjoon Kim, *Sanuphyukmyungkwa Haeunsanup (The Industrial Revolution and Shipping Industry)* (Seoul, 2006); Sungsook Lee, *Yusung, seksualiti, Kukka (Women, Sexuality, State)* (Seoul, 2009)

Two Island Empires Compared: Britain and Japan

In 2010, 100 years after the Japanese annexation of Korea, NHK (Nippon Hoso Kyokai, the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation) broadcast a TV series about the history of Japanese-Korean relations. In this series the instalment that dealt with the March First Movement of 1919 included an episode, in which a British Foreign Office memorandum criticized Japanese policy of "Japanising Korea completely", contrasting it with British colonial policy in India and Egypt, where Britain was "trying to administer the country in the interest of the natives with a view to educating them up to take up a large share in the Government."¹

The following instalment covered the 1930s and the war period, during which time Japan pursued a policy of forcible assimilation and Japanisation (*kominka seisaku*). As in the previous instalment, comments by British diplomats on Japan's policy in Korea were to be presented, but those comments had to be dropped because of the time constraint. The comments included one by Sir Robert Craigie, the British Ambassador to Japan, about a detailed report on Japanese activities in Korea. He wrote: "[This] report gives a very vivid picture of the brutal exploitation of Korea which the Japanese have carried out for their own benefit and in complete disregard of the national feeling and culture of the subject people. For this reason ... I suggest that the material in the report would be suitable for publicity in India, Burma and any other British territories where Japanese propaganda is directed to proving that Japanese exploitation is preferable to British rule." An official of the Far Eastern Department added in his minute: "Our colonial, particularly Indian record may not be perfect, but our policy has striven to be enlightened and beside the J[a]p[ane]se record it is as white as snow."²

These two examples show that British policy-makers tended to think that British colonial rule was much better than that of Japan. One can naturally ask whether this judgment was historically accurate, or, more fundamentally, whether there was such a thing as "good" or

¹ NHK special programme: Japan and the Korean Peninsula, No.2, The March First Independence Movement and "Pro-Japanese Koreans", 16 May 2010. This memorandum by the Far Eastern Department was quoted in Dae-yeol Ku, *Korea under Colonialism: The March First Movement and Anglo-Japanese Relations*, Seoul 1985, 151. See also Motohiro Kajii, "*Shokuminchi*" *shihai no shiteki kenkyu: Senkanki Nihon ni kansuru Eikoku ryoji hokoku kara no kensho* [A Historical Study of "Colonial" Rule: Examinations Based on British Consular Reports about Inter-war Japan], Kyoto 2006, 39.

² R.L. Craigie to R.H. Scott, 21 May 1941, and minute by T.E. Bromley, 18 July 1941, FO371/27992, The National Archives (Kew).

"better" colonial rule in world history. This paper is an attempt to answer this question by examining several points which are significant for the historical evaluation of Britain and Japan as colonial powers. In doing so the emphasis will be put on Japanese colonial rule of Korea.

The Meaning of Difference in Time Scale, Spatial Expanse and Structure

Needless to say, the British Empire lasted much longer than the Japanese Empire. This difference in time scale meant that, when Japan started to build up its colonial empire, Britain already possessed a vast and far-flung empire. It was natural that the British Empire served as an important frame of reference, often as a model, for Japanese empire-builders. For example in 1905, the crucial year when Korea was turned into a Japanese protectorate, a book titled *Hogokoku keiei no mohan Ejiputo* (Egypt as a Model of Protectorate Rule) was published by Fusazo Kato, a political journalist.³ A little later, in 1908, Lord Cromer's book, *Modern Egypt*, which was based on Cromer's experience as Consul-General in Egypt, was published and was translated into Japanese in 1911, immediately after Japan's formal annexation of Korea. In the introduction to this translation, Shigenobu Okuma, a veteran statesman, applauded Cromer's administration in Egypt as very instructive for Japan's rule of Korea.⁴

As for the spatial expanse of the empire, while the British Empire was worldwide, the Japanese Empire was concentrated in east Asia and the west Pacific in a concentric form. As long as this concentric Japanese Empire did not infringe on British territories or spheres of interests, Britain adopted a magnanimous attitude towards Japanese expansion, as was shown when Britain adopted a kind of policy of appeasement towards Japan after the Manchurian Incident in the 1930s.

There were also structural differences between the two empires. The British Empire was racially diverse and the colonies of white settlement occupied important positions, but the Japanese Empire did not have similar colonies. As the result of the racial diversity in widely-spread colonial territories, the British Empire displayed a distinctly hierarchical structure, and this hierarchy reflected racial distinction. It was thought that "native" peoples under British domination were racially inferior, hence the right of the British to rule them and the duty of the British to raise them to a higher stage of civilization. For example Alfred Milner, who played a key role in British imperialism in the late 19th century and the early 20th century, maintained: "The white man must rule, because he is elevated by many, many steps above the black man;

³ Fusazo Kato, *Hogokoku keiei no mohan Ejiputo* [Egypt as a Model of Protectorate Rule], Tokyo 1905.

⁴ Earl Cromer, *Saikin Ejiputo* [Modern Egypt], Tokyo 1911, 12-13.

steps which it will take the latter centuries to climb, and which it is quite possible that the vast bulk of the black population may never climb at all.”⁵

In contrast to the British Empire, the Japanese Empire was, if only on the surface, less hierarchical. The spatially confined structure meant that the peoples under its colonial rule were racially similar to the Japanese and what amounted to racial feeling was often hidden under the assertion of the sameness of racial roots. But under the cloak of the assumption that the peoples in colonies were of the same stock as the Japanese, Japanese colonial rulers and Japanese public at large embraced a sense of racial superiority towards the colonized peoples. Inevitably such an attitude became very hypocritical. To take an example, Kazushige Ugaki, who was War Minister in the 1920s, told the emperor in 1931, before taking up the post of Governor-General in Korea, that as War Minister he had always advised his officers and soldiers to the following effect: “though it is of course necessary to have a sense of superiority towards Koreans, that feeling should be hidden in your mind, and it should be used as a motive when you lead and instruct them, who are backward in every respect.”⁶

One area in the Japanese Empire where a kind of hierarchical structure was evident was the mandated islands in the South Pacific. Here one could see a clear racial hierarchy, in which the Japanese occupied the top position, followed by the Okinawans, and then by the Koreans and the Taiwanese. In this hierarchy native islanders were placed at the bottom.⁷

Ireland and Okinawa

This position of the Okinawans leads us to a problem that I think important in considering the structure of the two empires, i.e. the similarity of two particular areas: Ireland and Okinawa. What should be noted about these two areas is that they displayed the character of both being ruled and ruling in the imperial structure. The colonial character of Ireland did not diminish after the Union in 1801 and nationalist movements against British rule never lost momentum. But at the same time the Irish people formed a significant part of the ruling strata in the hierarchical order of British imperial domination. Okinawa also retained a kind of colonial character and the Okinawans were discriminated against by the people of the mainland, but just like the Irish the Okinawans formed a part of the ruling strata in Japanese colonies, especially in the mandated islands, to which many Okinawans emigrated.

⁵ Cecil Headlam, ed., *The Milner Papers. South Africa, 1899-1905*, vol. 2, London 1933, 467.

⁶ Setsuko Miyata, *Chosen minshu to kominka seisaku [The Korean People and Japanization Policies]*, Tokyo 1985, 170.

⁷ Lin Poyer et al., *The Typhoon of War : Micronesian Experiences of the Pacific War*, Honolulu 2001.

This analogy between Ireland and Okinawa is significant, for during the period of Japanese colonial rule over Korea Ireland was from time to time compared to Korea. The most representative case can be found in the writings of Tadao Yanaihara. He analysed extensively Japanese colonial rule in Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria, and, with this in mind, studied British colonial policies in India and Ireland, both of which "belonged to the same category of the colonial problem".⁸ For him the practical interest of the Irish problem lay in the fact that Japan was facing similar problems in its colonial territories, especially Korea. Though such a comparison between Ireland and Korea certainly had contemporary validity, for the purpose of historical analysis of empire and imperialism, the comparison between Ireland and Okinawa is more instructive.

Aspects of Colonial Rule

Next two aspects of the colonial rule in the two empires should be discussed: colonial people's political participation and their education.

As was mentioned above, British colonial rule was based on the assumption that the ruling British people and the peoples under British domination were different racially and that there existed a wide gap in their respective levels of civilization. Under this assumption it was envisaged that the political participation of colonial peoples would develop through several stages, the final step of which was the establishment of independence from the imperial government.⁹ Of course, actual political developments in the colonies did not follow such a smooth path. For example, even after the Second World War, when the movement towards decolonization began to gain momentum, a plan to extend local people's political participation in Hong Kong was not realized, and Hong Kong remained decidedly unrepresentative until the last years of British administration.¹⁰ However, the notable fact in comparison with the Japanese Empire was that a system existed by which colonial peoples could have some perspective on future political development.

In the case of the Japanese Empire, for ruling which the rhetoric of racial affinity was widely used, such an idea as gradual extension of the scope of political participation did not exist. In Japanese colonies, while the Taiwanese concentrated on the creation of a colonial

⁸ Tadao Yanaihara, "Airurando mondai no enkaku" [*History of the Irish Problem*], (1937) , in *Yanaihara Tadao Zenshu* [*Collected Works of Tadao Yanaihara*], vol. 3, Tokyo 1963, 461.

⁹ Martin Wight, *British Colonial Constitutions 1947*, Oxford 1952, 17-39.

¹⁰ Wm. Roger Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism. The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization*, London and New York 2006, 356.

parliament in Taiwan, the Koreans demanded participation in the Japanese parliament as well as an increase of their political power in Korea itself. But the Japanese colonial authorities did nothing to respond to these demands. It is true that after the First World War, "councils" at various local levels were set up both in Korea and Taiwan, but these were only consultative bodies with a very limited elective element. It was as late as April 1945 that the Koreans were given the right to send their MPs to the Japanese parliament. Behind this decision lay the critical situation of the war, in which the Japanese government wanted to apply conscription to Koreans, and for which this concession was nothing but a compensation. This reminds us of the fact that the granting of the franchise to the Okinawans was promised in 1899, one year after the imposition of conscription on them in 1898. The Okinawans exercised their voting rights in 1912 for the first time, but with the defeat of Japan immediately after the above concession the Koreans could not exercise their voting rights.

As for education, as is well known, in 1835 Thomas Macaulay asserted that Western ideas, taught through the English language, would develop "a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, opinion, in morals and intellect." Here stress was laid on the education of Indian elites, who were to promote the British imperial cause. Though this policy was partly successful, it also resulted in creating the basis of educated Indian nationalists who challenged British domination. With the knowledge about this Lord Cromer observed about the situation of education in Egypt: "The process of manufacturing demagogues has not only already begun, but may be said to be well advanced."¹¹ It was only after Cromer's retirement from Egypt that a university was opened there, but its budget was so restricted that it could not make any real mark on Egyptian education until after the First World War.

In Korea Seoul Imperial University was set up in 1926. Though Koreans were admitted, it was mainly for Japanese students, and the Japanese colonial authorities did not permit the establishment of other universities or colleges. Regardless of whether or not the lesson of British rule in India and elsewhere had been learned, education which might produce a politically conscious elite who could challenge colonial rule was thus avoided.

In primary education, the situation in the two empires differed especially at the final phase of the colonial rule. In the British colonies, in spite of demands from colonial peoples, the development of primary education was very slow. In India at the time of independence only thirty-five per cent of the children of school age were going to school.¹² This pointed to the

¹¹ The Earl of Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, vol. 2, London 1908, p.534.

¹² Anathnath Basu, *Education in Modern India. A Brief Review*, New Delhi 1992. (reprint ed.), 63, 92-103; Judith M. Brown, "India", in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 5, *The Twentieth Century*, ed. Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis, Oxford 1999, 428.

hollow nature of the assertion of educating colonial peoples so that they could reach the stage of self-government. On the other hand in Korea in 1943 sixty-two per cent of male children and twenty-nine per cent of female children of school age were enrolled in public primary schools.¹³ On the surface Japanese colonial education policy seems to have been more progressive than that of the British Empire, but here again it should be pointed out that the acceleration of public primary education occurred only after the 1930s under the necessity of consolidating colonial rule to further the Japanese invasion of China and the advance southwards.

Colonial Modernization and Colonial Modernity

The problem of education brings us to the next theme: colonial modernization and colonial modernity.

Strictly speaking there is a distinction between the concept of colonial modernization and that of colonial modernity. The former discusses how modernization in various aspects of colonial societies, especially industrialization and capitalist development, occurred under colonial rule with the assumption that modernization after a European/western model is inherently a positive outcome, and the agents for such changes are mainly sought among the colonial powers. The latter deals with similar phenomena in colonial societies, but things that are regarded as modern are not viewed in completely positive light --- negative characteristics such as oppressiveness or discrimination are often stressed ---, and the agents for those changes are sought among colonial subjects. The advocates of the theory of colonial modernity tend to emphasize the difference between these two for understandable reasons, but it should be pointed out that both theories share the same emphasis on the changes that are labelled as modern in colonial societies, whether the modernity in question is regarded as modernity after the western model or not and on the element of continuity from the colonial period to the period after independence. In the following part these two concept are used without strict distinction. Examples are taken from arguments about India on the one hand and Korea on the other.

In the dedication of his autobiography titled "The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian", a well-known Indian intellectual Nirad Chaudhuri wrote in 1951, only four years after the independence of India, as follows:

¹³ Noriko Furukawa, "Shokuminchi kindai shakai ni okeru shotokyoiku kozo" [The Structure of Primary Education in Colonial Modern Society], in *Teikoku to gakko [Empires and Schools]*, ed. Takeshi Komagome and Shinya Hashimoto, Kyoto 2007, 155.

TO THE MEMORY OF THE
BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA
WHICH CONFERRED SUBJECTHOOD UPON US
BUT WITHHELD CITIZENSHIP;
TO WHICH YET
EVERY ONE OF US THREW OUT THE CHALLENGE
"CIVIS BRITANNICUS CUM"
BECAUSE ALL THAT WAS GOOD AND LIVING
WITHIN US WAS MADE, SHAPED, AND QUICKENED
BY THE SAME BRITISH RULE¹⁴

This dedication, which invited strong criticism from many Indians, was not an all-out praise of British colonial rule of India, but it was completely unthinkable that in Korea at such an early stage of independence a leading Korean intellectual would write such a phrase in a book that was to be read widely.

Though positive views about Britain's contribution to India's economic development during the colonial period did not spread widely, they surfaced from time to time. In the case of Korea it took much longer for similar arguments about positive effect of colonial rule to emerge, but they did emerge against the background of Korea's rapid economic growth.

For example, a Japanese economic historian, Mitsuhiko Kimura argued that Japan developed and modernized the Korean economy substantially by preparing social and economic infrastructure during the early period of colonization, developing agricultural production in the 1920s and then industrial production after the 1930s.¹⁵ Though Kimura did not forget to point out that the Japanese colonial authority paid hardly any attention to the improvement of Korean living standards, his argument clearly stressed the modernizing aspect of Japanese colonial rule in Korea.

Some Korean historians share these views. According to Ahn Byongjick, throughout the 20th century, including the colonial period, Korea experienced 100 years of high economic growth. This was assisted by the Japanese colonial authorities that made the development of Korean capitalists possible by promoting the building of social infrastructure, political and social reform and the introduction of Japanese capital.¹⁶ Such an argument can be said to correspond to Tirthanker Roy's assertion for the case of India that in India "major forms of transformation --- class structure, commercialization, creation of a modern bureaucratic state,

¹⁴ Nirad C. Chaudhuri, *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian*, London 1951, v.

¹⁵ Toshio Watanabe, ed., *Gaisetsu kankoku keizai [Korean Economy: An Overview]*, Tokyo 1990, Ch.2 (Kimura is the author of this chapter).

¹⁶ Ahn Byongjick, "Kyacchi-appu katei to shite no Kankoku keizai seicho shi" [The History of Modern Korean Economic Growth as a Process of Catching-Up], *Rekishigaku Kenkyu*, 802, 2005.

access to new technology, and even ideas of nationalism, equality, and freedom --- had roots in the colonial encounter."¹⁷

In recent years arguments about colonial modernity in Korea's colonial period have been spreading more widely. Historians adopting this perspective have been analysing changes in colonial cities, schools, hospitals, and so on. One of the leading Japanese protagonists of the theory of colonial modernity, Masahito Namiki, even evaluates highly the decision to grant limited franchise to Koreans at the last phase of the Second World War, arguing that by being given the voting rights the Koreans could finally enter into the "public sphere" of the empire. According to him, that was the moment when Koreans' entitlement as the members of imperial Japan was approved.¹⁸

These arguments of colonial modernization and modernity are severely criticized. In the case of India, it has been pointed out that, if there was some economic and social developments during the colonial period, it "occurred not as a result of colonialism but in spite of or in opposition to it."¹⁹ And in a different vein Maria Misra maintained that, because the imperial state lacked legitimacy, it tended to drape itself in the authority of the collaborator groups and that sort of strategy might well produce traditionalization instead of modernization.²⁰

As for Korea, in his criticism of colonial modernization theory, the economic historian Huh Sooyoul emphasized that neither agricultural nor industrial development during the colonial period brought benefit to the Koreans and what occurred was nothing but "development without development".²¹ A vehement criticism of colonial modernity arguments concerning Korea was delivered by Cho Kyeungdal, who asserted that the said modernity was confined to the upper strata of colonial society and did not reach the common people. The

¹⁷ Tirthankar Roy, *The Economic History of India 1857-1947*, New Delhi 2006 (second ed.), 5.

¹⁸ Masahito Namiki, "'Shokuminchi kokyosei' to Chosen shakai" ["Colonial Publicness and Korean Society], in *"Bunmei", "Kaika", "Heiwa": Nihon to Kankoku* ["Civilization", "Progress", "Peace": Japan and Korea], ed. Park Choon-Seok and Hiroshi Watanabe, Tokyo 2006, 229.

¹⁹ Aditya Mukherjee, *The Return of the Colonial in Indian Economic History: The Last Phase of Colonialism in India* (Presidential Address, Indian History Congress), New Delhi 2007, 31.

²⁰ Maria Misra, "Lessons of Empire: Britain and India", *SAIS Review*, 23-2, 2003, 150.

²¹ Huh Sooyoul, *Shokuminchi Chosen no kaihatu to minshu* [*Development of Colonial Korea and the Korean People*], Tokyo 2008 (Translation from Korean).

"colonial publicness" stressed by Namiki and others did not extend further than a narrow sphere, the extent of which was set down by the colonial authorities.²²

Such debates about the meaning of modernization and modernity in colonial territories both in the British Empire and the Japanese Empire have not reached any definite conclusion and will continue. But, in talking about colonial modernization and modernity stress should always be put on "colonial" and not on "modernization and modernity". It is true that "we must view colonial hegemony as a historical process continuously negotiated, contested, defended, renewed, re-created, and alerted, by challenges from within and without."²³ But the nature of the space or zone in which those activities took place was determined by the ruling power.

Colonial Violence as a Crucial Factor

The most serious problem of the discussion about colonial modernization and modernity is the tendency to obscure a factor which is crucial in understanding the nature of colonial rule, i.e. colonial violence.

Imperial and colonial rule both in the British and Japanese Empires was based on a hierarchical and discriminatory structure, whether explicit, as in the case of the British Empire, or not so explicit, as in the case of the Japanese Empire. The factor of violence permeated into daily practices in colonial life, and erupted from time to time especially when colonial authorities confronted strong nationalist movements. In April 1919, when the March First Movement had not yet come to an end in Korea, the Amritsar massacre occurred in India, in which nearly 400 Indians were killed. In Egypt March and April of 1919 saw widespread anti-British revolts. In spite of this the Foreign Office memorandum mentioned at the beginning of this paper criticized Japanese policy in Korea in comparison with British policy in India and Egypt. It is interesting to note that the first issue of *Chosa shiryō* (Research Material) edited by the Governor-General's Office of Korea in the early 1920s was a booklet on the Egyptian revolt of 1919.²⁴

These considerations lead us to the answer to the question set at the beginning of this paper --- the question of whether British colonial rule was much better than that of Japan or

²² Cho Kyeongdal, *Shokuminchiki Chosen no chishikijin to minshu: Shokuminchi kindaiseiron hihan* [Intellectuals and Common People in Colonial Korea: A Criticism of Colonial Modernity], Tokyo 2008, 10.

²³ Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., *Colonial Modernity in Korea*, Cambridge, MA 1999, 9.

²⁴ Chosen sotokufu kanbo shomubu chosaka, ed., *1919 nen no Eijput daibodo* [The Great Rebellion in Egypt in 1919], n.p., n.d. (1923?) This was the translation of Sir Valentine Chirol's book, *The Egyptian Problem*, which was published in 1920.

whether there was such a thing as "good" or "better" colonial rule in world history. It is of course negative. Therefore we historians who keep a critical eye on the Japanese colonial past should always observe British imperial and colonial history with a similar critical vision.

Yoichi KIBATA
Seijyo University

Declaration of Establishment of The East Asian Society of British History

It shall hereby be duly and solemnly declared that The East Asian Society of British History has been established.

Association Articles of The East Asian Society of British History

BE IT KNOWN THAT WE, the subscribers and such other persons as may hereafter be associated with us do hereby associate ourselves according to the following articles of association.

ARTICLE 1

The name of the said association shall be The East Asian Society of British History.

ARTICLE 2

The purpose of The East Asian Society of British History shall be to promote activities appropriate for a historical society.

ARTICLE 3

All funds of the society shall be used exclusively for the purpose of the society or the operations thereof, and, no officer, member, agent, or employee of the said society shall receive any pecuniary profit or benefit from the funds of the society except reasonable compensation for services effecting one or more of its corporate purposes.

ARTICLE 4

The society shall be governed by such bylaws and amendments, thereto, as are adopted by the membership.

ARTICLE 5

The society shall have its principal administrative offices in Japan and Korea. The addresses of the office shall be as specified by the bylaws and amendments.

Bylaws of The East Asian Society of British History

ARTICLE 1 Name

The name of this organization shall be The East Asian Society of British History.

ARTICLE 2 Purposes

- 1) To promote and encourage historical research in all aspects of British history and to make available to the members of the society and to the public, the results of this research.
- 2) To hold seminars, conferences, and meetings as well as to discuss such matters as are of interest to the members of the society and the public.
- 3) In general, to carry on any and all activities appropriate for a historical society.

ARTICLE 3 Membership

- 1) Regular membership shall be open to all individuals and organizations interested in the purposes of the society.

- 2) Honorary membership shall be conferred by a majority vote at an annual meeting of the standing committee.
- 3) Organizations or groups shall also be allowed to apply for membership.
- 4) Student members shall be graduate students or at an equivalent status.
- 5) The annual membership fee shall be US\$ 30.00 for regular individual or organizational members and US\$ 10.00 for full time students. The lifetime membership shall be US\$500.000. If the annual membership fee has not been paid for 2 consecutive years, then the concerned person or organization shall lose membership of the society and all rights pertaining thereunto.

ARTICLE 4 Standing Committee

- 1) There shall be set up a standing committee. Membership of the committee shall be for six years unless otherwise determined by the consent of the majority of the members of the committee.
- 2) There shall be four members from Japan, four members from Korea, one member from UK, and one member from another East Asian country on the standing committee.
- 3) The committee shall be responsible for the overall governance of the society.
- 4) The co-chairs of the committee shall serve for four years.
- 5) Among the co-chairs, the chair from Korea shall serve as the acting chair during the year when the journal is published in Korea, and the chair from Japan shall serve as the acting chair during the year when the journal is published in Japan.
- 6) The committee shall appoint two auditors, one from Japan and one from Korea, who will serve for two years.

ARTICLE 5 Editorial Board

- 1) There shall be set up an editorial board for the editing and issuing of the *East Asian Journal of British History*. Editing and issuing of the journal shall comply with the provisions of the *Editorial Rules* to be separately drawn up.
- 2) There shall be three members from Korea and three members from Japan on the editorial board.
- 3) One member from Japan shall serve as editor in chief during the one year in which the journal is issued in Japan, and one member from Korea shall serve as editor in chief during the one year in which the journal is issued in Korea.
- 4) The standing committee shall have the right to appoint members of the editorial board.

ARTICLE 7 General Membership Meeting

The general membership meeting shall be held every three years, if necessary. The location of the meeting shall be the triennial Conference for British History organized jointly by Korea and Japan.

ARTICLE 8 Finance

- 1) The finance for this society shall be secured by membership fee, contribution, and donation.
- 2) The standing committee shall receive an annual audit and report its result at the general membership meeting.

Supplement

Any details not specified by these Bylaws of the society shall comply with general conventions. Furthermore, these Bylaws shall take effect from March 1, 2011.

Call for Papers

The East Asian Journal of British History is an annual journal published in English by *The East Asian Society of British History* on topics related to the British Isles. The purpose of the journal is to promote scholarly dialogue among historians and scholars on Britain and its history. The East Asian Society of British History invites scholars to contribute articles, reviews and texts, and studies series.

Submission

1. The East Asian Journal of British History welcomes submission of scholarly articles on the history of the British Isles. A copy of the manuscript should be submitted to the editorial board by email at eajbh.submission@gmail.com
2. The editors of the EAJBH seek articles that provide new contents and perspectives and make a fresh contribution to historical knowledge. Our principal consideration in determining whether an article should be published is its appropriateness to the readership of the EAJBH.
3. No manuscript will be considered for publication if it is concurrently considered by another journal or if it has been published or is soon to be published elsewhere.
4. All articles will be refereed, with the final decision made by the editorial board.
5. Contributors are requested to follow the Style Guidelines given below.
6. Copyright of the articles, reviews and texts, and studies series remain with the EASBH.

Style Guidelines

To be prepared by professor Tsurushima. info@kanadelibrary.org