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## *Special Feature: William III and the Glorious Revolution*

### Introduction

Sugiko Nishikawa\*

In the late 1980s Japan, as an undergraduate about to begin to work on British historiography, I saw at first hand the struggles of Prof. Takane Matsuura and Prof. Hiroshi Imai, the then-leading Japanese historians of early modern British history, in trying to grasp ‘revisionist’ studies, a flourishing academic movement among British historians. The flood of reinterpretations of the seventeenth century had already reached the Far East, and the importance of the religious component in the politics of the period, one of great contributions of the 1980s and 1990s debates to scholarship, became gradually recognised (especially in regard to Jacobitism), yet it was a task beyond the capacity for any Japanese to follow the ferment among British academics with the regard to the new ‘revisionism’. It may be said that although it was increasingly aware of the challenges to traditional interpretations in the English-speaking world, Japanese historiography of Glorious Revolution slightly stagnated until the end of the 1990s.

It was in this climate, strongly influenced by the ‘revisionists’ challenges, that Prof. Tony Claydon did his doctoral research at the University College London, completing it in 1993. (I started my own doctoral studies at the same place in 1992, and remember seminars on the late Stuart age at the Institute of Historical Research, the University of London, which UCL research students usually attended, especially one on ‘The Long Eighteenth Century’, co-chaired by Julian Hoppit. Other topics included ‘The Seventeenth Century’ co-chaired by John Miller, ‘Ecclesiastical History’ co-chaired by Nicholas Tyacke, and ‘Low Countries’ co-chaired by Jonathan Israel the editor of *The Anglo-Dutch Moment*, — all were fully attended). It was therefore not surprising that Prof. Tony Claydon’s first book, *William III and the Godly Revolution* (CUP, 1996) which focused sharply and vividly on how religion was central in involving the English into a war introduced by a new Dutch king, was warmly welcomed by Japanese academics working on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They appreciated it as an insightful and cutting-edge guide to British researches on the late Stuart age which, along with his edited book, *Protestantism and national identity: Britain and Ireland, 1650–1850* (co-edited with Ian McBride, published by CPU, 1998), at the same time revealed a vital new area of interest in academic directions in Britain. Prof. Claydon’s writings also encouraged us to think that the religion as a historical factor did not fade away in 1660, nor in 1688, and it continued to exert a powerful influence in British society.

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While the importance of Dutch influence on the Glorious Revolution is already shown in *William III and the Godly Revolution*, Prof. Claydon's subsequent projects broadened this focus to place developments of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century Britain into a wider European context. This is evidenced not only in important publications such as his article on 'William III' in *the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, his *William III: profiles in power* (Longman, 2002) and *Europe and the Making of England, 1660–1760* (CUP, 2007) but also by his founding of the 'Williamite Universe', an international network linking continental historians working on William III, and his setting up of the 'Restoration conference at Bangor University' which brings together historians working on the period from 1660 to 1750. In the study of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, both are now indispensable. Every two years, historians from various places in the British Isles, continental Europe, New Zealand, the USA and sometimes Asia make a long pilgrimage to north Wales in order to join the discussions there.

In the following paper written for Japanese readers, Prof. Claydon focuses on reappraisal of the revolution as constitutional change, stressing the vital importance of the political circumstances in which William III of Orange found himself. It reminds me of Prof. Claydon's comment on William that he had strong confidence in God's providential support — the bell at Het Loo, his palace in the Netherlands, had the inscription; *si Deus pro nobis quis contra nos* ('if God is for us, who can be against us?', Romans 8. 31.) — so he entrusted his fate to a provisional government in the winter of 1689. It is a privilege to have a paper written by a historian who knows William so well.

### **Selected publications by Tony Claydon**

1. *William III and the godly revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), iv+272 pp.
2. edn with Ian McBride, *Protestantism and national identity: Britain and Ireland, c.1650–c.1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), xi+317 pp.
3. *William III: profiles in power* (London: Longman, 2002), xxi+202 pp.
4. edn with William Arthur Speck, *William and Mary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 157 pp.
5. *Europe and the making of England, 1660–1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), x+370 pp.
6. edn with Peter Clarke, *The church, the afterlife and the fate of the soul (Studies in Church History, vol. 45)* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2009), xxiii+429 pp.
7. 'The recent English historiography of the Glorious Revolution', *Odysseus (Bulletin of the Department of Area Studies, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo)*, supplement 1 (2009), pp. 27–42.
8. 'British networks and the Glorious Revolution, 1688–1689', *Odysseus (Bulletin of the Department of Area Studies, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo)*, supplement 1 (2009), pp. 70–86.

9. edn with Peter Clarke, *God's bounty? The churches and the natural world (Studies in Church History, vol. 46)* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2010), xxviii+457 pp.
10. edn with Peter Clarke, *Saints and sanctity (Studies in Church History, vol. 47)* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2011), xxii+437 pp.
11. edn with Thomas N. Corns, *Religion, culture and national community in the 1670s* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2011), x+198 pp.
12. 'The sermon culture of the Glorious Revolution: Williamite preaching and Jacobite anti-preaching, 1685–1702', in Peter McCullough, Hugh Adlington and Emma Rhatigan (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of the Early English Sermon* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 480–495.
13. 'A European general in the English press: the print image of the duke of Marlborough in the Stuart realms' in John B.Hattendorf, Augustus J.Veenendaal and Rolof van Hövell tot Westerfliet (eds), *Marlborough: soldier and diplomat* (Rotterdam: Karwansaray, 2012), pp. 300–319.
14. 'Daily news and the construction of time in later Stuart England, 1695–1713', *Journal of British Studies*, 52:1 (2013), pp. 55–78.
15. 'Gilbert Burnet: an ecclesiastical historian and the invention of the English Restoration era', in Peter Clarke and Charlotte Methuen (eds.), *The Church and Literature (Studies in Church History, vol. 48)* (Woodbridge, Boydell & Brewer, 2012), pp. 181–191.
16. 'When did the "long eighteenth century" begin?', in Jean-François Donyach and Aude Mairey (eds), *Les âges de Britannia: repenser l'histoire des mondes britanniques* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2015), pp 99–106.
17. edn with Charles-Édouard Levillain, *Louis XIV outside in: images of the Sun King beyond France, 1661–1715* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2016), xi+231 pp.
18. 'The reformation of the future: dating the reformation in the late Stuart era', *Etudes Episteme*, 32 (2017). URL=<https://doi.org/10.4000/episteme.1831>
19. *The revolution in time: chronology, modernity and 1688–1689 in England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), viii+257 pp.



## The Revolution of 1688–9: Constitutional Change and William III

Tony Claydon\*

### The Revolution of 1688–9 as a Triumph of Parliamentary Power

It has been claimed that the revolution of 1688–9 in England saw the victory for parliamentary power. By the mid eighteenth century the revolution (in which a new king, William III had displaced the catholic and absolutist James II) was described, particularly by the Whig party, as the birth of English freedom — or at least the moment when the constitution was altered to put parliament in charge. Whigs celebrated the triumph of William III (the revolution included a successful invasion by this prince of Orange to seize England’s throne) as a triumph for parliament’s rights and the idea of government by consent. They believed it was perhaps the first foundation of true liberty anywhere in the world.<sup>1</sup> This interpretation remained popular with historians such as Thomas Babington Macaulay in the nineteenth century, and G. M. Trevelyan in the early twentieth.<sup>2</sup> Such scholars viewed the revolution as perhaps the most important individual stage in the development of Britain towards parliamentary democracy. Even in the late twentieth century, Margaret Thatcher could claim Britain had not needed the equivalent of the French Revolution in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, because the triumph of parliament in 1688–9 had meant there had been no royal tyranny to overthrow.<sup>3</sup>

In this interpretation, the 1688–9 revolution was not the moment that parliament became sovereign. That had been accepted for some time before. Since at least the sixteenth century, people had acknowledged that when monarchs acted through parliament, they were supreme; and that when they secured the consent of the Commons and Lords, there was nothing that, legally, they could not do. The Tudors, for example, had used parliament to implement the protestant reformation. This had included wholesale confiscations of huge amounts of ecclesiastical property; profound constitutional changes — for example making the monarch head of the church; and even (in so far as the legislation defined new doctrines) changing the truth about God in England. People in the sixteenth century had therefore had the highest sense of a parliaments’ power, and — in this sense — parliamentary sovereignty already existed before 1688–9.<sup>4</sup> Yet the claims about 1688–9 went further. Eighteenth-century Whigs, and their heirs, saw the revolution as the final victory of parliament in a battle with the crown

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1 For meanings of the 1688–9 in the eighteenth century, see H. T. Dickinson, ‘The eighteenth-century debate on the Glorious Revolution’, *History*, 61 (1976), pp. 28–45.

2 G. M. Trevelyan, *The English revolution* (Oxford, 1938); Thomas Babington Macaulay, *The history of England from the accession of James II* (1848).

3 *Hansard House of Commons Debate 07 July 1988* (vol. 136, cc. 1233–63).

4 For example, Thomas Smith, *De Republica Anglorum* (1583) had explained the limitless legal power of an English parliament.

which had raged through the Stuart era. It was therefore more than simple confirmation that the crown was most powerful when it co-operated with parliament. The Whig interpretation insisted that 1688–9 was the moment when the two representative parts of parliament — the House of Lords, and especially the House of Commons — emerged as the key elements of the constitution, and as more powerful than the third part of parliament, the monarch. They suggest that with William III's arrival in England the two houses came to be recognised as the ultimate source of authority in England, and as the central institutions of government. In time, this would allow the establishment of British democracy, because assemblies that embodied or represented the people had seized control of the state.

This short article will examine if these claims are true. They can certainly be disputed. The English constitution is, and was, unwritten. It is therefore not always clear what it says. What its exact rules were at any point in time about the relative powers of different government institutions has always been debateable. This was clear recently, in the controversy connected to the Brexit debates about whether the prime minister has the right to suspend parliament for an unusually long autumn break; and it was certainly the case in the seventeenth century. The Stuart age had seen considerable constitutional dispute, argument, and uncertainty — culminating in crises such as the civil war of 1642–6, when Englishmen had fought open military battles about the limits on monarchical power. It is true that the revolution of 1688–9 produced 'The Declaration of Rights'.<sup>5</sup> This document, presented to William III as he was offered the throne, looks at first sight like a clear definition of the English constitution. It listed a series of controls and boundaries on the monarch's prerogatives. Yet examined more closely, the Declaration provides no real clarity about the true source and location of authority in England. The document's legal status was fragile. It was a resolution, not of a parliament (which could have defined its own power if the monarch had agreed to its proposals), but rather of an ad hoc convention which (though constituted as if it were a parliament) had gathered with no clear mandate, and had come together during an extraordinary political emergency when no king was exercising power. Similarly, it had not been obvious whether William had accepted the Declaration, or whether he thought it was binding on him. He had listened as it had been read out; and he had warmly thanked those who presented it to him (not least because it the document offered him the crown). However, he had not specifically and unequivocally consented to the limitations on his power as a condition of him becoming king.<sup>6</sup> Both these uncertainties meant the Declaration had to be passed as a separate act of parliament later in 1689, to ensure that its terms became law. Moreover, the Declaration was not a comprehensive constitutional statement. All it did was insist on some very specific limitations on the monarch's power. Most of these stemmed from concerns about particular things William's predecessor, the now exiled James II, had done. For example, the Declaration stated that rulers

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5 *The Declaration of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons assembled at Westminster* (1689).

6 There has been debate about the implications of William's actions in accepting the throne after the Declaration had been read to him — contrast Lois Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights, 1689* (Baltimore, 1981), ch. 15, with W. A. Speck, *Reluctant revolutionaries: Englishmen and the revolution of 1688* (Oxford, 1988), pp. 113–114 — but it is clear that there was no formal promise.

could not tax without parliament's approval; that they could not simply suspend laws that parliament had passed just by using the royal prerogative; and that they could not maintain a peacetime army with parliamentary consent. The Declaration did not engage in any theoretical discussion of where ultimate authority in England lay, and was silent in many areas of royal power. The result was that the monarch remained unrestrained, and his authority was still unlimited, in great swathes of national life. The Declaration left the king as chief executive of government, in charge of policy — both domestic and foreign; and free to appoint ministers as he liked. It left him as head of the church of England; as commander in chief of the armed forces; and free to make war, peace, and foreign alliances, as he wished. Perhaps reflecting these rather limited controls on royal action, the Declaration insisted it was not innovating, and thus implied it had left the constitution unchanged. It insisted that the limitations on monarchs it had outlined, were nothing but 'ancient rights and liberties' which had been asserted many times before by the authors' 'ancestors'.<sup>7</sup>

So, the formal constitutional statement that came from 1688–1689 provided no real sense that the revolution was an important constitutional moment. The Declaration of Rights was restricted in scope; it said it was not altering anything; and it was of dubious legal status. However, if instead of looking for a formal and definitive statement of the constitutional meaning of the revolution, we rather concentrate on the story of what happened over 1688–9, there does seem to be far more evidence of big change in the principles of government. As we survey the extraordinary events of the revolutionary winter, we will see parliament being cemented as the dominant institution in the nation, even without any official recognition of this in new law or in grand constitutional documents. Moreover, we will see considerable paradox in the process. Particularly, if we concentrate on the political objectives and style of William himself, we will see that parliament was recognised as supreme, even though nobody had demanded this, or particularly wanted it. Circumstances forced the Lords and Commons to act as if they were the sole source of authority in England — particularly in response to William's strategies for gaining the throne. William's approach to rule then solidified parliamentary power — not so much by choice (the new king would have preferred a rather more autocratic system to the one that emerged), but because it was the most effective way to mobilise England's resources in a war with Louis XIV's France.<sup>8</sup> This war had been William's key objective from the start of his political career. A constitutional revolution may therefore have happened, but without anyone planning or intended it; and the increase in parliament's

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7 There was a considerable body of work insisting on the conservative nature of the Declaration of Rights in the 1970s. Henry Horwitz, 'Parliament and the Glorious Revolution', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 47 (1974), pp. 36–52; J. R. Jones, *The revolution of 1688 in England* (London, 1972); Howard Nenner, *By colour of law: legal culture and constitutional politics in England. 1660–1689* (1977); J. P. Kenyon, *Revolution politics* (Cambridge, 1977) — this has been challenged by Schwoerer, *Declaration of Rights*, and works stressing the radicalism of the revolution generally — see below note 16.

8 For evidence that William felt limited and frustrated by his powers as king, see his conversations with the earl of Halifax in 1689: H. C. Foxcroft, *The life and letters of Sir George Savile* (1898), vol. 2, pp. 203–47.

importance and power may have happen as a result of the actions of a man, William, who in many ways opposed it.

### **The events of 1688–9 and Parliamentary Authority**

So, here is the story — particularly from William’s point of view.<sup>9</sup> By the summer of 1688, William III, prince of Orange, had been Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht and Gelderland — and Captain General of the United Provinces of the Netherlands — for sixteen years. He had come to these powerful offices in 1672, when the Dutch nation had turned to the leader of the Orange family, its traditional saviours, in a moment of crisis. The Netherlands had faced invasion by the French forces of Louis XIV; and had been almost completely overrun. Through luck, flooding fields to block French advance, and forming alliances with Louis’ enemies the Habsburgs of Spain and Austria, William had led the Dutch to salvation: but the experience had left him determined to counter Louis’ power in Europe.

In 1688, there seemed to be a new threat from France, connected to the situation in England. William had an interest in that country, as he was both the son-in-law, and the nephew, of its king James II. However, William was worried about a number of things in England, which might lead James to join France in its attempts to control Europe. At the heart of the concern was James’ mishandling of English politics. The king had alienated many of his subjects by his campaign to promote the rights of catholics in a protestant country. He had also upset them by his use of royal power to help catholics, when laws had been voted by parliament to restrict their freedoms. This looked to many like an attempt to impose absolutist monarchy. William feared that the opposition James was stirring up might force England’s ruler into an alliance with Louis. If James faced resistance from his subjects, France might offer money and military support in return for England joining its international alliance. William also worried the situation in London might lead to civil war, which would have unpredictable consequences. The last English civil war, in the 1640s, had led to a regime under Oliver Cromwell which had been hostile to the Dutch, but had become quite friendly with the Bourbon monarchy in France. By June 1688, William had decided he had to intervene with armed force in England, to prevent these possibilities. His decision was encouraged by an invitation from some of James’s leading opponents among England’s elites, but it was probably finalised when James’ wife gave birth to a son. This meant William’s wife, Mary, was no longer the heir to the English throne. Before this point, William might have felt he could wait until James died, and would gain control over England through Mary in due course, so the risks of invasion were not worth taking. Once James had a male heir, however, this more cautious option was closed.

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9 For a clear recent histories of the revolution, see Tim Harris, *Revolution: the great crisis of the British monarchy, 1685–1720* (London, 2006), Edward Vallance, *The Glorious Revolution: 1688 and England’s fight for liberty* (London, 2006); for William’s perspective on it see Wout Troost, translated by J. C. Grayson, *William III, the stadholder-king* (Aldershot, 2005); Tony Claydon, *William III: profiles in power* (Harlow, 2002); Tony Claydon, ‘William II and III’ — online *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.

Yet when William decided to invade, he knew he faced two dangers. First, he might be resisted by the English people. They might see his intervention as a foreign invasion, and his Dutch forces might not be popular in a country with a tradition of rivalry with the Netherlands. The English might also see William's arrival as a treasonous attempt to remove a legitimate English king. Second, William might deepen the divisions between Whigs and Tories. These two parties had emerged in England in the late 1670s. They had disagreed about whether James should be allowed to come to the throne (the Whigs arguing that his Catholicism should disqualify him, whilst Tories upheld the principle of hereditary succession), and about religious issues (here Whigs argued for more toleration for those protestants who had objections to features of the official church of England). Subsequent history had deepened personal animosities between the two groups, and William knew his invasion might be opposed if one party saw it as an advantage to the other.<sup>10</sup> The danger in particular was that Tories might see William's action as attempt to impose a Whig solution using armed force. William's expedition might remove a king the Whigs had never liked, and William seemed to lean towards the Whigs' position on the religious disputes. If Tories took this position, much of the political nation would be alienated from William.

To avoid these dangers, William made very limited claims about the objectives of his invasion. Crucially, he said he was not intending to remove James, and made it clear he was not taking sides in disputes between Whigs and Tories. William made these claims in a manifesto, his *Declaration of Reasons for Appearing in Arms in England*.<sup>11</sup> This pamphlet did not blame James for misgovernment, but instead argued political tension had been the result of the actions of 'evil counsellors' who had seized control of policy. William's *Declaration* said his sole aim in intervening in England was to secure a free parliament. This body would investigate the evil counsellors; examine the nation's grievances against royal policy; settle the religious disputes between Whigs and Tories; and investigate the birth of James' son (some believed this had been a fraud, with a baby smuggled into the queen's birthing chamber in a warming pan). In this way, William hoped to calm fears about his expedition. It denied it was aimed at removing England's monarch, it promised the English they would be in charge of their own future through the decisions of the free parliament, and reassured Whigs and Tories that the disputes between them would be settled in future discussions, so they would have no immediate reason to oppose William on party grounds. The effect though, was to announce that parliament was at the heart of the objectives of the Dutch expedition.

The *Declaration of Reasons* was very widely circulated in the autumn of 1688 as William invaded England (he landed at Torbay in Devon on 5 November). The Dutch had smuggled a large number of copies of the manifesto into England before the prince's expedition and had set up a network of agents to hand his manifesto out to people as soon as he arrived in England.

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10 The development of political parties to 1689 is traced in Tim Harris, *Politics under the later Stuarts* (Harlow, 1993).

11 *Declaration of his highness William Henry, prince of Orange, of his reasons for appearing in arms in the kingdom of England* (1688).

William's supporters printed more copies on a press he brought with him from the Netherlands and allowed booksellers and printers to reproduce the work free of charge. The document became so prominent and so closely associated with the prince that it became a sort of symbol, or icon, of his cause. For example, it was read out when groups of troops defected from James to William; and it was read out to crowds as parts of the North of England rebelled against James.<sup>12</sup> It also came to set the terms of debate in the early winter of 1688–9. Although James tried to suppress the manifesto, with proclamations banning people from reading or distributing it, this strategy proved a failure, and soon James's supporters were publishing tracts to answer its arguments. This meant there was a robust official response to William's propaganda, but it also meant both sides were talking about the central demand of the *Declaration* — the free parliament that William had demanded. For example, some supporters of James pointed out the king was now willing to meet parliament — but that it could not safely convene because of the crisis William's own invasion had created.<sup>13</sup> As a result of all this broadcasting and discussion, parliament went to the core of people's political thinking. Very many people now expected that parliament would be central to the political settlement: they came to think they had rebelled against James to secure the powerful parliament that William had promised.

The next stage of the story ensured, not only that people were expecting parliament to play a big role in any political settlement, but that the Lords and Commons became the only bodies with the possible authority to decide what happened next. This was partly because royal power collapsed completely in early December, so that the monarchy could and play no further role in the revolution. James had not been weak at the start of the crisis. He marched his army (of perhaps over 30,000 men) from London to meet Williams' troops who were advancing from Devon. Some officers of this force did defect to the Dutch cause, but probably not enough to seriously damage its fighting effectiveness. But James suffered some sort of psychological collapse when he and his forces arrived at Salisbury Plain. Perhaps fearing a return to the civil war that had marked his youth, and horrified by the opposition of close members of his family, he suffered a series of severe nosebleeds; refused to order his troops into battle against the Dutch; retreated back to London; and soon after fled the country, appearing to want to dissolve his government (particularly because he threw the Great Seal, the symbol of his authority, into the Thames). Most people read this as James abdicating — *de facto* if not *de jure*. If the king had indeed abdicated, his heir was his son. But his son was only a few months old, and had been sent away to France for his protection as soon as it was clear the Dutch were going to invade. This meant there was no one to exercise the powers of the monarch (it was later declared the throne was in fact vacant). The monarchy could play no role in deciding what

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12 For works covering this distribution, see Schwoerer, *Declaration of rights*, ch. 5; Lois Schwoerer, 'Propaganda in the revolution of 1688–9', *American Historical Review*, 82 (1997), pp. 843–74; Jonathan Israel, ed., *The Anglo-Dutch moment* (Cambridge, 1991), 'Introduction', pp. 1–46, and 'The Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution', pp. 105–62.

13 For these Jacobite arguments, see Tony Claydon, 'William III's *Declaration of reasons* and the Glorious Revolution', *Historical Journal*, 39 (1996), pp. 87–108.

happened next.

But if the monarch could play no role, William also had very limited influence. He wanted to control English foreign policy. He was now in military control of England. It must therefore have been tempting simply to declare himself the new king by right of conquest, or as *de facto* ruler, given that he was the only person with effective force to command. But the circumstances that had shaped the words of the *Declaration of Reasons*, and now that *Declaration* itself, prevented any simple seizure of power. If William had made himself king, this would make him look like an invader: and we have seen he was keen to avoid this. Simply taking the throne would be unpopular; it was probably too narrow a basis to claim authority in a dangerous political situation; and it would sour public opinion just as William wanted to lead a united English people against France. Most importantly, just claiming to be king would contradict what William had said in his manifesto. William had said in the *Declaration of Reasons* that he wanted a parliamentary settlement, not to become king. He had said this in a document which had been very widely distributed, which had shaped political discussion, and which had become the very meaning of the Dutch invasion for many English people. To have gone against this would have undermined the entire legitimacy of his invasion. William was therefore unable to declare himself king, even though he probably wanted to, and was, in terms of raw power, in a position to do so.<sup>14</sup>

Now that both William and James were excluded from much role in shaping the political settlement, the Lords and Commons began to look like the only remaining source of authority. The *Declaration of Reasons* had proposed that they should meet to settle the kingdom; all other potential powers in England had either collapsed or had justified themselves on the basis of the *Declaration*. William therefore accepted that any power he gained would have to be granted to him by parliament — or at least by bodies as close to a parliament as could be gathered in a chaotic situation where it was not sitting, and where it could not be called because a recognised king had to convene the two houses. So: once James had fled, William accepted temporary authority from the House of Lords which had gathered in the capital to form an ad hoc provisional government. When he arrived in London, William sought advice from the Lords, and also from a gathering of all MPs who had served Charles II (those who had served in the Commons before James came to the throne). He followed the advice given by these groups; and used the authority that the Lords had given him to call a ‘convention’ to decide the nation’s future. This body could not be a parliament because there was no king to summon one. However, it would be very similar to a regular parliament. The convention would consist of the House of Lords; and also a second house, elected in exactly the same way as a normal House of Commons would have been. This convention would discuss the state of the nation, decide what to do about the lack of a king, and attempt to reach a lasting constitutional settlement.

The convention was elected early in 1689, and met at Westminster through late January

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14 For more on the limitations on William at this point, see Claydon ‘William III’s *Declaration*’, and Claydon, *William III: profiles*, pp. 60–71.

and February.<sup>15</sup> Its debates were marked by disagreement between Whigs and Tories, and it took some weeks for the details of the settlement to emerge. Eventually, however, the urgency of the international situation encouraged compromise and consensus. The Catholics in Ireland were in full scale rebellion against English authority in that country; whilst James had secured the help of Louis XIV, and was threatening to invade England himself to regain his crown. The eventual agreement was that the throne had been vacant since James fled; that in future it could not be filled by a Catholic; and that monarchs had specific limits on their powers (those listed in the ‘Declaration of Rights’). It then offered the throne jointly to William and his wife Mary (though stating William should normally exercise actual power on his own); and it set rules around the royal succession. If Mary died before William and the couple had had not children at that point, Mary’s sister Anne and then her children would come to the throne, even if William re-married and had children by a second wife.

It can be argued that the settlement itself was not a great assertion of parliamentary sovereignty.<sup>16</sup> England remained a monarchy, with a Stuart royal house (Mary was the daughter of the previous king, William his nephew and son-in-law). As we saw, the Declaration of Rights left many of the monarch’s powers untouched, and claimed it was not making changes from England’s traditional constitution. The convention might have formally made a decision to change who was king — but it may have had little choice. By this stage it had become clear William wanted the throne, whatever his manifesto had said. His troops were occupying London; he was the only guarantor of order in a dangerously unstable political situation; and he was England’s only protection against French invasion and the Irish rebellion. William therefore not only had the raw power to make himself king, but probably also to limit restrictions on the monarchy. When the Declaration of Rights was being drafted, he lobbied against some of the more radical controls on the king that were being discussed, and these were dropped in the final version. Viewed in these contexts, it does not appear that the convention wanted, or would have been able, to implement a radical constitutional settlement that clearly put parliament in charge.

However, if we examine other aspects of the settlement, it begins to look more significant: particularly if we think about the authority on which the decisions were made, more than the decisions themselves.<sup>17</sup> The most important thing to note is that the future of the political system was decided by a parliament-like body, sitting when there was no king. This means the convention was claiming to have the authority to decide the future, even when there was no monarch. Moreover, the decisions that the convention made affected the underlying nature of the monarchy profoundly (if they had less effect on its power within the day to day governing

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15 The best detailed account of the convention’s deliberations, with supporting primary evidence, is D. L. Jones, *A parliamentary history of the Glorious Revolution* (London, 1988).

16 In addition to the works in footnote 7, see Jennifer Carter, ‘The revolution and the constitution’, in Geoffrey Holmes ed., *Britain after the Glorious Revolution, 1689–1714* (London, 1996), pp. 39–58.

17 The argument advanced in the rest of this section supports the twenty first century trend to stress the radicalism of the revolution (though it differs in detail and emphasis). See Steven Pincus, *1688: the first modern revolution* (New Haven, 2009); Patrick Dillon, *The last revolution: 1688 and the creation of the modern world* (London, 2006); Harris, *Revolution*; Vallance, *Glorious Revolution*.

of the country). The convention ensured the monarchy was no longer strictly hereditary. William was not the direct heir to the throne, and the decisions about who should inherit when he had died broke the principle of heredity too. The convention created a wholly novel joint monarchy. For the stability of the regime it decided Mary should co-reign with her husband. This was sensible (since Mary was an enthusiastic and loyal member of the church of England and had a stronger hereditary claim to the crown than William, she could appeal to Tories), but it launched an innovative experiment in monarchy: dual rule had never been tried before. The convention also imposed a religious test on monarchy. Catholics could no longer come to the throne, being judged dangerous for the country. This was a wholesale reversal of the normal principle for deciding religion in early modern Europe. To this point, rulers had generally determined the legal faith of their countries. Now, in England, the faith of the country would determine the religion of rulers.

These were big changes, and so we need to understand on what basis people thought the convention had the authority to make them. Clearly this could not be royal authority. There was no king when the convention deliberated. This also meant the convention could not be exercising the powers of a normal parliament. Parliaments include the monarch and are summoned by them: the convention was called a convention, and not a parliament, for this reason. William had called the convention, but the authority could not really derive from him. When it was called, he had no formal power in England, except, perhaps that temporarily granted by the remnants of parliament (the Lords and Charles II's MPs) in December 1688.

Was the convention acting as a representative of the people, and gaining authority from them? One might argue that 1688–9 was a situation as described in John Locke's *Second Treatise of Government*, which was published soon after James' fall, and which was once thought to be the best philosophical guide to what had happened in the revolution.<sup>18</sup> In the *Treatise*, Locke described a situation in which a ruler forfeited authority by misrule. When this happened, power had reverted back to the national community; and in order to found government again, this community had to come together to discuss how power was to be organised, and who to trust it with. If this is what had happened in 1688–9, it would have established Locke's principle that all power ultimately derives from the people. However, there are problems with this interpretation. First, it was not widely accepted in discussions around the revolution. Locke and a few other political writers talked in terms of power derived from the people in the immediate aftermath of William's triumph, but they were very much exceptions to the general tone of political debate. Most writers and commentators (all Tories, and the majority of Whigs) thought that Locke's arguments were dangerously democratic in a society that still mistrusted popular power and that had strong belief in hierarchy. They therefore suggested William had come to power by a variety of other means.<sup>19</sup> Second, what

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18 For an example of this older view of Locke, see Leslie Stephen, *A history of English thought in the eighteenth century* (1876). The second treatise forms the second half of [John Locke], *Two treatises of government* (1689).

19 For the vast range of ideas about 1688–9, circulating in the decade afterwards, see Mark Goldie, 'The revolution of 1689 and the structure of political argument', *Bulletin of Research in the Humanities*, 83

happened in 1688–9 did not match Locke’s ideas closely. If James had forfeited authority, Locke insisted that political power would go back to the whole population; and that old political structures would be void unless — or until — the people as a whole set them up again. But the convention, which might have claimed to represent the people in 1689, was not a representative of the whole population, ignoring old structures. It retained features of the old regime, and there were privileges for certain kinds of people. The convention had a House of Lords — to which only a tiny privileged percentage of the people were admitted. The Commons were elected on the property-based, and rather complex, set of rules from the old regime, which the people as a whole had not agreed. So, as commentators through the ages have pointed out, 1688–9 was not really a Lockean revolution, and the convention was not acting as a representative of the people in this sense.<sup>20</sup>

If the convention did not derive its authority from the old king, or William, or the people, then the only alternative source of authority was its resemblance to the House of Lords and House of Commons. The convention’s role in the revolution therefore suggested that the true source of authority in England was these two houses.<sup>21</sup> They had remodelled the constitution on their own, without need for monarchical endorsement. Indeed, they had comprehensively rebutted the alternative theory of monarchical authority. James II had, after all, claimed to be able to exercise power without parliamentary approval in important areas. But the convention, in the Declaration of Rights, had denied that kings could do this. And in the very act of passing the Declaration, and in making its changes to the royal succession, the convention was asserting that parliament (in the sense of Lords and Commons) COULD act without a king, even though the king could NOT act without the two houses. In fact, Lords and Commons could perform some very radical acts without consulting any monarch. All this was, as so often in early modern England, wrapped up in rhetoric of conserving the law, rather than making dramatic changes. But the logic of the situation pointed to a profound shift in perceptions of where ultimate authority lay. And this had occurred largely without being planned. It was the result of William’s political circumstances in 1688–9, and the rhetoric of a free parliament that he had crafted to meet his political challenges. His actions to water down the Declaration of Rights suggest William would have preferred to preserve more monarchical authority, as do his complaints through the rest of his reign that he was only a shadow of a real king. The story of 1688–9, however, had made such royal power impossible.

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(1980), pp. 195–236.

- 20 Lois Schwoerer notes the distance between Locke’s theory and the reality of 1688–9, but also notes Locke himself was pragmatic about the difference, believing the convention’s election and actions to be the most practical way to transfer power in the political circumstances: Lois Schwoerer, ‘Lockean ideas and the Glorious Revolution’, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 51 (1990), pp. 531–48.
- 21 Much of the explanation of the revolution in its immediate aftermath was that an ancient constitution, with the Lords and Commons at its heart, had governed the process: see Tony Claydon, *The revolution in time: chronology, modernity and 1688–1689 in England* (Oxford, 2020), ch. 2.

## William's War and Parliamentary Sovereignty

We have seen that William's circumstances in 1688–9 led to the idea of parliamentary sovereignty. In the last section of this article, we will see that the new king's political actions strengthened the power of the Lords, and particularly the Commons, after he had gained the throne. Again, this was the consequence of his wider style and objectives, rather than being his main aim, but it concreted the two houses even more firmly at the centre of the political system.

As we have seen, William intervened in England to make sure it joined his side in the European battle against France. Soon after becoming king, he declared war — as ruler of England — on Louis XIV. This looks like a standard and surviving assertion of monarchical power in England (the king took England to war as part of his prerogative to decide foreign policy, and as part of his role as commander in chief of the armed forces). Yet, in fact, William's political needs in fighting the war, and his political approach to organising it, strengthened parliament's role. William knew he would need the continuing consent of the English people for a long war. He knew that parliamentary opposition to wars under Charles I and Charles II had soon led to those kings abandoning the conflicts: indeed he had relied on the power of parliamentary opposition in England earlier in his career. In the 1620s, parliament's refusal to fully fund conflicts against France and Spain had led Charles I to seek peace. In 1674, his son Charles II had had to abandon his alliance with Louis in conflict with the Netherlands, because criticism of the policy in Lords and Commons had become deafening. That criticism had been stirred by William who had wanted to neutralise the English forces who were attacking his homeland.<sup>22</sup> From these incidents it was clear English monarchs could not fight wars without enthusiastic agreement from the legislature. To turn England into an effective war machine, William would have to find a way to secure this support.

His solution was to take parliament into partnership with the war effort. He ensured that it was given a role — not just in consenting to the finance that would be needed to pay for William's armies and navies — but being involved in the conflict at a much more detailed level. Parliament would monitor the success of William's armies, suggest strategy, call for the removal of failing commanders or ministers, check for financial waste and corruption in the running of the war, and decide in some quite fine-grained detail how money was to be allocated to different parts of the war effort. In all these ways, the king hoped parliament would come to see the war as its war, not just the king's. It would feel ownership of an enterprise in which it was so closely involved; and close supervision would calm suspicions that money voted for the war was being siphoned off to other purposes or lost in inefficiency and dishonesty. It is true that some of these new roles for parliament were inevitable. William fought a long war which required constant money; and only parliament could grant this. Parliament would therefore sit for several months every year so that it could respond to the king's demands for

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22 The best account of this is still K. H. D. Haley, *William of Orange and the English opposition* (Oxford, 1953).

finance. This was a dramatic increase in the regularity and length of parliamentary sessions, which put the Lords and Commons closer to the centre of national life, and it allowed the two houses to develop processes to consider proposals for military spending, debate war policy, and audit what had occurred.<sup>23</sup> But parliament was only able to take on these roles because William's determination to defeat Louis ensured a long war; and — perhaps more importantly — William had a new vision of the proper relationship between the king and the nation's representatives at Westminster.<sup>24</sup>

William's new approach probably came from his experience in the Netherlands. In his Dutch homeland, bodies with similar roles to the English parliament had always taken the central role in politics. The 'states' (or provincial assembly) of each province such as Holland, Utrecht and Zeeland — and the 'states general' (the representative assembly of the federal Netherlands as a whole) — were the legal sovereigns in the Dutch constitution. Nothing could be done without their consent, and as stadholder and captain general (offices which in other respects gave him some of the powers of a king), William had had to consult the states and states-general; he had had to secure their agreement for policies and finance; and he had had to accept their investigations into his actions, ministers, and military. Yet although this looked like severe restriction on the ruler's power, William had come to see that it could be an advantage. On the occasions when he had challenged the states' power, he had tended to lose control of Dutch policy. By contrast, when he had worked with the assemblies, he had found himself far stronger. Once the states' agreement to a course of action had been gained, the ruler knew he had the support of the whole nation — the people whom the assemblies represented. His policies were therefore less likely to be blocked by political opposition, and criticism of him was likely to be constructive, rather than obstructive. William found that by operating through parliament-like bodies in the Netherlands, he could mobilise the whole nation in his struggle with Louis XIV. People paid heavy taxes, fought in the armed forces, and lent the military their resources fairly willingly.<sup>25</sup> When William became king in England, he applied this lesson, and treated the English parliament in the same way as the Dutch states. He in fact treated the Lords and Commons as if they were sovereigns in England, even if they were technically not. He did this to enhance his own power to implement his priorities, but the result was an increase in the authority and role of parliament. Two examples can illustrate this.

The first is the declaration of war. William, once king, had the power simply to take England into a conflict with France as part of his prerogative control of foreign policy. But he did not do this. Instead, he presented the situation in Europe to the Lords and Commons in his first speech to them and asked for their advice. This looked like a major surrender of the

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23 W. A. Speck, *The birth of Britain: a new nation, 1700–1710* (Oxford, 1994), introduction, notes that by the end of William's reign, regular winter parliaments had structured a new political and social calendar in England.

24 Claydon, *William III: profiles*, chs. 3 and 5. The interpretation here parallels analysis that suggests parliament really achieved predominance in the war years, rather than at 1689 — for example, Carter, 'Revolution and the constitution', but argues that power was granted by William to parliament, rather than being won from him.

25 Claydon, *William III: profiles*, ch. 1.

initiative by the king. He was asking parliament whether he should declare war. Yet in fact the risk that they would not advise him to do what he wanted to do was small. At this point, Louis XIV had invaded Germany and looked as if he might soon over-run it, which would ensure he could become the unchallenged master of Europe. Louis was also supporting the rebellion against English rule in Ireland and encroaching on English territories in North America. In these circumstances, the parliament was bound to suggest England declare war on France, and it did so in an address to the king. William thus got what he wanted. But William's approach meant the war was now parliament's, at least as much as the king's. The Lords and Commons had asked for the conflict, and this would make it difficult for them to object to its effects later. William began the war, but when asking for funds from parliament over the next few years his speeches always called it 'the war on which I entered with your advice'. For political advantage, the king had behaved as if parliament were in charge of foreign policy.<sup>26</sup>

The second example is parliament's role in auditing the king's accounts. Parliament had demanded to do this under Charles I and Charles II, but those kings had resisted, saying that how the king spent the money granted to him was his own private affair. William, however, had a very different strategy. He thought parliament was less likely to be suspicious of royal government if he was open and transparent. He also thought parliament could be useful in uncovering waste and corruption that might be weakening the king's own war effort. So, William actually took the initiative in creating a system of parliamentary checks on his own government. He offered to show parliament his accounts before it asked to see them; and he suggested setting up a Commons committee, the Parliamentary Commission of Accounts, to go through his spending line by line. When that committee produced its first report, it was damning. It condemned wasteful, irrational, and corrupt spending of money by the king's administration, going into the faults in great detail. Yet William did not react with hostility. He instead thanked the commissioners for their work — and went on offering his accounts so that the Commission could play the same role in subsequent years.<sup>27</sup> Again, the king was behaving as if he were answerable to parliament: but was doing so to promote his own policies.

## Conclusion

To conclude. By the mid 1690s, parliament had become the central political institution in England; and looked like the ultimate source of all political power. The Lords and Commons had become standing institutions of state; and were playing a new and major role in the organisation and strategy of the new king's core policy — the war with France. They had effectively appointed that king on their own authority (though perhaps without much freedom to have done anything else); and had been key to the unfolding of the 1688–9 revolution. For all these reasons, we can see the early years of William III's reign as the birth of a parliamentary

<sup>26</sup> For example, *His Majesties most gracious speech to both houses of parliament, October 19, 1689* (1689).

<sup>27</sup> Claydon, *William III: profiles*, pp. 143–52; Tony Claydon, *William III and the godly revolution* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 196–215.

system in England: though it was not the foundation of parliamentary sovereignty (which had happened far earlier), nor the triumph of parliamentary government (given the independent influence the crown preserved for some time after 1688–9, this would have to be dated far later). Yet it is remarkable that this birth of a parliamentary England had not really occurred because anyone had advanced a set of new principles for rule. Rather, it was because a set of political circumstances — particularly the priorities and style of William III — had put parliament at the centre of national life. No one had quite planned this. Even William had done what he had done to try to seize and to exercise royal power, not to limit it. However, he found that his strategies forced him to share authority and influence with the Lords and Commons, and they bound him to respect these bodies with his own words. The effects of the revolution of 1688–9 were therefore as accidental as they were profound.

## The Glorious Revolution in the Dutch Context: Foreign-Policy Discourses, Local Patronage and Catholics

Genji Yasuhira\*

In November 1688, William III of Orange (1650–1702) landed at Torbay, Devon. It was a remarkable expedition to Britain, with an army of more than 21,000 men, 5,000 horses, and 500 vessels — four times the size of the Spanish Armada just a century earlier.<sup>1</sup> Without this Dutch intervention or invasion, the revolution of 1688–9 might have never been accomplished.

This essay seeks to offer some Dutch perspectives on the Glorious Revolution. To achieve this limited aim, it will first trace Dutch historiography on the revolution, explaining why this extraordinary event has attracted limited attention from specialists on Dutch history. Secondly, it will introduce and review recent work by David Onnekink on Dutch foreign-policy discourses in 1688 and 1689, and by Coen Wilders on the local patronage network in the Dutch Republic after 1688. The former sheds light on political and ideological discourses of Dutch foreign policy relating to the revolution, positioning them in the context of the Dutch Forty Years' War from 1672 to 1713. The latter focuses on the revolution's aftermath on local politics in the province of Utrecht. Thirdly, this essay will present on new prospects for the future study of the Dutch Catholic perspective on the revolution. In this final section, I will offer some insight into my current research project, in which I attempt to examine Dutch Catholic survival tactics after 1685 vis-à-vis various types of immigrants and refugees pouring into the Protestant Republic.

### Dutch Historiography on the Glorious Revolution

In *The Anglo-Dutch Moment* (1991), Jonathan Israel emphasised the Dutch role in, and the European dimension of, the Glorious Revolution, distancing himself from the traditional Whiggish interpretation of it in British historiography. To better understand the Glorious Revolution, he persuasively argued, historians have to take into account Dutch strategic considerations of international politics and warfare.<sup>2</sup> Israel's call, however, elicited hardly any reactions from Dutch historians.<sup>3</sup> Some attention was given to the Dutch account of the

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\* Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Research Fellow CPD.

1 Israel, Jonathan I., 'The Dutch Role in the Glorious Revolution', Idem (ed.), *The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and Its World Impact* (Cambridge 1991) 106. I would like to express my gratitude to the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science for its generous funding (grant number: 19J00289) and to Albert Gootjes for correcting my English.

2 *Ibidem*, passim.

3 Onnekink, David, "'The Embarrassment of Power": The Historiography of the Dutch Republic in European Context in 1688', *Odysseus, The Bulletin of Area Studies (University of Tokyo)* (2009) 54.

invasion or the ‘glorious expedition’,<sup>4</sup> but on the whole, scholars of Dutch history show little interest in the revolution of 1688–9.

Why have Dutch specialists all but neglected the event in which the Dutch undoubtedly played an indispensable role? According to Onnekink, who has spent the past decade studying Dutch perspectives on the Glorious Revolution, two factors may well have kept Dutch specialists from devoted scholarly efforts to the revolution. First, ‘the overwhelming military success of 1688 seems to be at odds with the narrative of victimisation’ among Dutch historians. In 1688, the Dutch succeeded in invading Britain with extraordinary military forces. Onnekink argues that Dutch scholars tended to depict the Dutch Republic as a tolerant, pacifist state threatened by offensive, militant neighbours, including expansionist France under Louis XIV (1638–1715). Such a historiographical ‘embarrassment of power’, so Onnekink claims, has led Dutch specialists to avert their eyes from the Glorious Revolution.<sup>5</sup> Second, these historians gave preference to the early seventeenth century, or at least the period up to 1672. In that ‘Year of Disaster’, France, England, Cologne, and Münster simultaneously attacked the Dutch Republic. Large parts of the Republic, with the exception of the province of Holland which was spared by the tactical inundating of the waterlines, were occupied by foreign powers. Although the seventeenth century is commonly called the ‘Dutch Golden Age’, many historians assume that the Republic’s political and economic zenith had already passed by the Year of Disaster. According to this interpretation, the Dutch expedition of 1688 represented just another step towards the fall of Dutch hegemony, which had already started in 1672 or even earlier.<sup>6</sup>

In light of the above, the Glorious Revolution is better positioned in a somewhat longer period of Dutch history, starting from the Year of Disaster — i.e., the Dutch Forty Years’ War from 1672 to 1713, in which the Dutch Republic intermittently fought against France, including the Franco-Dutch War (1672–1678), as well as the Nine Years’ War (1688–1697), and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713). In his *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War, 1672–1713* (2016), Onnekink sets out to offer a new perspective of Dutch political discourses during the Forty Years’ War. He argues that the Forty Years’ War has been represented as a battle which the liberal Protestant republic was forced to wage to defend itself against the attacks of the tyrannical Catholic kingdom. He furthermore distinguishes five different interpretations of the cause of the Glorious Revolution from the Dutch perspective: The first underlines Dutch strategic considerations on the European balance of power; the second emphasises the Dutch reaction to the French *guerre de commerce*; the third highlights

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4 Groenveld, Simon, “‘J’equippe une flotte très considerable”: The Dutch Side of the Glorious Revolution’, in Robert Beddard (ed.), *The Revolution of 1688* (Oxford 1988); Kuil, Arjen van der, *De glorieuze overtocht. De expeditie van Willem III naar Engeland in 1688* (Amsterdam 1988).

5 Onnekink, ‘The Embarrassment of Power’, 54–55. Onnekink coined the term ‘embarrassment of power’, recalling Simon Schama’s famous *The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age* (New York 1987).

6 Onnekink, ‘The Embarrassment of Power’, 54, 59. On the ‘Year of Disaster’, see, for example, Israel, Jonathan I., *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806* (Oxford 1995) 796–825; Tex, Jan den, *Onder vreemde heren. De Republiek der Nederlanden 1672–1674* (Zutphen 1982).

William's ambitions to the English throne; the fourth stresses the notion of the liberties of Europe; and the fifth dwells on William's role as the champion of Protestantism in Europe. Among them, so Onnekink argues, the first, strategic interpretation has dominated historiography. In this framework, the Glorious Revolution, or the Dutch invasion of Britain, is represented as an endeavour that the Republic was compelled to take so as to turn England against France, and to secure the balance of power in Europe threatened by Louis XIV's expansionism or imperialism. In this line, its proponents have suggested that the realist necessity incited the Dutch to intervene in Britain, while downplaying the ideological and religious dimension of Dutch foreign policy at the time. According to these historians, in 1688 there was a sort of consensus concerning the expedition to Britain among Dutch politicians, lacking a partisan conflict in domestic politics.<sup>7</sup> Against this historiographical backdrop, Onnekink sets out his own view on the Dutch perspective on the Glorious Revolution.

### Foreign-Policy Discourses in 1688 and 1689

According to Onnekink, early modern Dutch political history has been dominated by 'revisionist' historiography, which is composed of 'the structure-of-politics interpretation of domestic politics' and the realist interpretation of foreign policy. The former regards domestic politics as factional strife at the local level, denying the importance of parties at the national level. Both of these 'revisionist' historiographical trends, Onnekink claims, reduce politics to a struggle for material interests.<sup>8</sup> Drawing on Lene Hansen's post-structuralist model of foreign-policy discourse, Onnekink rather insists that 'identity and foreign policy [...] are continuously shaping and reshaping each other', and that representations of 'identities are based on a Self-Other scheme'. Besides, foreign-policy discourses are understood to have provided 'policymakers with an "account, or a story, of the problems and issue they are trying to address"'.<sup>9</sup> Basing himself on these assumptions, Onnekink in his analysis employs the two-party model of the Orangists and Republicans. The former are thought to have pursued the centralisation of government and backed the strict wing of the Dutch Reformed Church, deploying a Universal Monarchy Discourse — a pro-war discourse — which ascribed the root of all evils to Louis XIV in order to form alliances in Europe. The Republicans, on the other hand, are considered to have aimed at the preservation of provincial particularism and found support among the liberal wing of the Dutch Reformed Church, retaining a Peace and Commerce Discourse — an anti-war discourse — which proclaimed neutralism in international politics in order to pursue overseas trade. Although the historians whom Onnekink describes as 'revisionists' rejected the two-party model for early modern Dutch political history, he insists that it was the period of the Forty Years' War that shaped the partisan

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7 Onnekink, David, *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War, 1672–1713* (Houndmills 2016) 2, 65–66, 83.

8 Idem, 'Embarrassment of Power', 43–45, 46–54; Idem, *Reinterpreting*, 5.

9 *Ibidem*, 18.

identities of Orangists and Republicans through foreign-policy discourses, while resisting the idea that the two parties existed ‘in an organizational sense’.<sup>10</sup> Here Onnekink suggests parallels between the Whig-Tory and the Republican-Orangist division.<sup>11</sup>

A brief outline of the two-party struggle in the seventeenth century as understood by Onnekink looks as follows: During the Twelve Years’ Truce (1609–1621), which interrupted the Dutch Revolt against Spain (1568–1648), the partisan struggle between Orangists and Republicans reached the level of a civil war. In 1619, Stadholder Maurice of Orange gained ascendancy over the Republicans, while Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1547–1619), the Grand Pensionary (the *de facto* prime minister) and the leader of the Republican party, was executed. During that time, other Republican regents were likewise purged from their political offices throughout the United Provinces. In 1648, the Dutch Eighty Years’ War was finally ended with the Peace of Münster, but Stadholder William II of Orange (1626–1650) wanted to continue the war, against the wishes of the province of Holland. Then, in 1650, the Prince laid siege on the Republican city of Amsterdam and imprisoned a number of Republican leaders in the castle of Loevestein. However, William II passed away suddenly in the autumn of 1650, eight days before his son William III was born. Soon thereafter, the Great Assembly (1651) was convened, where the Republicans abolished the stadholderate in five provinces including Holland and Utrecht. During the first stadholderless period from 1650 to 1672, Dutch politics were led by the Republican party, headed by Grand Pensionary Johan de Witt (1625–1672). Soon after the French army invaded the Northern Netherlands in the Year of Disaster, De Witt was lynched and killed by an angry mob, who blamed the war on the conciliatory policies under the Republicans. Backed by popular support, William III was installed as the Stadholder that very same year. From that time on, the Orangists were in charge of national policy making, waging the Forty Years’ War against France.<sup>12</sup>

How, then, did the Dutch justify their invasion of Britain in 1688? In order to trace Dutch foreign-policy discourses in 1688 and 1689, Onnekink deals with three types of primary source materials, namely 1) formal published documents like declarations of war, 2) unpublished political documents such as diplomatic correspondences, and 3) popular publications like pamphlets. Onnekink argues that foreign-policy discourses in 1688 and 1689 overall demonstrate that the Dutch lived in fear of a repeat of the Year of Disaster, and that the Republicans’ Peace and Commerce Discourse was absent at that time.<sup>13</sup>

Before landing at Torbay, the Dutch formal published documents, including *Reasons for Parting* (*Redenen van afscheyt van sijn Hoogheyt den Heere Prince van Orange*, 1688), employed a Two Kings Discourse, in which English and French kings of the Catholic faith were represented as the menace. This sort of foreign-policy discourse emphasised the protection of the Protestant ‘religion and liberty’ in the Dutch Republic and England; a clear confessional divide was drawn between the English Protestant nation and the Catholic

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10 *Ibidem*, 19, 26.

11 *Ibidem*, 25, 34.

12 *Ibidem*, 25–26.

13 *Ibidem*, 69–83.

monarch James II. According to Onnekink, it is remarkable that these formal published documents lacked the Universal Monarchy Discourse of the Orangists and hardly many any reference to the European balance of power at all. Although previous studies have assumed that a Religion and Liberty Discourse was mobilised as war propaganda in William's *Declaration of Reasons* (*The Declaration of His Highness William Henry*, 1688), aimed at an English audience, Onnekink points out that the Religion and Liberty Discourse is widespread in Dutch documents from 1688 and 1689, and that the *Declaration of Reasons* did compare the situation of 1672 with the situation of 1688 in the Dutch context. After William entered Britain, however, the first signs of a Universal Monarchy Discourse emerged in formal published documents, including the Dutch declaration of war on France issued in March 1689. William had already made England join the Dutch side, so that Two Kings Discourse disappeared in the declaration, which now focused on similarities between the French invasion of the Dutch Republic in 1672 and the war of 1688. The declaration assumed that Louis XIV had been and was still concocting a plot to destroy the Dutch Republic, a typical narrative in Universal Monarchy Discourse, even though the declaration itself was still based on a Religion and Liberty Discourse. Noteworthy in the declaration is its introspective nature, lacking all references to the balance of power, to Protestantism, or to the liberties in Europe (with the sole exception of the Huguenots in France). The exclusive object of the war was to defend the Reformed faith and liberties in the Dutch Republic.<sup>14</sup>

Political documents written by Dutch diplomats also deployed Two Kings and Religion and Liberty Discourses. Remarkable about such political documents is their orientation towards Europe, as they pursued a European, supra-confessional alliance against the two Catholic kings. The Dutch diplomats did not blame the French or Catholicism *per se*. Rather, they demonised only the two kings or the entourage at their courts, especially the Jesuits, thus creating room for potential support from Catholics on the continent, including the Holy Roman Emperor. In his private correspondence, William likewise utilised a Religion and Liberty Discourse, albeit without reference to the European balance of power or universal monarchy.<sup>15</sup>

Popular pamphlets published before and during the Glorious Revolution relied on a Two Kings Discourse too, reminding their audience of the Year of Disaster. It is worth noting, however, that some pamphlets, like *The English Herring Baked on a French Grill* (*Den Engelschen bokkum gebraden op een France rooster...*, 1688), were fiercely anti-Catholic and depicted Louis XIV as a 'cursed Tyrant', who attempted to destroy the true church; here we see the Universal Monarchy Discourse of the Orangists. Likewise, *The Spirit of France* (*De geest van Vrankryk, en de grondregelen van Lodewijk de XIV aan Europa ontdekt*, 1688) focused not so much on the international Jesuit conspiracy, but on Louis XIV as the universal monarchy. In such pamphlets, the sole cause of the wars in 1672 and 1688 was ascribed to Louis XIV, who seduced England to oppose the Dutch Republic. At the outset of the Dutch invasion of Britain in the autumn of 1688, Universal Monarchy Discourse had come to occupy

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14 *Ibidem*, 69–72.

15 *Ibidem*, 72–76.

the Dutch popular pamphlets, replacing the Two Kings Discourse. Now the root of all evils was identified as the French King, who aimed at a universal monarchy by demolishing Christendom and liberties in Europe. Noteworthy in the popular pamphlets is the strong religious favour of the Universal Monarchy Discourse. Furthermore, the Orangist pamphlets after the Dutch invasion further developed the Religion and Liberty Discourse as well, integrating into it a commercial aspect of the Republicans' Peace and Commerce Discourse.<sup>16</sup>

On the basis of these analyses, Onnekink formulates two conclusive arguments vis-à-vis previous scholarship. First, he claims that it was not the material but the religious interests that coloured the Dutch foreign-policy discourses at the time of the Glorious Revolution. Religion and Liberty Discourse dominated Dutch foreign-policy discourses throughout the period 1688–1689, while Two Kings Discourse prevailed before and during the Dutch invasion, and Universal Monarchy Discourse gained supremacy especially after the autumn of 1688. Onnekink finds no evidence for the notion of the European balance of power in Dutch foreign-policy discourses in 1688 and 1689, even though previous studies had adopted the strategic interpretation of the Glorious Revolution, emphasising the realist necessity for the Dutch to keep the European balance of power for the sake of material interests.<sup>17</sup> Second, the Republicans' Peace and Commerce Discourse was absent not because of a national consensus on the Dutch invasion, as previously assumed, but because 'Republicans were confronted with a discursive deadlock'. As Onnekink puts it, 'Peace and Commerce Discourse seemed at odds with current threats' in 1688 and 1689. In addition, Orangists appropriated the commercial viewpoint of the Republicans when developing their Religion and Liberty Discourse.<sup>18</sup>

Although Onnekink's argument concerning the religious aspect of Dutch foreign-policy discourse and the absence of the European balance of power in such discourses is certainly persuasive, his claim regarding the two-party model of foreign-policy discourses raises many questions. For example, the absence of the Republicans' Peace and Commerce Discourse in 1688 and 1689 seems to exemplify the failure of their party's identity construction. While asserting that he does not aim to call for 'a revival of the two-party model [...] in an organizational sense',<sup>19</sup> Onnekink does end up substantialising the two parties, even though he fails to find the Republican anti-war discourse (Peace and Commerce Discourse) once the war had started. As Pepijn Brandon points out, 'Onnekink seems to replace this one-sided realism [advocated by so-called revisionist historians] with an even more one-sided constructivist approach to international relations in which war is considered the outcome of a series of purely subjective discursive strategies'.<sup>20</sup> The two-party model seems to recede even further into the background in early modern Dutch local politics as we will discuss them in the next section.

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16 *Ibidem*, 78–79.

17 *Ibidem*, 84.

18 *Ibidem*, 76–77, 79–84.

19 *Ibidem*, 26.

20 Brandon, Pepijn, 'Review: David Onnekink, *Reinterpreting the Dutch Forty Years War, 1672–1713*', *BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review* 133 (DOI: <http://doi.org/10.18352/bmgn-lchr.10581>) (2018).

## Local Patronage Network in Utrecht after 1688

What impact, then, did the Glorious Revolution make on Dutch local politics in practice? Coen Wilders recently approached this hitherto neglected question in his study on the patronage system and networks of William III in the province of Utrecht from 1672 to 1702.<sup>21</sup> Wilders's starting point is Daniel Jeen Roorda's interpretation of Dutch domestic politics as factional strife. In his groundbreaking study, Roorda subjected the traditional two-party 'Orangists vs. Republicans' model to heavy criticism, insisting that such distinctively organised national parties did not exist in practice. He rather suggested that local factions, rather than national parties, were at work in seventeenth-century Dutch politics. Factions were more loosely organised than parties, and driven by selfish and familial interests in local settings.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, it is Roorda's view that Onnekink labels as 'revisionist'. Here Onnekink finds similarities between Roorda's model and the theory of the structure of politics advocated by Lewis Namier in British historiography.<sup>23</sup> Before delving into Wilders's analysis of the aftereffects of the Glorious Revolution on Utrecht's local politics, we first have to offer a brief overview of the political system of the province of Utrecht before 1688.

In the Dutch Republic, each of the seven sovereign provinces had its own unique political structure. Going even further back than the outset of the Dutch Revolt against Spain, the Provincial States of Utrecht had been composed of three voting units: the first estate represented the clergy (canons) of the five chapters in the city of Utrecht; the second estate, the Knighthood (*Ridderschap*), represented the nobility; and the third estate represented cities. After the outlawing of Catholic religious practices in Utrecht in 1580, the first estate came to consist of eight secularised canons from the five chapters who were known as *Geëligeerden*.<sup>24</sup> The five chapters held a quarter of all the land in the province, and hosted no fewer than 140 canons belonging to Utrecht's highest socio-economic strata. Since the chapters remained as secularised corporations, canons continued to enjoy socio-economic and political privileges, even with the loss of their clerical functions.<sup>25</sup> In seventeenth-century provincial politics in Utrecht, the second estate (four to seven representatives of the nobility) and the third estate (two incumbent burgomasters of Utrecht, and four to six members of the Utrecht city council, as well as one to three representatives from each smaller city) fought each other over the eight

21 Wilders, Coen, *Patronage in de provincie. Het Utrechtse netwerk van stadhouder Willem III* (Amsterdam 2015).

22 Roorda, Daniel Jeen, *Partij en factie. De oproeren van 1672 in de steden van Holland en Zeeland, een krachtmeting tussen partijen en facties* (Groningen 1961).

23 Onnekink, 'Embarrassment of Power', 52–54; Idem, *Reinterpreting*, 5.

24 Kaplan, Benjamin J., *Calvinists and Libertines: Confessions and Community in Utrecht, 1578–1620* (Oxford 1995) 137.

25 *Ibidem*, 113–116; Rengers Hora Siccama, Duco Gerrold, *De geestelijke en kerkelijke goederen onder het cannonieke, het gereformeerde en het neutrale recht. Historisch-juridisch verhandeling, voornamelijk uit Utrechtsche gegevens samengesteld* (Utrecht 1905) 396–414. It is worth mentioning that Catholics — both priests and laymen — could be appointed to these prominent positions until 1615, when the Provincial States decided that from then on only the Reformed were to be eligible for appointment as canons. Water, Johan van de, *Groot Placaat-Boek vervattende all de placaten ... der Staten's lands van Utrecht*, 3 vols. (Utrecht 1729) I, 218.

votes of the first estate (the *Geëligeerden*); there was thus a conflict between the noble faction and the civic faction. Originally, the Stadholder had been a representative of the Burgundian and Habsburg sovereign in the Netherlands. In the Dutch Republic, the Stadholder in theory was appointed by and served the sovereign Provincial States, but in practice he asserted enormous influence on local politics, for example by the appointment of magistrates. Although Stadholder Maurice (1567–1625) decided in 1618 to distribute the eight representatives of the first estate equally between the nobility and the patriciate so as to achieve a power balance between the second estate of the noble faction and third estate of the civic faction, in practice this regulation was not always observed. In the course of the seventeenth century, the nobility gradually lost the political influence they had once had at the provincial level through the first and second estates, while the process of oligarchisation advanced in the third estate and in all of the city councils.<sup>26</sup>

The Year of Disaster marked a watershed also in the history of Utrecht. From June 1672 to November 1673, Utrecht was occupied by the French army, allowing for a temporary revival of the freedom to practice the Catholic faith.<sup>27</sup> After the French evacuation, Utrecht was initially occupied by the Dutch army and the States General. All the public office holders, including members of the city council and the Provincial States, were forced to resign by the States General. This was decided under pressure from the strict Calvinists, who ascribed the cause of the Year of Disaster to the Republicans; a collective petition, signed by approximately forty local Calvinists, demanded the dismissal of all public office holders.<sup>28</sup> The Reformed minister Thaddaeus de Landtman came to Utrecht after its ‘liberation’ and incited local Calvinists to draw up this petition.<sup>29</sup> In the evening of 16 November 1673, De Landtman offered a prayer of thanksgiving in the Dom Church in Utrecht, but, so the local patrician Everard Booth (1638–1714) observes in his diary, he did so not for the city or province of Utrecht, but ‘only for the other Provinces’. The next day Johan van Nellesteyn (1617–1677), who had been burgomaster in the past and later was to serve in that capacity again, told Booth that ‘over this City possessing such notable privileges, neither Holland nor the Generality has

26 Wilders, *Patronage*, 11–13, 30–31, 138.

27 For the French occupation of Utrecht, see, for example, Jessurun-ten Dam Ham, Suzanna Christina Johanna, *Utrecht in 1672 en 1673* (Utrecht 1934); Tex, *Onder vreemde heren*, passim; Vanhaelen, Angela, *The Wake of Iconoclasm: Painting the Church in the Dutch Republic* (University Park 2012) 130–158. For Catholics in Utrecht under the French occupation, see Forclaz, Bertrand, *Catholiques au défi de la Réforme. La coexistence confessionnelle à Utrecht au XVIIe siècle* (Paris 2014) 181–225; Yasuhira, Genji, *Civic Agency in the Public Sphere: Catholics’ Survival Tactics in Utrecht, 1620s–1670s* (Ph.D. dissertation, Tilburg University 2019) 152–182; Idem, ‘Confessional Coexistence and Perceptions of the “Public”: Catholics’ Agency in Negotiations on Poverty and Charity in Utrecht, 1620s–1670s’, *BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review* 132:4 (2017) 11–15; Idem, ‘Interconfessional Relations and the Function of Toleration: The Struggle for the Practice of Faith in Utrecht during the 1670s’, *The Shirin or the Journal of History* 98:2 (2015, written in Japanese) 17–25.

28 Booth, Everard, ‘Dagelijksche aantekeningen gedurende het verblijf der Franschen te Utrecht in 1672 en 1673’, *Berigten van het Historisch Genootschap te Utrecht* 6 (1857) 149–151.

29 Roorda, Daniel Jeen, ‘Prins Willem III en het Utrechtse regeringsreglement. Een schets van gebeurtenissen, achtergronden en problemen’, in Huib Leeuwenberg & Louise van Tongerloo (eds.), *Van standen tot staten. 600 jaar Staten van Utrecht, 1375–1975* (Utrecht 1975) 110–111.

any power'.<sup>30</sup> These local Utrechters felt threatened by the central authority led by Holland, which tried to intervene in or reduce Utrecht's local privileges. On 14 April 1674, William entered the city, and two days later a new system of governance (*regeringsreglement*) was imposed on Utrecht, reducing its political independence and assigning greater political authority to the Stadholder in local politics through his appointive power. The new civil government was installed, tightening relations with William and the strict Calvinists, and purging Republicans and those who had collaborated with the French occupiers.<sup>31</sup>

In his study on the new system of governance installed in Utrecht in 1674, Roorda found factional conflicts rather than partisan struggles in the local politics: in Utrecht from 1660 to the mid-1680s, the Orangists were divided between pro-Holland and anti-Holland factions, a middle group existed between Orangists and Republicans, and there were also opportunists like Everard van Weede van Dijkveld (1626–1702). Roorda argued that after 1674, Utrecht's local politics were to be determined by William's patronage system, emphasising the increase in the Prince's political influence at the local level. In his view, the agency of the Utrecht elite was largely curtailed.<sup>32</sup> Wilders, in contrast, reinterprets William's patronage system as a more reciprocal mediation system, modifying the previous image developed by Roorda and others, who claimed that Utrecht lost its political independence due to the new system of governance allowing the autocratic Stadholder to impose his own interests on the province. Wilders maintains that Utrecht's political elite also benefited from William's patronage and mediation.<sup>33</sup> Here, Wilders locates the turning point for Utrecht's local patronage and mediation system in the Glorious Revolution.<sup>34</sup>

The new Stadholder William provided Utrecht with formal and informal routes of mediation in local politics, which the Provincial States needed in order to prevent a repeat of the Year of Disaster. Until the French occupation in 1672, the Stadholder had been able to intervene in the Provincial States of Utrecht only when invited by the States. The new system of governance of 1674 officialised the Stadholder's role as a mediator in the Provincial States. Concerning issues of foreign policy or provincial finance, both of which required unanimous approval in the States, William's position could now be accepted without any further discussion. Besides, through an informal network, William began interfering in the Provincial States of Utrecht in a way that had not been common before. He ordered the secretary of the Provincial States to send him extracts of all the important resolutions taken at the States, which enabled him to get a hold on local affairs in Utrecht while he was away from the province. While William was mostly absent from the assemblies of the Provincial States of Utrecht after

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30 Booth, 'Dagelijksche aantekeningen', 153–154: 'alleenlijk voor d'andere Provintien' and 'dese Stad sulke notabele privilegien hebbende, Holland noch de Generaliteyt geen macht hadden'.

31 Booth, 'Dagelijksche aantekeningen', 161–162; Water, *Groot Placaat-Boek*, I, 169–174; Forclaz, *Catholiques*, 217; Roorda 'Prins Willem III', 117–119; Wilders, *Patronage*, 41–51, 58–62. For Utrecht Catholics in the aftermath of the French evacuation in the 1670s, see also Yasuhira, *Civic Agency*, 182–199; Idem, 'Confessional Coexistence', 15–21; Idem, 'Interconfessional Relations', 25–33.

32 Roorda 'Prins Willem III'.

33 Wilders, *Patronage*, passim, especially 152, 177–183.

34 *Ibidem*, 155–173.

1674, he did manage to express his views through his correspondence with the local political elite, even when he was not asked to do so.<sup>35</sup> In addition to correspondence, social gathering places in Utrecht offered another informal avenue for political power. Those places included the Prince's palace at Soestdijk in Utrecht, which William purchased in 1674, and the estates of noblemen, among them Godard Adriaan van Reede van Amerongen (1621–1691), the leader of the Utrecht noble faction. Hunting represented a particularly important occasion for Utrecht's elite to build a cordial relationship with the Prince.<sup>36</sup> Through these formal and informal patronage and mediation networks, Dijkveld and Amerongen expanded their political power in Utrecht.<sup>37</sup> In an attempt to quickly adopt a resolution in the Provincial States of Utrecht, after 1674, committees were to be formed to discuss the matter ahead of time in order to make proposals on political issues to the States. In these committees, Dijkveld and Amerongen were expected to approve the draft of the proposal, even though Dijkveld's influence was limited to the civic faction and Amerongen's to the noble faction.<sup>38</sup>

The Glorious Revolution introduced changes to this reciprocal system of the local politics. After the Dutch invasion of Britain, it took more than two years for William to return to the Northern Netherlands, and even thereafter, the Prince-King stayed in his fatherland for only a limited period of time. Now his primary geopolitical concern shifted from the Dutch Republic to England, Ireland, and the Southern Netherlands. As a consequence of William's physical absence from the Dutch Republic after 1688, a number of formal and informal practical problems arose in Utrecht's politics, accelerating oligopoly among the local elite. As for the formal practical problems, since William was mostly away from Utrecht and could not check the list of magistrate nominees promptly, the process of their appointment was often delayed. As for the informal practical problems, his response to letters from the Utrecht elite at best came back late, and at worst were never returned at all. The Utrecht elite also lost the opportunity to have an audience with William at his palace or the Amerongen house. Since William's focus in foreign policy shifted from Germany to England after the revolution, Amerongen lost the role he had once had in William's foreign-policy network. After Amerongen's decline, no mediator appeared between William and the Utrecht elite. Dijkveld, on the other hand, became a trusted minion of the Prince-King, turning into his most important diplomat. At the provincial level, Dijkveld developed his own patronage relationships not only among the civic faction, but also among the noble faction in the province of Utrecht, enabling him to control the Provincial States of Utrecht according to William's wishes. All of these circumstances resulted in a unilateral growth in William's influence in Utrecht's local politics, contributing to the increase in political power of only a small number of the local elite at the cost of many others.<sup>39</sup>

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35 *Ibidem*, 141–142.

36 *Ibidem*, 73–92.

37 *Ibidem*, passim, especially 95–134.

38 *Ibidem*, 140–141.

39 *Ibidem*, 155–173.

Based on Roorda's factional interpretation of seventeenth-century Dutch local politics, Wilders presents a persuasive, modified account of William's political role in Utrecht. After the new system of governance had been installed in 1674, William developed patronage and mediation networks in Utrecht, from which many members of the local political elite first benefited. It was the Glorious Revolution and William's physical absence from the Northern Netherlands that changed this reciprocal political system. In other words, the previous depiction of William's patronage system in Utrecht as a unilateral one may fit the situation after 1688, but certainly not the entire period of his stadholdership. As Tony Claydon vividly demonstrates, the revolution of 1688–9 and William's political circumstances gave birth to a parliamentary system in England.<sup>40</sup> In Utrecht, on the other hand, the revolution ended up reducing parliamentary independence.

### Dutch Catholic Perspectives

This essay aims to present Dutch perspectives on the Glorious Revolution, but so far we have only considered the revolution from the top-down viewpoint of the Dutch Reformed political elite. Since in principle only full communicant members of the Dutch Reformed Church were allowed to hold a public political office in the Republic, we have no option but to employ the Reformed perspective in narrating early modern Dutch political history of either foreign-policy discourses or local patronage networks. What we lack are bottom-up Dutch Catholic perspectives on the revolution.

For a better understanding of the Glorious Revolution in Dutch history, we need to turn to the perspective of Dutch Catholics, who were too important as a politico-religious minority in the multi-confessional Republic to ignore. The Dutch Republic is and has been famous for its religious diversity. It is impossible to determine the precise number of believers of the various confessions in the Dutch Republic, since people could voluntarily choose their particular confessional affiliation on Dutch soil. The Union of Utrecht established in 1579 guaranteed freedom of conscience for every inhabitant in the Dutch Republic including Catholics, and thus people were not legally coerced to become members of the Dutch Reformed Church.<sup>41</sup> Unlike the Anglican Church, the Dutch Reformed Church was not a state church but a 'public church', which had the obligation to serve everyone, meaning that even Catholics could baptise their children, marry, and be buried in public churches.<sup>42</sup> It is certain, however, that the Reformed did not form a numerical majority of the seventeenth-century Dutch population, and that many men and women continued to belong to the Catholic Church. In the mid-seventeenth century, for example, the total population of the city of Utrecht (30,000) was

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40 See Claydon's contribution in this issue.

41 E.g. Jong, O.J. de, 'Unie en religie', in Simon Groenveld & H.L.Ph. Leeuwenberg (eds.), *De Unie van Utrecht. Wording en werking van een verband en een verbondsacte* (The Hague 1979).

42 E.g. Deursen, Arie Theodorus van, *Bavianen en slijkgeuzen. Kerk en kerkvolk ten tijde van Maurits en Oldenbarnevelt* (Assen 1974) 13–33, 128–160.

composed of 12,000 Reformed full communicant members (40.0%), 10,000 Catholics (33.3%), 2,250 Lutherans (7.5%), 500 Anabaptists (1.7%), 200 Remonstrants (0.7%), and 5,000 undecided (16.6%).<sup>43</sup> Besides, in such cities as Utrecht, the Catholic community included many members of the socio-economic elite, even though Catholics on Dutch soil in theory lost the right to practice their faith publicly and to assume public offices. It was the 'tolerant' Dutch Republic that strategically institutionalised and legalised confessional discrimination against the politico-religious minority of Catholics.<sup>44</sup>

During the past decade of early modern Dutch historiography, the study of Catholics has seen a particular boost, now covering a wide range of topics from national and individual Catholic identity or sub-culture to Catholic survival tactics in local settings. One of the characteristics of such recent studies is their focus on the period following the second half of the seventeenth century, while previous studies on early modern Dutch religious history had dealt primarily with the period of the Dutch Eighty Years' War, from 1568 to 1648.<sup>45</sup> One of the questions past scholarship has not resolved, however, is the following: While the Glorious Revolution paved the way for the Toleration Act in England, what impact it have for the survival of Catholics in the Dutch Republic?

While I do not as yet have an answer to this question, I can clarify an aspect of the circumstances in which Dutch Catholics in the late 1680s lived by considering their reaction to Huguenot refugees. Due to the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, hundreds of thousands of Huguenots (estimated ca. 150,000) fled from France to Protestant states, including the Dutch Republic (ca. 35,000).<sup>46</sup> David van der Linden has recently demonstrated that many Huguenot refugees experienced socio-economic hardships on Dutch soil despite the favourable condition offered by the Dutch Reformed authorities for their residence or business.<sup>47</sup> Remarkably, in the cities of Leiden and Haarlem, local Catholics made substantial donations for the Huguenot exiles.<sup>48</sup> Ever since the outbreak of the Dutch Revolt against

43 Forclaz, *Catholiques*, 87.

44 See, for example, Yasuhira, *Civic Agency*, passim, especially 64–106; Idem, 'Confessional Coexistence'; Idem, 'Delimitation of the "Public" and Freedom of Conscience: Catholics' Survival Tactics in Legal Discourses in Utrecht, 1630–1659', *Early Modern Low Countries* 3:1 (2019); Idem, 'A Swarm of "Locusts": Pro/Persecution and Toleration of Catholic Priests in Utrecht, 1620–1672', *Church History and Religious Culture* 99:2 (2019).

45 E.g. Forclaz, *Catholiques*; Frijhoff, Willem, *Embodied Belief: Ten Essays on Religious Culture in Dutch History* (Hilversum 2002); Geraerts, Jaap, *Patrons of the Old Faith: The Catholic Nobility in Utrecht and Guelders, c.1580–1702* (Leiden 2018); Janssen, Geert H., *The Dutch Revolt and Catholic Exile in Reformation Europe* (Cambridge 2014); Lenarduzzi, Carolina, *Katholiek in de Republiek. De belevingswereld van een religieuze minderheid 1570–1750* (Nijmegen 2019); Parker, Charles H., *Faith on the Margins: Catholics and Catholicism in the Dutch Golden Age* (Cambridge 2008); Pollmann, Judith, *Catholic Identity and the Revolt of the Netherlands* (Oxford 2011); Spaans, Joke, *De Levens der Maechden. Het verhaal van een religieuze vrouwengemeenschap in de eerste helft van de zeventiende eeuw* (Hilversum 2012); Yasuhira, *Civic Agency*; Idem, 'Confessional Coexistence'; Idem, 'Delimitation'; Idem, 'A Swarm'.

46 Nusteling, Hubert, 'The Netherlands and the Huguenot Émigrés', in H. Bots & G.H.M. Posthumus Meyjes (eds.), *La Révocation de l'Édit de Nantes et les Provinces-Unies, 1685* (Amsterdam 1986) 26–30.

47 Linden, David van der, *Experiencing Exile: Huguenot Refugees in the Dutch Republic, 1680–1700* (Farnham 2015) 39–78.

48 Bots, H., Posthumus Meyjes, G.H.M. & Wieringa, Frouke, *Vlucht naar de Vrijheid. De Hugenoten en de*

Spain in 1568, Catholics were at times represented as the fifth column, who might betray the Reformed Republic and collaborate with Catholic enemies such as Spain and France.<sup>49</sup> As we have seen above, the Dutch Forty Years' War was justified as the battle for religion and liberty against the universal monarchy of Louis XIV. Accordingly, Catholic donations to Huguenot refugees in Leiden and Haarlem may well suggest that image construction was one of their tactics for survival. Local Catholics in these cities attempted to demonstrate their solidarity with the Protestant exiles, constructing a positive self-representation; and they tried to denounce what the Catholic king of France had done to the Huguenots, rejecting their own negative representation by the Dutch Reformed. This raises another research question for future studies: How did the Glorious Revolution change the domestic environment of confessional coexistence in the Dutch Republic, under which Catholics sought to create room for their survival by constructing their positive self-image vis-à-vis Huguenot refugees? The study of this question will offer us a bottom-up Dutch Catholic perspective on the revolution of 1688–9.

### Concluding Remarks

If we wish to understand the Glorious Revolution in the Dutch context, we must first position it in the context of the Dutch Forty Years' War against France from 1672 to 1713. The Year of Disaster inflicted a profound trauma on the Dutch, in whose eyes the situation of 1688 resembled that of 1672. Since Dutch historiography has commonly assumed that the decline of the Dutch Republic began no later than the Year of Disaster, the Glorious Revolution has failed to attract attention from specialists on Dutch history. The historiographical 'embarrassment of power' might be another reason for the neglect of this event among Dutch scholars. Regardless of whether or not the idealised two-party model may be applied to the analysis of Dutch foreign-policy discourses, Onnekink's argument is certainly persuasive with a view to the importance of the religious cause in such discourses and the absence of the notion of the European balance of power there. For the study of Dutch domestic politics in local settings at least, the framework of factional politics advocated by Roorda is still useful. As Wilders demonstrates, the patronage and mediation system in Utrecht, which was constructed in the aftermath of the Year of Disaster, was at first highly reciprocal for William and the local political elite. It was the Glorious Revolution and William's resulting physical absence from

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*Nederlanden* (Amsterdam, 1985) 72. On Leiden, see also Israel, Jonathan I., *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806* (Oxford 1995) 647–648. On Haarlem, see also Bergin, Emma, 'Defending the True Faith: Religious Themes in Dutch Pamphlets on England, 1688–1689', in David Onnekink (ed.), *War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648–1713* (Aldershot 2009) 228; Gibbs, Graham, 'The Reception of the Huguenots in England and the Dutch Republic, 1680–1690', in Ole Peter Grell, Jonathan I. Israel & Nicholas Tyacke (eds.), *From Persecution to Toleration: The Glorious Revolution and Religion in England* (Oxford 1991) 302.

49 E.g. Yasuhira, *Civic Agency*, passim; Idem, 'Confessional Coexistence'; Idem, 'Delimitation', passim; Idem, 'A Swarm', passim.

the Northern Netherlands that transformed the patronage and mediation system into a unilateral political tool for William's autocratic power. The revolution therefore ended up diminishing parliamentary independence in Dutch local politics. On the other hand, to date we still lack Dutch Catholic perspectives on the Glorious Revolution. Catholic survival tactics through representations vis-à-vis incoming Huguenot refugees may thus present prospects for future bottom-up studies on Dutch Catholic perspectives of the Glorious Revolution.

## *Historians and Their Histories* An Interview with Sir Keith Thomas

We are pleased to announce a proposal of publishing a series of interviews with distinguished historians of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The first instance is that with Sir Keith Thomas, held on 21 March 2016, and chaired by Kazuhiko Kondo, in the meeting room of the Faculty of Letters, the University of Tokyo. The list of the participants appears on pages 57–8. — Editors.

**Kazu:** We are delighted to have Sir Keith (Vivian) Thomas here at the University of Tokyo, to take part in an afternoon interview. We'd like to talk about your life and experience, what you thought about important things in your intellectual life, about recent historical studies and the humanities. We have distributed some printed notes about your vital facts. In fact, we are not the first to conduct an interview like this. There have been several interviews and bibliographical notes of the historian Keith Thomas. We may repeat what we think is most important today, but we may skip what seems irrelevant. And today we have Valerie, Lady Thomas, too. It'll be nice if you could intervene when you think necessary.

First, about your childhood. You were born in south Wales in 1933 as a farmer's son, and your mother was a graduate of Cardiff University. The family was Anglican and conservative as I understand. Will you tell me something about your family background and intellectual environment?

### **A Welsh boy**

**KVT:** Well, I was born in 1933 in Wick, a little village in the Vale of Glamorgan, which is the southernmost and most Anglicized part of Wales, because it had been occupied by the Normans since the Norman Conquest. My father was a tenant farmer. He was a farmer's son, one of seven children, all but one of them boys. He left school when he was thirteen. His father regarded his sons as potential farmers who would learn the necessary skills by working as his labourers for some years, after which he would set them up on a tenant farm of their own. My father worked for him until he was thirty, when he married my mother. She was the headmistress of the local village school, but gave it up on her marriage. Her father had been the headmaster of Llanbradach school, in the Rhymney Valley, though he too came from a farming family. Her mother, who had also been a schoolteacher, was a Scot from Glasgow. As a girl, my mother boarded at Howell's School, Llandaff, and went on to read English Language and Literature at the University College of Wales, Cardiff, though not very diligently, as she spent a lot of time acting.

My father began farming in Wick, but, when I was two years old, we all moved ten miles or so east to Llancarfan, where he rented Pancross Farm. It had originally belonged to the Church, but David Lloyd George, Prime Minister in the early twentieth century, had disendowed the Welsh Church, confiscating its lands and giving them to the University of Wales. So our landlord was the Principal of University College of Wales, Aberystwyth. It was a farm of 250 acres. As I grew up, my mother plied me with books and encouraged me to read extensively. My father, though less educated, was at least as intelligent as she was, but he had been brought up on the assumption that all farmers' sons should, if possible, become farmers. He quickly became aware that I was not going to make a very good farmer, whereas my brother, who was two years younger, could not wait to leave school and join him on the farm. Anyway, at the age of four I began at the village school. Six years later I passed the examination to go to Barry County School, which was a local grammar school, a selective school which happened to have a very good academic tradition.

**Kazu:** You were bright enough to get a scholarship to Barry County Grammar School. Being a pupil at the county grammar school as a scholar, does that mean that you were qualified to pay nothing for the education? And the famous history master there was Teifion Phillips. What was Phillips like as a teacher?

**KVT:** So far as the fee was concerned, in my first year — I went there in 1944 — you had to pay a small nominal sum, 50/-, and I remember queuing up with my father in the playground to pay this. Then a year later, the Butler Education Act came in to force, and secondary education was free. Teifion Phillips arrived slightly after me at the school. Although I was very fond of historical novels, I wasn't particularly interested in history at this stage. When I reached the sixth form, we had to decide what subjects to specialize in for what was called the Higher School Certificate. I was going to do English, Latin and French, but Teifion Phillips, the new history master, intercepted me on the way to the room where I was going to register and said, 'You are going to do history, aren't you?' And I, who always believe whatever the last person tells me, replied, 'Yes, I am going to do history'. The consequences of that single sentence have stayed with me for the rest of my life (laughter).

Teifion Phillips was a very inspiring history master. He was a man of left-wing opinions. The prescribed school textbook on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English history was a rather old-fashioned book by M. M. Reese, entitled *The Tudors and Stuarts*. He introduced me to the Marxist journal, the *Modern Quarterly*, which had a special issue on the English Revolution of 1640. I had always thought that the English Revolution was in 1688, not 1640, so this was, for me, a new interpretation of the seventeenth century. Teifion also introduced me to the book which would influence me most at that age, R. H. Tawney's *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*. Teifion also encouraged me to apply to Oxford, which was not the normal destination of boys from Barry.

**Kazu:** Balliol?

**KVT:** Yes, Balliol. I didn't know anything about Oxford colleges and I certainly didn't know that Balliol was at that time the top college, intellectually. I think I would have been put off from applying there, if I had known that. Anyway I did sit the examination and I got a scholarship at Balliol.

**Kazu:** Balliol was the college of R. H. Tawney, and other eminent ones.

**KVT:** Yes, Tawney had studied there; and so had many other great historians in the past: Sir Lewis Namier, Sir Charles Firth, Sir Maurice Powicke, Professor Richard Pares and many, many others.

**Kazu:** So at Balliol College, Oxford, were you tutored by Christopher Hill right away?

### Oxford 1952–57

**KVT:** I first met Christopher Hill when I came up for my interview at Balliol. A few days later, I received a letter from him, congratulating me on getting the Brackenbury Scholarship (the top one), which was very exciting news for me. I didn't go straight to Oxford after leaving school. Instead, I had to do two years of National Service in the army, most of it spent quite happily in Jamaica. After that, I came back and went to Balliol, where I had several very distinguished tutors. First, I encountered Richard Southern (later Sir Richard), an outstanding medieval historian. He believed in plunging you in at the deep end and the essays he set me were all on primary sources of medieval history, written in Latin.

Then I went to Christopher Hill for sixteenth- and seventeenth-century history, which was the period in which I was particularly interested. Christopher was, of course, a Marxist, though a very idiosyncratic one. He had come to the seventeenth century, not because it was the time of revolution, but because he was interested in metaphysical poetry. It was the literature of the period which had attracted him initially. He wasn't at all a didactic tutor. The Oxford system was that your tutor set you an essay; you wrote it and then read it aloud to your tutor, after which he and you discussed it together. In Christopher's case, there would be a long silence after I'd finished reading it. Abhorring a vacuum, I'd fill the silence by saying something for the sake of it; for example, I might say, 'If I had had more time, I would have said (such and such)'. A long silence again, which I'd break by saying, 'On the other hand, I could have said (so and so)'. Again, a long silence. At long last, the clock in next-door Trinity College would strike the hour and Christopher would lean forward with relief and ask what we were going to do next week.

Yet, despite his taciturnity, Christopher managed to get across the notion that only the very best would do. He did not prescribe the topics of the weekly essay; that he'd leave to you. For the weaker pupils, that was very heady wine, as they say. But for the intellectually more ambitious, it was challenging and good.

**Kazu:** What was the atmosphere of the college? Was it middle-left in political terms?

**KVT:** It was a great mixture. The whole gamut of political opinions was there. My contemporaries included Peter Brooke, who became a Conservative Cabinet minister; Charles Taylor, who went on to head a left-wing party in Canada; and Raphael Samuel, who was a communist in those days. Raphael was also a historian and is perhaps best known nowadays for having founded a discussion group called 'History Workshop'. He and I were members of a little group of friends who used to have breakfast together in Balliol Hall. One day he didn't turn up. We were just finishing breakfast, when he appeared in a dark suit, a black tie and weeping. I asked what the matter was. He replied, 'Uncle Joe is dead', and rushed out of the room. Joseph Stalin had died.

That gives you some idea of the range of political opinions at Balliol. Socially, it was very mixed. There were some genuine aristocrats and some lower middle-class meritocrats. But most of the undergraduates were solidly middle-class. It was quite an international college, particularly the graduate students. Some were European (the King of Norway is a Balliol man) and there were a great number of Rhodes Scholars from the USA and all parts of the Commonwealth — Canada, Australia, South Africa and so on. Balliol was the first Oxford college to admit people of colour and it had long been very cosmopolitan. In my day, this made it a more interesting society, than some of the other colleges, which were socially and culturally more homogeneous, and drew most of their members from the English middle class.

**Tony:** Was there a Scottish element?

**KVT:** Yes. There was a strong Scottish connection. The Snell Exhibitions for students from Glasgow University had been established a long time ago. In the eighteenth century, Adam Smith, author of *The Wealth of Nations*, had gone to Balliol on one. Typically, these Snell scholars had already done a degree at Glasgow and came to Oxford to do another.

**Kazu:** After military service, you entered Balliol College as an undergraduate in autumn 1952. Churchill's administration began in 1951 and the next year the accession of Elizabeth II took place, as well as the British atomic-bomb testing. The coronation ceremony of Elizabeth II was in 1953 and was televised worldwide. Were there any special feelings of your college about the Queen's coronation and so on?

**KVT:** No. I remember the day because it was a holiday. I went punting with some friends, but it rained most of the time. It wasn't a very big event for us undergraduates.

**Valerie:** I thought it was. We bought a television set for that purpose.

**Kazu:** How was it? *Your* impression of the coronation ceremony?

**Valerie:** Well, I'd say it was the first time a television programme was so popular that everybody either went to somebody else's house to see it or watched it on their own television set. The coronation caused a huge expansion in the number of households with television. It was in black and white, of course.

**Kazu:** We were talking about the year 1952, when Keith entered Balliol. It was also the year when the journal *Past & Present* was inaugurated. Were you conscious of the journal from the start or not?

**KVT:** Yes, I knew it existed and it was there that I published my first article, in 1958. I don't think that many of the articles in the very early numbers interested undergraduates very much. I got much involved in the journal later. I've forgotten when exactly I joined the editorial board, but it was sometime in the 1960s. By then it was beginning to become a major historical journal internationally.

**Kazu:** And after three years at Balliol, you were chosen a senior scholar, St Antony's College in 1955.

**KVT:** Yes. I went to St Antony's, a brand-new graduate college. It specialized in twentieth-century international relations and was notorious as a hotbed of spies and White Russians; it was very active during the Cold War. Bill Deakin, the first Warden, had led a mission to Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia and was very much responsible for Britain taking Tito's side. St Antony's specialized in the twentieth century, but Deakin brought in a few early modernists like me to be a sort of civilising influence (laughter). But I didn't stay there very long.

**Kazu:** Then you were appointed a research fellow at All Souls College.

**KVT:** I wasn't a Research Fellow, but a Prize Fellow, alias an Examination Fellow. It had been called a Prize Fellowship because it was a prize for passing the examination, and nothing was required of you for the next two years. Nowadays, rather more is expected. When I sat it in the autumn of 1955, the examination included two papers in whatever your subject was: it had to be history, law, philosophy or economics. In addition, there were two general papers, language translations, and an essay to write for three hours on one word. The word in my year was 'Sin', a topic of which, of course, I was wholly ignorant. So I was very lucky to be elected. The conditions of the Prize Fellowship were that you held it for seven years. In the first two years, you were paid a modest salary. After two years, you had to decide whether you were going to be a full-time academic or whether you were going into the world. If the former, your pay went up. If the latter, you became a so-called 'fifty-pounder'. The name stuck, but the annual stipend for non-academic fellows nowadays is more than £50.

What was distinctive about All Souls was that many of those it elected to fellowships did indeed go out into the world and become lawyers, businessmen, or civil servants. At the first

college meeting I attended, there was a sudden bang on the door. The butler came in and said, ‘The Prime Minister is on the telephone for Sir Edward Bridges’. Bridges was permanent secretary to the Treasury and head of the civil service. ‘London Fellows’ like him would come up on weekends, attend committee meetings, dine in Hall and return to London by train after dinner on the Sunday evening or breakfast on Monday morning. I remember in 1956, at the time of the Suez Crisis, I brought a former undergraduate friend to dinner, where he met Quintin Hogg (Lord Hailsham), then the First Lord of Admiralty, who complained to him that Anthony Eden had ordered him to send gunboats to Egypt without first consulting him. My friend was greatly impressed to find himself so close to centre of the world crisis.

### The year 1956 and after

**Kazu:** The year 1956 was not only the year of the Suez Crisis, but also of Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin in Moscow. I know a little bit about the eventual confusion among the communists and sympathizers in and after 1956. Do you have anything to tell us? Not only the Suez Crisis, but also the crisis among the Marxists?

**KVT:** It was Hungary, I think, that led to the great defection from the Communist Party. Christopher Hill left it at that time and sought a new Left alliance. At the time I was at All Souls, where one of the Fellows was G. D. H. Cole, Professor of Political Theory, and a very prominent Socialist philosopher. He was very anxious to re-establish a sort of Popular Front, which would be a combination of the left wing of the Labour Party with Communists, like Christopher Hill. There were several meetings, but nothing came of it and the Communist Party split. The journal *Past & Present* had been founded in 1952, with the subtitle, ‘A Journal of Scientific History’ — ‘scientific history’ was a jargon term for Marxist history. Soon after Hungary, *Past & Present* widened its board and recruited Lawrence Stone, J. H. Elliott, and others. The subtitle, ‘Journal of Scientific History’, was deleted. Many of the old-time Marxist members of the board, like Christopher Hill and R. H. Hilton, resigned from the Communist party.

**Kazu:** There is a painting of the editorial board of *Past & Present*. Here are [from the left] Hobsbawm, Christopher Hill, Rodney Hilton, and you are here [at the right end]. And Joan Thirsk, John Elliott, Lawrence Stone.

**Takao:** Was E. P. Thompson there?

**KVT:** No. E. P. Thompson was a member of the board, of course, but I think this was painted after he had died in 1993.

**Kazu:** Did all seven of you sit for the painter at a time?



Stephen Frederick Godfrey Farthing, *Historians of 'Past and Present'* (1999), oil on canvas, 1734 mm×2066 mm. © The National Portrait Gallery, London.

**KVT:** No, we sat separately.

**Kazu:** So, is this an idealistic meeting of the board?

**KVT:** Yes. The painter was Stephen Farthing, a well-known artist, but he had never done portraits before. He took the task very seriously, and spent months reading the works of all these historians, but much less time actually looking at them. The painting was a commission for the National Portrait Gallery. It is supposed to be reading from left to right politically (laughter). I was never to the right of John Elliott, though. Anyway, this was a picture of some intellectual ambition, but not a reproduction of an actual meeting. Hobsbawm is holding his telephone, which is a symbol of the fact he was always in touch with the rest of the world.

**Kazu:** Now what about your young Anglican conservatism in South Wales? Did you feel comfortable enough at Oxford, or did your recent liberal mindedness come to any confrontation with your parents? If I am too rude, please correct me.

**KVT:** No, not at all. My father was pretty shocked to think my tutor was a communist, and was convinced that I was going that way too. I ceased to be either a Christian or a Conservative during my time at Oxford. I came up to Oxford a young Conservative, despite two years in the army in Jamaica, which ought to have taught me something about imperialism. By the time I left All Souls, I wasn't a communist, but I was definitely left of centre.

**Kazu:** You were also a Welshman in Oxford. Did you have any particular feeling? I know Jesus College has some Welsh connection, but Balliol, St Antony's, All Souls and St John's?

**KVT:** No, Balliol didn't have many Welshmen. A boy from my school had gone to Balliol to read history a year before me, and at All Souls, one the Prize Fellows elected two years before me had come from Neath Grammar School in Glamorgan. It was quite unusual in those days for All Souls to elect people from grammar schools. Mostly, their Prize fellows had been to Winchester or Eton. Unconsciously, I adapted to my new circumstances and was effortlessly assimilated. Rather like Roy Jenkins, I am a *déraciné* Welshman.

**Kazu:** You published something about Roy Jenkins later, after his death. Was he a friend of yours?

**KVT:** Yes, indeed. I got to know him years later when I became President of Corpus Christi College. In 1988 Harold Macmillan, who had been Chancellor of the Oxford University, died, and there was an election contest for the succession. Roy Jenkins, Edward Heath, former Prime Minister, and Lord Blake, a Conservative historian, were the three candidates. I supported Jenkins on general grounds without knowing him personally. When the list of supporters was published in the *University Gazette*, they did it alphabetically by order of colleges, with the head of the college first, so mine [CCC] was the first name on the list, thereby looking as if I was his chief nominator, which I wasn't. That was, I suspect, the origin of his interest in me. Valerie and I got to know him and his wife Jennifer very well. They were generous hosts, who frequently invited us to lunch in their house in East Hendred in Berkshire, and we met all sorts of notable people there.

Roy Jenkins was the son of a miner and trade unionist Arthur Jenkins, who became a Labour MP, who had actually gone to jail for being involved in some strike. Roy came from the Abersychan Grammar School in North Monmouthshire. He was a sort of ... what did the Queen say about Roy Jenkins?

**Valerie:** 'Much too grand for me'. He was a Champagne Socialist (laughter).

**Kazu:** I don't know if there was any Welsh devolution movement or such during the 1950s. Was there?

**KVT:** Yes, there was a small group, the Welsh Nationalist Party, which was very much a

Welsh-language party. It represented only a small minority of the Welsh population, usually thought to have some particular resentments, which they blamed on the English. It was not a large movement at all. But it was particularly popular among school teachers and university lecturers, especially if they were Welsh-language speaking, which of course the majority of the Welsh weren't at all.

**Kazu:** Later, you became one of the founding fellows of the Learned Society of Wales. What is it?

**KVT:** It's a very recent invention, a learned society which hasn't been going for more than ten years. It's meant to be a Welsh Academy, though it's a rather unselective academy, by comparison with the British Academy, which has much more demanding criteria for election.

### History School at Oxford

**Kazu:** During your student and junior fellow years, you were not a Marxist and you had a strong interest in antiquarianism. Some interest in French philosophy as well? My question is, what was your leading motive, *Leitmotif*, in your student and research fellowship years?

**KVT:** When I was an undergraduate, the subjects we studied were the whole of English (i.e. not British) history from late Roman times to 1914. There were two papers on a chosen period of general history, which meant European history. I did the one between roughly 1500 and 1700. There was a compulsory paper in political science, which involved the close study of Aristotle's *Politics*, Hobbes's *Leviathan* and Rousseau's *Contrat Sociale*, and more general questions on leading political philosophers from Plato onwards. There was a paper on constitutional history, medieval, early modern or modern, and two papers on a so-called Special Subject, which involved the study of the original sources for a particular period or topic. I did the one on the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1647–1658.

To understand the origins of this rather curious and heavily Anglocentric syllabus, one needs to know that the study of history at Oxford began in about 1870. It was conceived of as a school for would-be politicians, civil servants, governors of the empire, in short for those entering public life. It was undemanding, for it was assumed that candidates had spent three or four years doing some other subject first, normally Classics and Philosophy ('Greats'), but would devote only one academic year to Modern History (by 'Modern' was meant 'not Ancient'). To know some modern history was a necessary qualification for those wishing to become statesmen. It was thought that you needed to know the outlines of the English history, particularly English constitutional history. You needed to have some political wisdom, so you studied political science, as exemplified by those great authors, Aristotle, Hobbes and Rousseau. They were studied not as historical documents, but for the political wisdom they were thought to offer. In the early years of the Modern History School in the late nineteenth

century you were expected to know geography and to be able to draw maps illustrating battles. The idea was to train public servants, not to produce historians.

In Germany, however, history had become a seriously professional academic subject. There were people in Britain who wanted the same to happen in Britain. In Oxford the key figure was the Victorian medievalist, William Stubbs, followed later by Sir Charles Firth, the seventeenth-century historian, who became Regius Professor of History in 1904. He delivered a famous inaugural lecture, saying that the study of history at Oxford ought to be designed to produce academic historians, as well as educated men of the world, and the syllabus should be adapted to fit that. This produced a great revolt among the college tutors, who all signed a round robin, saying that Firth was mistaken, because most of their pupils had no intention whatsoever of becoming academics and anyway (and revealingly) didn't have the necessary private means. Firth failed to change the syllabus in any substantial way. Indeed it hadn't changed much when I came up nearly fifty years later. The only obvious changes were that political science was no longer studied as a treasury of ever-lasting wisdom but was regarded as a set of philosophical texts, and that British history was no longer primarily constitutional history but included economic history and, to some extent, social history.

The consequence was that, when I was an undergraduate in the 1950s, the main historical debate in Oxford was about the causes of the English Civil War, the so-called 'gentry controversy'. It had been sparked off by an article of R. H. Tawney entitled 'The rise of the gentry', in which he argued that there were social causes of the Civil War. Those social causes arose from the dissolution of the monasteries, which redistributed a lot of land to a new gentry class, so that the gentry by 1640 owned far more land than the nobility did. The Civil War, he implied — and he cited the contemporary political theorist James Harrington to support that view — was a move by the gentry to establish their political power at the expense of the aristocracy. His interpretation was supported by Lawrence Stone and Christopher Hill, but there were some influential attempts to refute it, most notably by Hugh Trevor-Roper, who argued that the gentry were a declining class rather than a rising one. There ensued a fierce controversy about the amount of land owned by different sections of the population. It was very bitterly conducted, not least because one of the participants was Lawrence Stone, who was on the side of Tawney and Hill, although he had been an undergraduate pupil of Trevor-Roper. Trevor-Roper had lent him his transcripts of some important documents relevant to the question of novel aristocratic indebtedness, on which Stone published an article under the title, 'The anatomy of the Elizabethan aristocracy'. Unfortunately, Stone had misunderstood the financial documents he was using, as Trevor-Roper demonstrated in an onslaught entitled 'An anatomy anatomised'. Things got very bitter, and the row attracted a lot of public attention. The American historian, J. H. Hexter, wrote an article about it in the journal *Encounter*, a respected literary journal of the time, which subsequently turned out to be financed by the CIA.

When I began life as a graduate student, the gentry controversy was still fresh, and, for that reason, my initial plan was to write a doctoral thesis on the court of James I. Trevor-Roper's argument had been that the most important source of income for landowners was not land, but the office at court. I planned to investigate that theme via a study of the life of Robert Cecil,

Elizabeth's and James's minister. But Joel Hurstfield, a professor at University College London wrote to me to say that he was completing a book on Robert Cecil (which he never did), so I was saved from that and had to find a new subject. I had long been interested in antiquarianism. In my second year as an undergraduate, I had written an essay for a University prize (the Stanhope Essay Prize). The prescribed subject was the seventeenth-century Oxford antiquarian, Anthony Wood. He had left a large collection of letters, diaries and working notes, some of them published, others still in manuscript in the Bodleian, but written in a beautifully legible hand. I had very happy memories of the time I spent reading his manuscripts and was initially keen to return to them. But after a week or two I decided that they were too *déjà vu*.

My next plan was to study the mid-seventeenth-century controversy about religious toleration. I soon discovered that one of the main arguments deployed against toleration was that it would split up the family: the wife, son and daughter might all be of different beliefs from the father, who was supposed to be in charge of their religion, and that would be quite unacceptable. This alerted me to the position of women, then a very neglected subject. I did some research on the way in which religious communities outside the established Church gave women more scope than that afforded by the Church of England. The result eventually appeared as an article in *Past & Present* entitled 'Women and the Civil War sects'.

**Kazu:** Yes, published in 1958.

**KVT:** It was a bit early for a young scholar to start publishing, but, unlike my contemporaries, I didn't have to spend time writing a doctoral thesis. This was because I had in November 1955 been elected to a Fellowship at All Souls College and, in those unregenerate days, All Souls thought that it would be rather *infra dig* for their Fellows to be writing theses which would be examined by fellows of another college. So, I never got a doctorate, any more than I passed A Levels. Instead, I spent the time looking round and investigating a number of different topics.

**Kazu:** During that period you were appointed fellow and tutor of St John's College in 1957, and remained there for thirty years?

**KVT:** Twenty-nine years, to be precise. I was very happy at All Souls and it would have been possible for me to stay there for seven years. But the prospect of a permanent position at St John's College was too good to resist. I had not written a thesis and I had published nothing. Yet I'd had been offered what was effectively a job for life. It was quite extraordinary. When I applied for the post, I asked Christopher Hill to be one of my referees, and he was very shocked to learn that I was hoping to go to St John's. 'St John's?' he said, with obvious disdain. 'St John's?' He was a very committed Balliol man. 'It's a very beautiful college', I said defensively. He replied, 'I'd have thought that three years at Balliol would have taught you to put the soul before the body' (laughter). Anyway, I went to St John's and found that it had a soul as well as a beautiful body. I was very happy there and I had a lot of brilliant pupils.

### ‘Women’, ‘Double Standard’ and ‘Anthropology’

**Kazu:** Now, coming back to ‘Women and Civil War sects’, and looking at our publication list, I see this *Past & Present* article in 1958, and, perhaps more importantly, in the next year 1959 comes ‘The double standard’ in the *Journal of the History of Ideas*. It occupies more than twenty-two pages with eighty-seven footnotes, and it can be called perhaps one of the first major historical contributions to expose gender difference. Much later in 1999, somebody wrote a rejoinder in *Past & Present*. What was the first reaction to ‘The double standard’?

**KVT:** Well, shock, horror (laughter). When I applied to St John’s, I was advised not to mention that I had written an article on sexual morality. And I tried to keep very quiet about being interested in the history of women.

**Valerie:** You lectured.

**KVT:** Yes. But not until after I’d been elected to St John’s. The first lectures I gave were in the autumn of 1957 and they were entitled, ‘The relations between the sexes in England from the Reformation to the First World War’. ‘The double standard’ was the third of them. About six people came — because the subject wasn’t on the syllabus and, anyway, who was interested in the history of women? I was so far ahead of my time that I rather despaired of writing women’s history and pusillanimously moved on to other things.

**Kazu:** I know that Keith and Valerie got married in 1961, and I presume that you already got to know each other by the time. Did Valerie affect anything when you wrote it? Or, am I too intrusive?

**KVT:** No, you’re not too intrusive, and no, I formed my ideas of women before I met her. I modified them afterwards, of course.

**Kazu:** Well, another methodological contribution, ‘History and anthropology’, comes out in *Past & Present* in 1963, followed by ‘The relevance of social anthropology to the historical study of English witchcraft’, in Mary Douglas’s edited book, *Witchcraft, Confessions and Accusations* in 1970. Such publications are interspersed by other reviews and articles on the seventeenth century, Hobbes’s political thought, the Reformation, the gentry, and work and leisure. You were among the leading figures of the flourishing social historians throughout your thirties in the 1960s and the early 70s. Tell me some secrets of your historical interests in the 60s. Peter Burke, four years younger than you, had already moved from Oxford to Sussex in 1962.

**KVT:** Yes. My study of women had brought home to me that so much of human life was not part of any conventional historical syllabus. Women were half of the human race, yet many

of their activities were never discussed by historians. So, I was interested in widening the scope of academic history. My interest in anthropology developed by pure accident — as so many things in my life have done — which was that I was in 1961 the editor of the *Oxford Magazine*, the local journal for Oxford academics. As the editor, I had the first choice of the books which publishers sent us for review, and one of them was a very slim pamphlet by Professor E. E. Evans-Pritchard, called *Anthropology and History*. I read it and wrote an enthusiastic review, because he was in favour of bringing the two subjects closer together. The review was about a thousand words long. Lawrence Stone read it, and asked me to give a paper on the subject. So, I developed it and gave it as a talk to his seminar. Then he asked me to offer it to *Past & Present*. That's how it got published there. Although I was interested in the social theory of anthropology, what most attracted me was that when an anthropologist went to an unfamiliar place, he or she studied everything. They didn't make politics and the constitution their central concern. It was the idea of studying human life in all its dimensions that particularly appealed to me.

**Koji:** Can I just interrupt? Were these choices of your subjects and methodologies inspired by a kind of regular encounter with the people at All Souls, for example? Was there any sort of interesting and decisive chance encounters with those prominent people or the unfolding of a world event?

**KVT:** I'm not sure if it came from meeting other people. At All Souls, I met individuals of the highest intellectual calibre. I got to know Isaiah Berlin quite well, Stuart Hampshire, Evans-Pritchard — and lots of other extremely interesting people. It certainly was a place which fostered intellectual ambition, but the particular direction which my ambitions took was not, I think, inspired by the place. I was not imitating anyone else.

**Kazu:** These methodological developments would lead up to 1971, when your *Religion and the Decline of Magic* was published. I would like to discuss that publication after a coffee break.

### Years leading up to 1971

**Kazu:** Now back to the 1960s and 1971. E. P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class* came out in 1963, and was republished as a Penguin in 1968. His 'The moral economy of the English crowd', and also Natalie Davis's 'The reasons of misrule', would be published in *Past & Present* in 1971. Keith's first, very influential, book, *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, came out also in 1971. I would like to have your, kind of, contemporary feeling of the year 1970/71 when you finished writing *Religion and the Decline of Magic*.

**KVT:** I don't quite understand your question. 1971 was indeed the year, in which my book

and some book reviews by me were published. But of course, the book had been planned in the previous decade. The late 1960s were an intellectually formative period for me.

**Kazu:** Tell us something about the late 60s.

**KVT:** In my particular case, *Religion and the Decline of Magic* came about by accident. I was a busy history tutor and one of the subjects I taught undergraduates was the Special Subject on the Commonwealth and the Protectorate in England in the late 1640s and 50s. A part of it related to the Levellers, the radical group. In preparation for one of the weekly classes, I was pursuing the career of Richard Overton, the author, among other things, of a book called *Man's Mortality*, which took a very sceptical view of the notion of immortality. I discovered in the Bodleian Library a letter by Overton, written to the astrologer William Lilly, asking whether, if he, Overton, joined the agents of the army, he would succeed in his efforts to restore freedom to the land. That this supposedly rationalist agitator, Overton, should have gone to an astrologer for advice interested me, particularly as the letter in question was pinned inside a large volume, which was one of Lilly's case books. He had a thousand or more customers a year coming to him for advice, and he devoted a page to each of them, in which he drew an astrological chart and made calculations relating to the questions they brought to him, like, 'Should I marry this woman?' or 'Should I move house?' These case books were in the Bodleian, because they had belonged to Elias Ashmole, a seventeenth-century herald and astrologer, all of whose papers had ended up in the Library. I thought they were very interesting, and began to work on astrology.

I soon discovered that one of the problems which people often brought to astrologers was that of whether they had been bewitched. I had already read Evans-Pritchard's famous book on witchcraft among the Azande, a Sudanese people. So I accumulated a lot of material relating to both astrology and witchcraft. I was also very conscious that all this had religious implications, which needed to be explored. The book accordingly broadened and became bigger and bigger. I thought nobody would ever publish it. But Eric Hobsbawm, whom I knew through my membership of the board of *Past & Present*, was a talent scout for the publisher, Weidenfeld & Nicolson. He recommended my book to its owner, George Weidenfeld, an Austrian refugee and a very successful publisher, who accepted it. Its subject-matter hadn't yet become fashionable, so it was very highly priced — eight pounds! The *Times Literary Supplement* had an editorial on the book, not its contents, but its price. Weidenfeld's edition was in hardback, but it was later reissued as a paperback by Penguin.

### *Religion and the Decline of Magic*

**Kazu:** Kei Nasu is a better reader of *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, and I would like him to say something more relevant.

**Kei:** Earlier you mentioned your *Past & Present* article on history and anthropology, 1963. When you wrote it, had you already started gathering materials for *Religion and the Decline of Magic*? Was it before or after?

**KVT:** It was after, though I mentioned witchcraft in that article as one of the neglected subjects of potential interest. Looking back at my book now, I can't understand how I managed to cover so much ground so quickly. I did all the research for the book in the second half the 1960s; and I took about a year to write it.

**Kei:** It is forty-five years since the publication of *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, and it remains a classic for anyone interested in English religious, cultural or social history. But when it was published in 1971 it was, I presume, quite a radical book, radical in its subject matter, in theory, and in its departure from conventional political history. Since then, there have been a lot of debates among historians on the nature of the Protestant Reformation, on the Civil War, on the public sphere and so forth. Your book greatly influenced these debates, but again it was not really about those specific issues. How do you see it now as a historian in the twenty-first century? And if you were to add a new postscript or a new chapter, what would you say?



Sir Keith Thomas. Photograph by Kei Nasu.

**KVT:** So, you want me to write a critical review (laughter). Well, it's a book of its time, and the author is older, though I'm not sure that he's wiser. I stand by my account of the medieval church, although that has had a very hostile reception, particularly from Catholic writers,

notably Eamon Duffy, whose book, *The Stripping of the Altars*, offered a very idealized version of late medieval religion, based on evidence of a great many East Anglian parishes. It's a brilliant book and very well-written, but it exaggerates the popularity of late medieval Catholicism and the word 'Lollard' doesn't even appear in the index. Duffy notwithstanding, I persist in thinking that, for the population at large, magic and religion were inseparable. It was believed that prayer could have direct efficacy on what happened to people in this world. The medieval Church had a repertoire of ceremonies which could make the crops grow, or drive away the thunder or whatever. I believe all that to be true, and see it as aspect of the medieval church, which Duffy and others are reluctant to accept.

Then on to the Protestant attack. There is a strong movement initiated by the late R. W. Scribner, a Cambridge, then Harvard, historian of the Reformation in Germany. He pointed out that Lutherans had a somewhat magical attitude to portraits of Luther, which they thought could work as charms, and his pupil, Alexandra Walsham, a brilliant Cambridge historian, has developed his argument. She launched a long-running critique of my work, because she wanted to argue that the Protestants were quite as superstitious as the Catholics. I have a lot in the book about the Protestant belief in prodigies and the working of providence and so on, and I think she is only expanding and emphasising what I said about that. More generally, she underrates the extent to which Protestant theologians disenchanted the world and dissociated themselves from the notion that prayer and religious ceremony could have any practical effect. I think her argument is exaggerated.

A more interesting criticism of the book is the claim that the approach in the book is essentially what anthropologists would call a functionalist one: that is to say, that beliefs are discussed in terms of their consequences. I argue that it was widely thought that turning a witch away from the door would bring misfortune to the household. The magic of the cunning men and women was admired because it was thought they could cure people or find lost goods, or give you advice or whatever. That's a functionalist view, exploring the impact of magical beliefs on daily life. It is more interesting to investigate why these beliefs came to be held in the first place. It is fair to say that I didn't devote enough attention to exploring beliefs from the point of view of the actors themselves. What, one should ask, was going on in the cunning man's mind? That is a very difficult question to answer, but I should have spent more time trying to do so. There has been a shift over the decades, a move from an external, functionalist view of social action to an internal view, looking at it from the actor's point of view rather than from the outsider's.

Finally, it would be plausibly argued that I exaggerated the extent to which magical beliefs disappeared in the early eighteenth century. Perhaps I should have emphasized their survival at the village level, right through the nineteenth and possibly into the twentieth century. A lot of research has been devoted in recent years to the survival of cunning men, wise women and witches in country villages in Victorian times. Their presence doesn't at all surprise me. My point was that this survival of older beliefs was not normally found among the gentry, or the educated middle classes. They didn't believe in fairies, ghosts or cunning men. But a lot of their social inferiors still did. So 'the decline of magic' is too crude a way of describing what

happened. What I really meant was that magic declined among thinking people.

**Kei:** Thank you. As you mentioned ‘disenchantment’, could you tell us more on the nature of the change that took place during the seventeenth century? The readers of your book not only enjoy so rich details but also are encouraged to think about a larger structure of changes in people’s beliefs and assumptions, in humans’ relations with the surrounding natural world. Do you see these changes as more or less different faces of the same historical change?

**KVT:** I think what is called the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century was very important in a lot of ways. Before that time, it was commonplace to regard the world of nature, of minerals, of stars, of everything all around, as alive. It was believed that it was possible for magicians to catch spirits by conjuration and put them to some practical use. The discovery of magnetism encouraged the notion that some substance had occult powers. For example, there was a wide belief in the weapon-salve, an ointment which was to be applied, not to the wound, but to the weapon which had caused it, even though that might by then be miles away. The assumption was that the application of the salve to the congealed blood on the weapon would release spirits which would travel back through the air to heal the original wound.

Similarly, the influence of the stars was seen as a physical one which could be captured. You could enclose it in a stone, a seal, a jewel or whatever, keep it safe and bring it out when needed. The astronomical rethinking of the seventeenth century put paid to that. It also brought an end to the belief in the science of the zodiac. It turned out that the heavens were infinitely larger than had been imagined and that there were far too many heavenly bodies for their influence to be calculated. In these and other ways, there was a real link between changes in natural philosophy, as science was called, and the discrediting of magical beliefs. Other changes are harder to explain. Why, for example, did Protestants come to deny the physical efficacy of religious ceremonial? It came from reading the Bible differently, but to say that is only to push the question back one step and ask why that happened.

**Kei:** The final question from me. Every historian likes to think his or her century is the best. We know you studied under Christopher Hill, but what makes you keep working on the seventeenth century? What is the charm about it?

**KVT:** I’m quite interested in other periods too (laughter). The trouble is that I have invested rather heavily in the seventeenth century, and it’s too late to trade in my investments for access to another period. When I was asked [by Koji] whether any individual influenced me, I should have said that I was unconsciously much influenced by Christopher Hill, not by his Marxism, but by his ferocious reading. He read very extensively. His habit was to buy every monograph which related to the period, to read it and make notes, and then sell it to a second-hand bookshop across the road from Balliol, so that he could afford to buy another. He read literally everything which was published on the period, which was possible in those days. It’s not possible now.

As well as keeping up with new books, Christopher also tried to read as much as he could of what was published in his period. Puzzlingly, he hardly ever read or cited manuscripts, though. I don't know why not. I often read manuscripts, but, like him, I concentrate on the printed publications of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which are very extensive and leave little time for anything else. When I read anything, a Jacobean play perhaps, or a political pamphlet or a sermon, I make notes on it. They are not necessarily on the overt subject of the work, but might be on some passing remark. For example, if a preacher says, 'We mustn't waste our time like small children playing with pebbles and making mud castles ...', I think, aha, children in the seventeenth century used to make mud castles. I try to read 'against the grain', as they say, and I have now accumulated so much material on a large range of topics that there is, alas, no chance of my living long enough to be able to write it all up.

**Kazu:** You say you are interested in other centuries, but you've published primarily on the seventeenth century. On the screen [of the *P&P* portraits] there are other historians who wrote about the seventeenth century. For example, Hobsbawm raised the 'general crisis of the seventeenth-century' debate, and John Elliott made some contribution to it. Do you have any particular opinion on the seventeenth-century crisis debate?

**KVT:** No, I don't, except that I am not convinced there was one (laughter). You can always find a crisis if you look for it.

### **Digitization and historian's *métier***

**Koji:** Building upon Kei's question, how do you think of all the tools now available thanks to digitization? Digital humanities may change the kind of methodology you pursued. Younger generations may go to EEBO and just do full quick searches instead of going to the libraries and archives. Have you ever used these digital things, or what are your thoughts on this kind of methodology?

**KVT:** I use them incessantly now. There is no doubt that my previous approach is outmoded. EEBO and ECCO are online collections of all books printed in English between the beginning of printing and 1800. They are available online and searchable. You can read them and print them out. That has transformed historical study. It means that if you live in Japan you can usually do as much as somebody who lives in England and works fifty yards away from the Bodleian Library. So far as early printed books are concerned, proximity to the Oxford libraries doesn't give me a great advantage any more. The new technology also means that if you are interested in some particular topic and can identify the words which relate to it, you can quickly discover earlier usages than those you'll find in the *Oxford English Dictionary*. The only caveat, but an important one, is that, having discovered a reference, one has to be careful not to quote it out of context. If you rely only on the search engine you can get into a serious

trouble in that way. But if you are careful and energetic enough, you can, thanks to EEBO, uncover hundreds of examples of the word's usage, from which you can derive all sorts of new insights. It's an advantage to have read the whole book or pamphlet in which the terms occur, and thereby have a better sense of the context. But there's no doubt that the new facilities have transformed historical study.

**Kazu:** Yes. I can underwrite Keith's remark. When Oxford University Press decided to revise the *Dictionary of National Biography* in the 1990s, Keith was one of those important historians promoting the digitization and online service of the new *ODNB*. So, he's been an orthodox historian, with a novel spirit.

**KVT:** That's kind of you. But yes, it's true that I have been involved with digitized publications. I must confess, though, that I greatly regret the semi-disappearance of books as physical objects. I passionately prefer the tactile value of a book to the disembodied reading of something online. Aesthetically and sensually I regret the semi-disappearance of books. So, I am a reactionary.

**Kazu:** As to the historian's *métier* and the secrets of your work, perhaps Chikashi has some remarks to make.

**Chikashi:** It's very closely related to what Kei and Koji said. I've just read your article in the *London Review of Books*, under the heading of 'Diary', in which you disclose your secret of gathering sources, arranging them and writing your book. Could you tell us more about your routine work as a historian? Also I have a question. Towards the end of the article, you say you are happy to be numbered among those historians whose books remain literary constructions shaped by the author's moral values. I'm very much impressed by this, because when you started your intellectual career in the 1950s and 60s, those were the times of social-science-based history, let alone the *Annales* school. I wonder why you were more inclined towards a literary-based historian rather than a more social-science-based historian.

**KVT:** Let me answer the latter question first. It's because I put the heart before the head. I mentioned that one of my tutors at Balliol was Sir Richard Southern, whom I later got to know very well because he became President of St John's College, where I was a fellow. He believed very much in written history as the expression of an individual mind, and he regarded a book's literary style as a reflection of that. He wrote marvellously. I don't aspire to his eloquence, but I believe strongly in lucidity and accessibility. I regard history as a subject which any ordinary, intelligent lay person should be capable of understanding, although I recognise that some of what I write may in practice be too allusive for some readers. But, in principle, I wouldn't want to write a book which any educated person couldn't pick up and understand.

As regards social sciences, in the 1960s I wrote a lot about history and anthropology. I also wrote a rather brash and unsubtle article for the *Times Literary Supplement's* issue in 1966

devoted to ‘New ways in history’. I’d been asked to write an article on history and the social sciences. I think my pen ran away with me on that occasion. I said how important it was that historians should take on board the concepts of the social sciences. I still believe that, but I don’t believe that it should be at the expense of English prose. I don’t see why quite sophisticated conceptual arguments should not be expressed in accessible language. You mentioned the *Annales* school, which certainly influenced me very much. Some of the *Annalistes*, like Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, wrote very well indeed and produced works of literature. It is perfectly possible to combine analytic rigour with lucidity and even elegance.

As to my working methods, I didn’t offer that article to the *London Review of Books*. They asked for it. It happened by chance, as have so many other things in my life. I happened to sit next to somebody at a dinner party, who turned out to be one of the editors of the *LRB*. He asked me, ‘How do you work?’, and I told him. He was so appalled that he said, ‘You must write an article about it.’ So I wrote this confessional article. It reveals that what I do does not deserve the dignifying name of *method*, but it describes my *practice*. When I read a book, say a collection of seventeenth-century sermons, I make notes as I go along on any points which interest me. As I have quite a wide range of interests, a single sermon might yield as many as a dozen passages, each relating to a different topic. I copy out or summarise these passages in longhand with the page number added. I have dreadful handwriting, but I’m an even worse typist, so it’s faster that way. Then I go home from the library with several sheets of paper, each with about a dozen passages on them. Opposite each of these passages, I write their source, for example ‘Donne, *Sermons*, vol. 4’. I get a pair of scissors, and slice the sheet up into perhaps a dozen little slips. I then put them into the appropriate envelope, labelled ‘meal times’, ‘friendship’ or whatever, and return the envelopes to the filing cabinet where they live in alphabetical order. If an envelope on, say meal times grows promisingly fat, I empty it out to see what I’ve got. I then start to study meal times seriously, resorting to EEBO, ECCO, books and articles on the subject, and so forth. That is the way I work. I don’t recommend it (laughter). If you practise it over a lifetime, you’ll find that you have accumulated thousands and thousands of notes, which tend to fall out of their envelopes, get all over the floor, and make a terrible mess. Anyway it’s too late now to change. But that is what today would be called my database. It’s handmade to suit its owner’s idiosyncratic requirements.

### **British history, history of ideas and cultural history**

**Kazu:** You are a Welsh-born historian engaged in English history. You assured us that you were not engaged in Welsh nationalism or anything like that. But, there has been an important move in historiography since the late 1970s, called ‘revisionism’, and a movement for the ‘history of the British Isles’ rather than history of England. Do you have any particular opinion upon ‘revisionism’, John Pocock’s British history and so on?

**KVT:** First of all, the term ‘revisionism’ derives from the debates within communism.

Nowadays it is widely applied to almost any practice or way of thinking which is different from what came immediately before it. In the context of English history it was used to characterize the work of those historians who, unlike their predecessors, thought that the Civil War did not have long-term origins, that there was nothing fundamentally wrong with the English state in 1640, no irreconcilable divisions, and that the fighting was all an unfortunate accident. Revisionists were led by historians like Conrad Russell, who were wholly against the assumption underlying the gentry debate, which was that large events must have had long-term causes. That was the original use of revisionism.

Then there is what you call Pocock's revisionism, which suggests we should be studying British history rather than English history. I entirely agree with that. It is true that, for many years the Oxford syllabus assumed the primacy of English history. There were no questions on Scottish, Irish or Welsh history, and very little on the relations between England and the other parts of the United Kingdom. Today, it is fashionable to describe the English Civil War, as 'The War of Three Kingdoms', and to a great extent that is an accurate description. I don't think there is anything about this development which would have surprised S. R. Gardiner or Charles Firth, the great historians of the period who wrote more than a century ago and always included chapters on Scotland and Ireland in their books. But there's no doubt that today historians give much more attention to national and regional differences within the UK than they used to. The Oxford history examination papers are papers in British history, not English history. Even so, a lot of the questions still relate only to English history or only to Scottish history.

The social and cultural histories of the several constituent parts of the United Kingdom were different, but not in a straightforward way. Some parts of South Wales, for example, were socially and economically indistinguishable from Somerset across the Bristol Channel. But most of North and Central Wales was pastoral, very different from southern England. There were similar differences between different regions in both Scotland and Ireland. More fundamentally, Scotland had a different legal system from the English one and, eventually a different form of established church. Ireland was even more distinct, in language, religion and social structure. For all these reasons, I have normally chosen to write about England alone, even when much of what I said about England would have been equally applicable elsewhere.

**Kazu:** Right. Somewhat related to that, I think the practice of your work, making memos and scraps of several historic quotes on your cards and reviewing them occasionally and build up your argument — that has something to do with what historians of ideas, intellectual historians, do as well. But you don't describe yourself as an intellectual historian or historian of ideas, do you?

**KVT:** No, I don't. I try to be a historian of values, rather than ideas. It's the underlying assumptions which determine action, whether it is political action, or action within the family or in the village, or wherever. Sometimes these assumptions were stated, because many people were politically self-conscious, but often they were not stated. For example, it was an unstated

assumption that right is superior to left. The implications of that assumption were very considerable. I'm not a historian of ideas, though I used to lecture every year on Aristotle, Hobbes and Rousseau, and I wrote about the ideas of Levellers. I am quite interested in the history of political ideas. But the sort of serious intellectual history which, say, Quentin Skinner does so well, is not what I do.

**Dongsun:** Excuse me. Could you tell me more about the difference in approach between you and intellectual historians like Quentin Skinner, John Pocock, John Dunn? I presume myself to be a student of intellectual history, so I would like your opinion about the difference — what distinguishes you from those intellectual historians.

**KVT:** All the people you mentioned are extremely gifted people. We live in an exceptional period of intellectual history. No question of that. They are stellar figures. But they are exclusively concerned with the articulation by highly intelligent figures of what were often quite complex political ideas and, as Quentin Skinner has shown, expressed with sophisticated rhetoric. But they write about books and pamphlets published in the early modern period which lots of the people I am interested in would never have heard or been capable of reading. I am concerned with the lives of ordinary people as well as those of intellectuals. The historians you mentioned are intellectuals writing about intellectuals. I am quite happy to write about intellectuals — but not only intellectuals. That is the difference.

**Dongsun:** I have another question about revisionism. I think some revisionists are sceptical about overarching history. Your book provides something like a big theory about the decline of magic and religion. Do you want to propose a big theory?

**KVT:** I'm not sure that I ever proposed a big theory. It's remarkable what people can see in their mirror. They see their own ideas there. I am not very good at constructing a theory. I am increasingly more interested in evoking the texture of the life or the assumptions of the time. I'm often criticised for not paying more attention to change because I tend to lump periods together and, for example, see similarities between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. I might well quote from each of those periods in consecutive sentences. I don't think I am being anachronistic when I do that.

**Dongsun:** Do you think you have to clarify your preconception in your book?

**KVT:** No. If authors have to clarify their preconceptions, it will be an endless business. I know that my readers will be quick enough to see what they are, and to criticise them accordingly. But if you insist that I should have a chapter on the subject, it would say, generalizing wildly, that, although people have many different motives for their actions, economic considerations are often uppermost; and a great deal of religious and political thought is a rationalization of self-interest.

**Kazu:** A historian interested in the underlying values of the people of the period. Can I describe you as a historian of culture?

**KVT:** You could (laughter). Well, there is no better word. For a long time I thought myself as a social historian, but that's not a very accurate description of what I was trying to do. My former pupil Peter Burke became a great champion of cultural history. I remember being invited to a conference in the Netherlands on 'What is cultural history'. I went there without the faintest idea of what cultural history was. Then I found out that that it was what I had been doing all the time (laughter). But cultural history involves quite a lot of things with which I have not been much concerned. Cultural history is very much about practice, whereas I am more interested in the mental assumptions lying behind that practice.

### Historical change and 'how'

**Harumi:** Can I ask some, very similar question perhaps? By reading your book, we find various topics and episodes which we can develop in many ways. It's really like a treasury. Also we find that you present a very big picture of transition in the mental world — how people engage with the world. I wonder if there is any of your preference how your books would be read: to those details, the whole picture or the whole mental world.

**KVT:** Well, I suppose what I really hoped was that the book would stimulate the readers' imaginations; and, if they are academics, I would encourage them to go on and pursue their insights. I dabbled in a great number of topics after I published *Religion and the Decline of Magic*. I was deluged with very flattering invitations to do grand lectures, here, there and everywhere. In each of them I thought I had to speak on a different topic. So I opened up quite a few new subjects, which now other people have taken over and run with much further than I went. I'm perfectly content with that. I don't mind stimulating disagreement, but I try to be interesting (laughter).

**Harumi:** I was interested in many of the topics you touched on, and I am now developing them.

**Koji:** I think it's really about how you account for a long-term change in the body of values and assumptions that you study. How far does your research in long-term change of values and assumptions explain such narratives as state formation, the rise of fiscal state, the rise of print culture, the scientific revolution, the growth of Atlantic trade and the commercial revolution? Or, to what extent will you be able to bring in something like more microscopic analysis of individual practices and assumptions? At one point you mentioned, cultural historians are slightly different from you and more concerned with practice. Do you see any scope for integrating that kind of analysis into an argument of long-term change in this cultural

landscape?

**KVT:** I think that all the possible causes of change in mental assumptions, all the ones you list, are potentially relevant. There never was a single cause. But some of these changes are very difficult to explain. Why, for example, did people gradually become sickened by the extremely ferocious penal system? In England, it was a capital offence to steal more than a shilling, a trivial sum, and people were hanged for that. Then came a time when that seemed a barbarous thing to do. Why was that? There are all sorts of possible explanations. One is that, with a growing economy and a consequent demand for labour, it came to be thought better to preserve people's lives so that they could work, rather than cutting off young men in their prime. Another answer would be that the eighteenth century was the age of sensibility, and exquisite feelings were offended by cruel punishments. There are so many possible explanations for all of this. It's very difficult territory, but it's important, and historians, who spend a lot of time accounting for economic, demographic, and political change, need to devote more attention to explaining changes in our sensibilities. The study of emotion is increasingly fashionable, but that's not quite the same thing. Why do we gradually find something revolting which in the past we regarded as agreeable entertainment? It's a difficult question.

**Koji:** I'm tempted to ask one more question. Posing a question in terms of 'why' invites us to pinpoint a handful of potential causes. But perhaps there is another way of putting a question in terms of 'how' or 'in what way'. Say, the concept of civilization or civility led to different ways of use in the rapidly changing circumstances of 1640 — that sort of posing a question. We are no longer thinking in terms of a social scientific way of disaggregating and assigning several factors, but trying to view that through an actor's practical experience.

**KVT:** That is absolutely right and very profound. One of the things I wrote down in the 1950s was the remark of A. J. Ayer on philosophy: to explain why something happened, it is sufficient to explain *how* it happened.

### **The prospect of historical studies/humanities**

**Kazu:** I would like to finish the session by asking the last question. We've been discussing your past and historical studies in the past. Now I would like you to talk about the future of your work and historical studies and also of the humanities. Will you tell us any prospect or opinion about these, and will you give any message to the younger generation?

**KVT:** Learn from my mistakes is my message (laughter). Of the changes in historical studies, the most obvious one, certainly in Britain and North America, is the shift away from the nation state as the fundamental unit of analysis in response to globalization, international companies

and worldwide communication. The concentration on a particular locality seems obsolete, and the most obvious direction in Oxford at the level of undergraduate syllabuses is a move to global history. I have some slight hesitations about this. One is that the earlier back in time we go, the less do we find that the world was united: countries like Japan existed in semi-isolation from the rest of the world. Another is that when people study the history of their own nation, they can read original sources because they are written in a language which they can understand. I don't believe that an Oxford undergraduate can make a very serious study of Japanese history without knowing Japanese. And no one is going to understand all the languages spoken in the world. So global history is going to be history written out of secondary sources. Hence my reservations.

I also have some reservations about another general trend, the preoccupation with the history of the *self*. This comes very much from North America. The history of emotions is one aspect of that. Its earlier instance was the obsession with the body. It seems quite closely related to the American obsession with physical appearance. The study of emotion is getting close to touchy-feely, the look at me, how do you feel, sort of thing, which I, having been brought up to have a stiff upper lip, find rather repugnant (laughter). But its popularity is a sign of our times and there is a great deal of it about. I'm entirely in favour of gender history, though. I did a search through all the examination papers, set in all subjects in the Oxford History School in the last two years. And I found that the topic most likely to come up, whatever the period, in all centuries and in all countries, was masculinity. I thought things had got out of proportion. I think we all know that everything has a gender dimension, but there are other dimensions, too. Sorry, that is not actually the message to the younger generation you asked for (laughter).

The future of humanities is very serious, and I think humanities are indubitably imperilled. Mrs Thatcher, when meeting an academic, asked what he was doing, and he replied, 'Anglo-Saxon history'. And she said, 'Oh, what a luxury!' The notion that the humanities are a luxury is, I think, prevalent in the world at large. It's a profound mistake, because human interaction at a global level, as well as a national level, does depend on the understanding which the study of humanities brings about.

**Kazu:** So, the humanities are not a luxury; they are essential to human life and civilization. With that important message we come to the end of this afternoon's session. Thank you very much, Keith, Valerie, and all of you, for your cooperation.

### **Participants:**

KVT: Sir Keith Vivian Thomas, Fellow of All Souls College, former President of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, former President of the British Academy.

(In order of appearance)

Kazuhiko Kondo, Professor emeritus of the University of Tokyo

Anthony Jenkins, Professor emeritus of Okinawa Prefectural University of Arts

Valerie, Lady Thomas

Takao Osanai, Graduate student at the University of Tokyo

Koji Yamamoto, Affiliated Researcher, CRASSH, University of Cambridge

Kei Nasu, Professor of International Christian University, Tokyo

Chikashi Sakashita, Professor of Tokyo Woman's Christian University

Dongsun Lee, Graduate student at the University of Tokyo

Harumi Goto, Lecturer of Toyo University

(Titles and affiliations are as of the time of the interview.)

*Editorial cooperation by Harumi Goto, Anthony Jenkins, Kazuhiko Kondo and Satoshi Tsujimoto*

## BOOK REVIEWS

WATARU NAKAJIMA, *Jonathan Swift as a Conservative Trimmer: An Ideological Reading of His English Politico-Religious Writings, 1701–1726*. Tokyo: Kinseido, 2020. vii+168 pp. ISBN 978-4-7647-1196-9.

Reviewed by NORIYUKI HARADA\*

In Chapter 4 of Part I of *Gulliver's Travels* (1726), Jonathan Swift (1667–1745) describes a memorable visit from Reldresal, Principal Secretary of Private Affairs, to Gulliver's house in Lilliput. The Principal Secretary confesses that, though the country seems to be flourishing to foreigners like Gulliver, Lilliput labours “under two mighty Evils; a violent Faction at home, and the Danger of an Invasion by a most potent Enemy from abroad” (Swift 42). Reldresal explains that the “violent Faction” is due to the struggle between one party called Tramecksan (whose members wear high-heeled shoes) and one called Slamecksan (who wear shoes with low heels). Although the principle espoused by Tramecksan seems to be “agreeable” to the “ancient Constitution” of Lilliput, the political power of the country is now wholly on the side of Slamecksan. However, “his Imperial Highness, the Heir to the Crown”, has “some Tendency towards the High-Heels” and the high-heels that the Prince wears obviously give “him a Hobble in his Gait” (Swift 42). Reldresal then mentions the other evil: “a most obstinate War” against Blefuscu, another country of little people (Swift 43). The cause of the war is simple and even humorous; “the primitive Way of breaking Eggs before we eat them, was upon the larger End,” but the present Emperor's grand-father happened to cut one of his fingers in his childhood when he was breaking an egg according to “the ancient Practice”, and his father, the Emperor at the time, commanded all his subjects to break the smaller end of their eggs (Swift 43). As the people of Lilliput resented this Law, rebellions arose and many people left Lilliput for Blefuscu, which fomented the civil commotion and accused the Emperors of Lilliput of “making a Schism in Religion, by offending against a fundamental Doctrine” of Lilliput's religion (Swift 43). However, according to Reldresal, the text of *Brundrecal* (the “*Alcoan*” of Lilliput) reads as follows: “*That all true Believers shall break their Eggs at the convenient End*” (Swift 43). Swift's satire on the contemporary confusion in English politics and religion is obvious; in the episode of Tramecksan and Slamecksan, we can easily understand the “violent Faction” as the conflict between the Tories and the Whigs around 1720, and also, from the particulars of the small-endians in Lilliput and the big-endians in Blefuscu, perceive the conflict of the Anglican Church and the Roman Catholics as well as the antagonism between England and France. However, what we want to know here is the author's message implied in these satiric scenes; what ideals or solutions did Swift, an Anglo-Irish priest of the Irish Church, imagine in writing his masterpiece? Was he simply disillusioned with the realpolitik of England, or, more widely, entangled with a misanthropic idea of human society? Nakajima's new book offers a persuasive answer to these pressing questions.

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Nakajima's *Jonathan Swift as a Conservative Trimmer: An Ideological Reading of His English Politico-Religious Writings, 1701–1726*, published in 2020, is based on his Ph. D. dissertation submitted to Sophia University in Tokyo and his exchange of opinions on the topic with many prominent Swiftian scholars, including Hermann J. Real in Münster. Nakajima's view of Swift's political and religious position as a conservative trimmer is convincing and it is not a compromise for Swift's change of the political party he supported. Nakajima reads Swift's numerous political tracts published or written during the time between 1701 and 1726 both widely and closely. He considers such works as "A Discourse of the Contests and Dissenters between the Nobles and the Commons in Athens and Rome" (1701), "A Letter from a Member of the House of Commons in Ireland to a Member of the House of Commons in England, concerning the Sacramental Test" (1708), "A Project for the Advancement of Religion, and the Reformation of Manners" (1709), articles for *The Examiner* (1710–11), "An Arguments to Prove, That the Abolishing of Christianity in England, May, as Things Now Stand, Be Attended with Some Inconveniences, and Perhaps, Not Produce Those Many Good Effects Proposed Thereby" (1711), "The Conduct of the Allies" (1711), "The Conduct of the Allies, and of the Late Ministry, in Beginning and Carrying on the Present War" (1711), "The Sentiments of a Church-of-England Man, with Respect to Religion and Government" (1711), "Some Free Thoughts upon the Present State of Affairs" (1741), "The History of the Four Last Years of the Queen" (1758), "An Enquiry into the Behaviour of the Queen's Last Ministry" (1765), and "Memoirs, Relating to That Change Which Happened in the Queen's Ministry in the Year 1710" (1765), as well as Swift's major writings like *A Tale of a Tub*, *Journal to Stella*, and *Gulliver's Travels*. Nakajima also carefully traces the idea of the mixed constitution and the importance of the balance of power from the seventeenth century to the early eighteenth, referring to the discourses of Richard Hooker, Thomas Hobbes, Edward Hyde (1st Earl of Clarendon), Henry St. John (1st Viscount Bolingbroke), and of course George Savile (1st Marquess of Halifax), whose *The Character of a Trimmer* (1688) is one of the inspirational origins for the design of this modern academic project. Drawing carefully on his research from those political and religious tracts and articles, Nakajima develops a clear narrative thread in his book; he first circumscribes the archetype of Swift's political thought in Chapter 1, gives a clear explanation of Swift's views on the church and the state in Chapter 2, evaluates Swift's nonpartisanship in his Tory tracts in *The Examiner* and other pamphlets around 1710 in Chapter 3, and finally turns his attention to *Gulliver's Travels*, advancing the view of Swift as a would-be historiographer of the change of dynasty in Chapter 4.

Needless to say, there is a long history of discussion and interpretation of Swift's political tendencies and its relationship with his religious beliefs. For example, F. P. Lock states that Swift was "a natural Tory whose background and connections kept him in the Whig fold until he realized his true political home" in his *Swift's Tory Politics* (1983), while J. A. Downie sees Swift as a Whig, and emphasizes his liberal side in *Jonathan Swift: Political Writer* (1984), noting that, whilst supporting the established Church, Swift "believed in the protection of liberty and property, and championed the rights and privileges of the individual against the oppression of either a king or a ministry" (quoted in Nakajima 2). In his *Swift's Politics: A Study of Disaffection* (1994), Ian Higgins opposes these views, offering instead the idea that "Swift has a Jacobite inclination, in consonance with the High-Church Tory cause" (quoted in Nakajima 3). It is Anthony Quinton's *The Politics of Imperfection: The Religious and Secular Traditions of*

*Conservative Thought in England from Hooker to Oakeshott* (1978) to which Nakajima looks back on when he considers a comprehensive view of the history of conservative thought in early modern England, and places Swift in this context. Nakajima finds the essence of Swift's thought and behavior conservative in attitude, aside from the heated discussion on whether he was a Tory or a Whig, successfully elucidates Swift's view of mixed government and judges Higgins's view of Swift as a Jacobite to be "fairly unreasonable" (Nakajima 48). He also clearly points out the similarities and differences between Swift's views and those of Thomas Hobbes. As observed in *Leviathan*, Hobbes claims that the monarch must be the "chief Pastor" of the nation in order to avoid domestic turmoil such as Civil War (quoted in Nakajima 65). In Hobbes's view, the monarch "functions as the symbol of the unity of the spiritual and the secular" (quoted in Nakajima 65) and in this sense, Swift's views are close to those of Hobbes. However, when Hobbes goes on to profess a vehement anti-clericalism, Swift's "firm adherence to the Anglican establishment" naturally takes "ideological counter measures against Hobbesian views of church and state" (Nakajima 67).

The explanations Nakajima offers in the book provide a useful answer to the questions raised at the beginning of this review. The cause of "a Hobble", or the domestic disquietude of Lilliput, does not consist in Slamecksan's political control over the "ancient Constitution" of Lilliput, nor of course in the monarchical institution itself; instead, it consists in the Prince's predilection for high heels and the problem is, as is humorously described, a trifle. Swift does not insist on the ruling legitimacy of either party, nor on a state of anti-monarchical commonwealth. What underlies the satiric description of Lilliputian politics is Swift's claim of the "common forms" whereby men are bound together by historical accumulation of political wisdom and successful management of human affairs (Nakajima 137). This is an important aspect of considering Swift as a conservative thinker. As for the cause of the war against Blefuscu, we can clearly observe Swift's conservative-trimmer views. Even a casual reader can infer that the big-endians suggest Catholics and the small-endians Anglicans, but what should be noted here is Reldresal's additional explanation that: "the convenient End, seems, in my humble Opinion, to be left to every Man's Conscience, or at least in the Power of the chief Magistrate to determine" (Swift 43). Certainly, as the judgment of "the convenient End" is left to "every Man's Conscience", small-endians find much credit in Lilliputian Emperors and big-endians in the Emperors of Blefuscu and accordingly wars have continued incessantly between the two empires. However, Reldresal's claim that the judgment is left to "every Man's Conscience, or at least in the Power of the chief Magistrate" is in itself not criticized, nor satirized, and Gulliver himself does not oppose this opinion. We can assume that, if Reldresal's explanation were simply terminated with the words from the *Brundrecal*, Swift would offer a satirical or even atheistic comment on the religious conflicts. He does not do so, however. By inserting Reldresal's "humble Opinion", Swift instead implies the importance of preserving the established Church in Lilliput, or England, and the constitutional monarchy in which public conformity and the power balance of the mixed constitution are maintained.

Some readers of *Gulliver's Travels* may think that the author is equivocal and opportunistic, but Nakajima grasps the essence of Swift's political stance and calls him a "would-be historiographer" in the last chapter of his book, comparing Swift's attitude towards political events with that of Daniel Defoe. Nakajima states that, as one "who was versed in the 'secret history' of politics and politicians", Swift "tried to hybridize the principles" of opposing political

parties, rejecting all forms of faith but Anglicanism as heresy” (Nakajima 130). Nakajima’s conclusion is persuasive when he argues, based upon his close reading of Swift’s published and unpublished works between 1701 and 1726, that the main thrust of Swift’s argument did “not change at all from that of his former Tory (or, further back, even Whig) tracts, in point of his skepticism about the effectiveness of the dual party system” (Nakajima 130).

It is unique and even provocative to consider Swift as a conservative trimmer in the ideological context of Halifax. In fact, we cannot say that the name of Halifax has been conspicuous in previous discussions on Swift’s politico-religious writings. However, Swift’s standpoint as a conservative trimmer acquires greater importance when we try to view the deeper thoughts and actions of a man who, involved in heated discussions of politics and religion in early eighteenth-century England, nevertheless kept a distance as an Anglo-Irish clergyman and successfully constructed imaginative worlds into which he could project his sympathies. Nakajima’s book is clearly an invaluable contribution to Swiftian studies from a Far-East country to which Gulliver himself has travelled, and where also historical researches on early modern England in general and, in particular, in the writings of Halifax and Bolingbroke, have recently flourished.

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SORA SATO, *Edmund Burke as Historian: War, Order and Civilisation*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. xvi+281pp. ISBN 978-3-319-64441-7.

Reviewed by HIDEKI KUWAJIMA\*

### Author’s Attitude, Contents Organisation, and the Core Chapter

The book entitled *Burke as Historian: War, Order and Civilisation* was written by an up-and-coming Japanese Burke scholar Sora SATO (Present: Associate Professor of History of Socio-Economic Thought at Toyo University in Tokyo). This monograph is based upon the author’s Ph.D. dissertation in History accepted by the University of Edinburgh. He had already published some articles in prominent journals such as *The History of Modern Ideas* (2014 and 2015) and *Modern Intellectual History* (2016). To publish a book in English is a recent trend for young Japanese (and probably most of East Asia-origin) scholars, who are engaged in the historical study of British philosophy and thought. Dr. Sato’s work is an epoch-making and symbolic example to the reviewer — who has been involved with Burke studies in Japan for more than twenty years — as it also shows us the nascent aspect of Burke’s thought.

The intent and structure of this book. In the introductory section of the book are as follows,

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the author reflects on the history of Burke's research and says, "In comparison to theoretical researches, a historical approach has been produced rather slowly, but it seems to have become more influential in the current scholarship on Burke." (p. 3). The major previous studies that unravel the relationship between the historical context of Burke's thought and his political career are mainly two authorised works: F. P. Lock's *Edmund Burke*, 2 vols., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998–2006, and Richard Bourke's *Empire and Revolution: Political Life of Edmund Burke*, Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2015 (p. 3, n. 8), which have been published in recent years. The author, who interacts especially with R. Bourke, has entirely structured his book on the basis of their new perspectives.

The chapters are organised as follows: Introduction (Chapter 1); English History: Conquest, Antiquity and National Spirit (Chapter 2); European History: Vigour, Enthusiasm and Principles (Chapter 3); The History of the Americas: The Spread and Transformation of 'Europe' (Chapter 4); Irish History: Antiquity, Conquest and Incomplete Liberty (Chapter 5); The History of Asian-Muslim Nations: 'The Garden of Eden' ? (Chapter 6); and Conclusion: Burke and History (Chapter 7).

Based on the identification of 'philosophical historians' in the 18<sup>th</sup> century Enlightenment, Dr. Sato illustrates Burke's way of historiographies in various areas of the world. The author never failed to take Burke's treatments on the political, commercial, and religious issues of the day into consideration. In the following passage, due in part to the limitation of words, the reviewer will here focus upon 'Irish History (Chapter 5)'. The main reason why I pick this chapter up is that the idea of 'Burke as Irishman' seems to be one of the pivotal points of his thought. 'The History of Asian-Muslim Nations (Chapter 6)' is also fascinating, but I will be seldom referring to it for focusing my review on the point of 'Burke as Irishman' in the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

A noteworthy point in the Chapter 5 discussion is that there has ever been a critical episode to be an excuse for the suppression over Irish Catholicism. The event in question is the so-called 'Irish Rebellion of 1641', which marks a series of massacres beginning with the event that native Irish Catholics killed a large number of Protestant settlers on the Ulster Plantation. From the 1760s to the 1780s Burke had a strong interest in the historical narrative of the 1641 Rebellion, and he tried to revise the rather exaggerated bloodiness or cruciality, based on the nature of the Irish Catholic (pp. 156–62, 178–81). At that time Burke had a friendship with the following Irish historians: Charles O'Conor, John Curry, Thomas Leland, Colonel Charles Vallancey, Thomas Campbell, and Sir John Temple (pp. 155–67). And in direct association with these historians Burke circulated the old Irish or Gaelic manuscripts that he had secretly obtained. And He lobbied to expose the truth of the 'rebellion'. The works written by these historians were, however, almost all unsatisfactory in his assessment.

### **Chapter 5, or Relationship between Burke and Irish Revisionist Historians**

As Dr. Sato puts in a footnote and clearly writes by himself (p. 155, n. 10), his description here owes to 'the pioneering and still leading works of the theme': John C. Weston, Jr., "Edmund Burke's Irish History: A Hypothesis", *Publications of Modern Language Association of America*, 77, 1962, pp. 397–403, Walter D. Love, "Edmund Burke, Charles Vallancey and the Sebright Manuscripts", *Hermathena*, 95, 1961, pp. 21–35; idem, "Edmund Burke and an Irish Historiographical Controversy", *History and Theory*, 2, 1962, pp. 180–198; idem, "Charles O'

Conor of Belanagare and Thomas Leland's 'Philosophical' History of Ireland", *Irish Historical Studies*, 13, 1962, pp. 1–25. There are unpublished Ph.D. dissertations prior to these journal papers by both of them: Weston, "Edmund Burke as Historian" at University of North Carolina, 1956, and Love, "Edmund Burke's Historical Thought" at the University of California, Berkeley, 1956. It is interesting to note that there is synchronicity between these two academics in the US.

Owing to Weston and Love, Dr. Sato refers to Burke's support, particularly given to the revisionist historian John Curry and Charles O'Connor. In 1747 Curry published *A Brief Account from the most Authentic Protestant Writers of the Causes, Motives, and Mischiefs, of the Irish Rebellion, on the 23d Day of October 1641*, London, and then in 1758 he published *Historical Memories of the Irish Rebellion in the Year, 1641*, London. These were the first attempts to tell and revise the history of Ireland by a native Irishman. He passed Curry's *Historical Memories* on to Scottish novelist and naval surgeon Tobias Smollett in the circle of Dr. Johnson, the editor of *The Critical Review* from 1756. Burke himself planned to supervise the publication of the revised edition (p. 155). In 1766 O'Connor also published *Dissertations on the History of Ireland*, Dublin: George Faulkner, and sent a copy of it to Burke (Corr.: O'Connor to Burke, 25 April 1765); he seemed to have hoped that Burke himself would write a revisionist history of Ireland (p. 156). But the author tells us that due to Burke's entrance into the political world as a Member of Parliament (MP) of Westminster in 1765, the historiographical revisionist actions mentioned above all failed. As the author says, Burke had to be more cautious of his intercourses with Roman Catholics in Ireland (p. 156).

However, in September 1765 Burke visited his close friend Sir John Sebright, MP for Bath, at Beechwood Park in Hertfordshire, and accidentally discovered many old Irish manuscripts in Sebright's library (originally collected by Edward Lhuyd and purchased by the Sebrights in 1713). In 1769 Burke borrowed two volumes, and sent them to Tomas Leland, a Dublin-born historian, translator, and professor of oratory at Trinity College, Dublin, expecting him to write a revised version of Irish History as a native 'philosophical historian' in Ireland (The manuscripts borrowed by Burke from the Sebrights were circulated among Leland, Vallancey, and others). In 1773 Leland eventually published *The History of Ireland from the Invasion of Henry II*, 3 vols, Dublin. However, this work was regretfully far from satisfactory one for Burke (p. 157).

Dr. Sato adds the names of Colonel Charles Vallancey and Thomas Campbell in his 'revisionist historian' list. Even during Burke's later year he had kept his deep interest in rewriting Irish history from their native Irish Catholics' side. In 1786 Vallancey published *A Vindication of the Ancient History of Ireland*, Dublin, and then he contributed an 'approval' letter from Burke (29 November 1786) for his work in *The Dublin Chronicle* on 10–12 April 1788. But Campbell immediately pointed out that Burke's letter in fact contained 'serious criticism' on Vallancey's work (p. 159). Actually Campbell was one of the historians to whom Burke had given advice to rewrite. In the summer of 1787 Campbell had called at Burke's estate of Beaconsfield, and then been handed the Irish manuscripts by Burke. The advisor to Campbell was not only Burke, but also Dr. Johnson at that time. In 1789 Campbell finally published *Structures on the Ecclesial and Literary History of Ireland*, Dublin (London, 1790). Burke was unsatisfied with this as well, for Campbell did not follow Burke's advice that he should concentrate on rewriting a modern history of Ireland (Campbell followed Dr. Johnson's advice in the work). Afterwards Burke complained about Campbell's attitude in his work in the letter to his son Richard (Corr.: Burke to Richard Burke, Jr., 20 March 1792), in which Burke asked

his son to retrieve the manuscripts from Campbell (pp. 159–161).

We have hitherto illustrated in detail Dr. Sato's description of the section: Burke 'As Supporter of Revisionists' (the subheading of Ch. 5, Sec. 1) of modern Irish history. As for the revisions, or the rewriting of the 1641 Rebellion was one of the most important keys for Burke to overturn the hundreds of years of English Protestant rule over Irish Catholics.

### **Rewriting Irish History based on the Discourse of Irish/Gaelic Barbarism**

In the next section 'Enthusiasm and Impartiality: Towards Henry II's Conquest' in the same chapter Dr. Sato mentions the labelled idea of 'Irish barbarism' to be enlightened by civilisation in the antecedent Irish historiography (pp. 162–167). The author mainly refers to two problems: One is the discovery and publication of Macpherson's *Fingal*, a translation of old Gaelic poetry, which demonstrated the literary excellence of the ancient Gaelic world including Ireland. The other is the authorised description of English conquest over Ireland, which was based on Sir John Davies's *A Discoverie of the True Causes Why Ireland was Never Entirely Subdued, nor Brought Under Obedience of the Crowne of England, Until the Beginning of His Maiesties Happie Raigne*, London, 1612.

The Fingal/Ossian controversy of the Gaelic poetry in the 1760s saw development in the *Annal Register*, London, Dodsley, in which Burke had been deeply involved as a main editor. In the controversy Burke had taken a positive attitude to access the Ossian manuscripts in question, though he had eventually come to see them as a forgery in the 1770s (pp. 162–163). His affirmative attitude towards the existence of the Ossian manuscripts had a close relationship with the problem of 'civilisation' (pp. 162–163).

There was a civilisation/barbarism debate over Ireland before Henry II's conquest in the 12th century. The topic turns to the existence of the old Irish Brehon laws from the 15<sup>th</sup> or 16<sup>th</sup> to 18<sup>th</sup> centuries (pp. 164–166). The English poet and lawyer John Davies's arguments in *Discoverie* seem to be paraphrased as follows: «The cause of the disorder in Irish society, or their barbarism had depended on the native Irish legal system called the Brehon laws. Then, English laws should be extended and introduced into the island for their civilization». Burke and his revisionist historian friends noticed the fact that Davies's views of Irish history and tradition had put a strong impact on the conquest (pp. 172–175), as the author mentioned in the subsequent section 'Constitutional Relationship' (Ch. 5, Sec. 3).

Burke's position does not accept the theory of military conquest, but the extension of English laws to the indigenous Irish people. The spread of English laws would be beneficial to Irish fellows, and they would enjoy the same rights as the English. Apart from the Brehon laws, Burke recognised the importance of poetry, music, and other refined arts from the old Ireland (pp. 173–174). Burke's opinion concerning Irish commercial regulation is as follows: «The whole integration into the British imperial order might promote commerce and industry in Ireland was on the very same thought», which depended on John Hely-Hutchinson's *The Commercial Restraints of Ireland Considered in a Series of Letters to a Noble Lord. Containing A Historical Account of the Affairs of That Kingdom, so far as The Relate to This Subject*, Dublin, 1779 (pp. 184–85).

### **Closing Review**

We conclude this review. Behind these detailed historical analyses by Dr. Sato, there must be the latest Burke research by F. P. Lock and Richard Bourke, as well as the excellent leading

studies of W. Love and J. C. Weston, Jr. in the 1960s. We can also point out the author's earnest excavation of the *Catalogue of the In Library of the Late Right Hon. Edmund Burke*, 1833. Sato has a down-to-earth approach to research, such as reviewing historical books in the same period. Such an attitude is the guarantee of a book's scholarly value.

Now, in my closing words of this book review, I would like to say one last thing mainly relating to Chapter 5. Since Dr. Sato is deeply touching the frontline of the latest Burke research in England, Scotland, and Ireland, he is to clarify the following 3 points: 1) Could Burke be justly called a 'Jacobite'? If could so, what is the reason? 2) What was the intellectual community of Irish revisionist historians like? 3) Might we follow the latest established theories by F. P. Locke and R. Burke without any re-examination?

The author as an up-and-coming Burke scholar is expected to answer these questions in some future work. This is by no means a flaw of this book. Around the time of the publication of Sato's book, there was a book by 10 Burke scholars in Japan, including Dr. Sato and the reviewer, who published the first Japanese companion to Burke Studies: Nakazawa Nobuhiko and Hideki Kuwajima (eds.), *Bāku Dokuhon: 'Hoshushugi no Chichi' Saiko no Tameni (in English: The Burke Reader: 'Father of Conservatism' Revisited)*, Kyoto: Showadō, August 2017. I would recommend reading this, if possible.

NOTE: This book review is an expanded and supplementary English version of the reviewer's article in Japanese, which has been published in the *Annals of Japanese Society of Eighteenth-Century Studies*, Vol. 34, June 2019, pp. 95–96.

SHINJI NOHARA, *Commerce and Strangers in Adam Smith*. Heidelberg: Springer Nature, 2018. xi + 192pp. ISBN 978-981-10-9014-1.

Reviewed by DAISUKE ARIE\*

The publication of this English book, written by a young scholar aged under forty years, is extremely epoch-making. This statement can be supported with three reasons. First, the book symbolizes the emergence of a new generation in Adam Smith (1723–1790) and the Scottish Enlightenment studies, which earlier constituted the mainstream scholarship on the history of Western economic thought in Japan for a long time, particularly after World War II. This may be corroborated from the website of the Japanese Society for the History of Economic Thought (JSJET: <https://jsjet.net/about/intro/>) established in 1950. Second, its framework is unrelated to Yoshihiko Uchida's (1913–1989) thesis that has for a long time greatly influenced the Japanese scholarship of Smith post World War II. Early scholars, including Uchida, tended to read Smith as a 'guidebook' for Japan's modernization towards a free and democratic society from pre-war quasi-feudalistic authoritative society. Uchida portrayed Smith as a mercantilism criticizer, a predecessor of the labour theory of value, and an 'insufficient Marx' at the same time. Third, there are almost no comments on Japanese scholarship of Smith in the book except in Appendix

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1 of Chapter I that provides a concise overview of the post-World War II Japanese Smithian studies. As a matter of fact, there is no mention of so-called ‘Japanese view’ in the book nor Asian characteristics included in its main claims. In its essence, this book may be regarded as a Smithian study written by an author of unknown nationality. This trend persists in the recent English works within this field written by the group of scholars from the same generation, such as Ryu Susato, *Hume’s Sceptical Enlightenment* (Edinburgh University Press, 2015), Atsushi Komine, *Keynes and His Contemporaries* (Routledge, 2017), Seiichiro Ito, *English Economic Thought in the Seventeenth Century* (Routledge, 2021). It sharply contrasts with the older generation’s works, such as C. Sugiyama and H. Mizuta eds., *Enlightenment and beyond: Political Economy comes to Japan* (University of Tokyo Press, 1988) and T. Sakamoto, *David Hume and Adam Smith, A Japanese Perspective* (Edition Synapse, 2020). The latter works firmly represent the typical viewpoint of ‘the Japanese perception of Western thought’, or ‘the dissemination of the Western ideas to East Asia’ that has been often seen so far.

This book begins with Nohara’s extremely modern interests of ‘globalization’. He describes this interest in the eighteenth century, when economies expanded globally, beginning from European countries, after the Age of Discovery and the wave of colonization. He then seeks to elucidate how Smith perceived this eighteenth-century globalization. In addition, Nohara attempts to describe that: Smith depicted the situation in front of him as the most civilized stage of ‘commercial society’ and how the society was maintained and developed to increase the country’s wealth and consequently, the well-being of its people. They were put together as ‘political economy’ shown in the *Wealth of Nations* (1776). Based on the concept above, this book consists of the following chapters.

- Ch. 1 Introduction
- Ch. 2 Travel Literature and the Enlightenment World
- Ch. 3 Fellows and Strangers in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*
- Ch. 4 Adam Smith’s Historical Politics
- Ch. 5 Adam Smith on Regularity and Irregularity in Sentiments: Morality and Prudence
- Ch. 6 Adam Smith on Money and Impact of Encountering Strangers
- Ch. 7 Adam Smith on Markets
- Ch. 8 Encountering the World: The Model of International Trade
- Ch. 9 Conclusion

The first half (Ch. 2–Ch. 5) describes Smith’s explanations regarding the establishment of general rules of morality for sustaining and developing a commercial society. In other words, Nohara shows that Smith first departs from the sentiment of ordinary people who are the subjects of secular acts, rather than the transcendent teachings of the Bible or the Church, in explaining the rationale for people’s moral conduct in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759: *TMS* hereafter). For Smith, the basis of morality is human emotion or feeling. Nohara then focuses on the concept of ‘strangers’ which appears in *TMS*. This focus itself is not unusual in Smithian readings. The following interpretations are already common understanding. Strangers who cross each other every day in a society repeat ‘sympathy’ about the propriety of each other’s actions in repeated communication including economic transaction. Consequently, actors in a society will

suppress their own actions to a certain extent instead of aiming for limitless self-desire, then common rules of the society will spontaneously be created. At this stage, the self-regulated act is a reasonable and acceptable range of acts when seen from the ‘well-informed impartial spectator’ (*TMS*). This process proceeds most typically in a commercial society.

The following explanation from half a century ago by Hiroshi Mizuta (1919–) has been one of the most influential interpretations for establishing this process. He explained this self-suppressing formation process as a function of ‘sympathy’, which is also the work of stranger’s imagination. When the stranger attempts to perform an action, he first mentally transforms himself into an ‘impartial spectator’. The doer then would assume, if he were in the impartial spectator’s position, to the extent that the spectator would sympathize with the doer’s conduct based on the sympathizer’s understanding of the situation in which the doer is placed. Then the doer would control his own conduct within that tolerance.

The uniqueness of Nohara’s reading of *TMS* in Ch. 3–Ch. 5 is that, without fear of misunderstanding, he makes a stranger jump over the above process to impartial spectator. This would imply that they will probably be directly linked to each other, and if so, this interpretation will require that a stranger be substantively an impartial spectator (pp. 66, 68). Smith himself struggled to explain why the actions of strangers or market players in a commercial society could lead to the formation of general rules of social morality, even though they could not share the fellow feelings of family and friends, or those of narrow community members. Instead of examining the process of rule-formation, Nohara replaces this framework with ‘strangers and impartial spectators’ as a means of understanding the relationship between modern ‘local societies’ and the ‘global world’. Nohara believes that in both the eighteenth-century commercial society and the modern world, people face each other and negotiate with each other as strangers and impartial spectators, rather than locally as fellow villagers and people in small societies.

Nohara, then, tries to examine a concrete future direction of overcoming the confrontation and the friction of both from this understanding. In other words, he suggests that individuals in the local community could overcome conflicts in the global world and form general rules for proper maintenance of the whole by wisely facing each other even as strangers in the global market. In fact, from this point of view, he also mentions the argument of John Rawls and communitarians. Certainly, this demonstrates Nohara’s excellent sense of reality as an economics scholar who departs from the concrete context of the age whether it is the present age or the eighteenth century — and his approach might correspond well to the reality of nationalism movements and the anti-globalism movement seen in the United States and other developed countries. On the other hand, it is no wonder that readers of this book glimpse Nohara’s optimism for humanity and a certain perfectionism, symbolized by the fact that a stranger simultaneously calls for him/her to be a personally well-cultivated impartial spectator. Some professional Smithian scholars will also question how valid such an approach is as a reading of Smith’s text.

As mentioned earlier, interpreting Smith’s ‘strangers’ and ‘impartial spectators’ is far from simple. In fact, there are many different interpretations. One reason is that the primary meaning of ‘sympathy’ in the eighteenth-century English was not the same as its modern English definition of direct emotional contagion. In modern English ‘sympathy’ is the feeling that is evoked upon seeing a poor or a grieving person which makes the observer sad. Smith’s ‘sympathy’, used above, is largely compatible with the ‘cognitive empathy’ of modern English,

for example, to share feelings of joy by knowing and understanding why others are happy. Additionally, the word ‘empathy’ did not yet exist in the eighteenth century, and the word that began to be used after the twentieth century may mean direct emotional transmission, along with the cognitive meaning used in the description of Mizuta. In fact, there is also an idea to interpret Smith’s sympathy as a direct empathy, regardless of whether it is inside or outside the country, unlike Mizuta. It goes without saying that this often happens when reading classics, whatever fields they may belong to.

The second half of this book (Ch. 6–Ch. 8) is devoted to the theoretical aspect of Smith’s political economy. Since this part may be unfamiliar to some readers of this journal, I will introduce only the outline below. Chapter 6, which deals with money, compares Hume and Smith’s quantity theory of money, and argues that, in contrast to the prevalent view about the money theory of classical economics, Smith did not consider money to be neutral to economic activity. Chapter 7, which deals with the market, forcibly draws Smith’s attention to the uniqueness and independence of individual markets, rather than the general equilibrium theory of neoclassical economics, which sees the market as a uniform space that expands infinitely. That is because Smith argues based on observations of real market systems and business practices, and the insights can also be seen as a precursor to A. Marshall’s (1842–1924) partial equilibrium theory, according to Nohara. Chapter 8 is about the theory of international trade. It is introduced here that Smith, giving the example of Bengal in India, recognizes the fact that trade breaks through the limits of the one-country market and that the colonialism that is inevitably born in the process of economy expansion involves war and violence.

The above is an overview including my comments. However, considering the expertise of the readers of this book review, I briefly write the essence of this book including Ch. 1: Introduction and Ch. 9: Conclusion below.

Strangers can communicate with each other through money’s intermediary function, resulting in the movement of goods. This is commerce and economy. The economy, with its merits and demerits, will continue to expand globally across communities and national boundaries. Nohara derives this from Smith’s account and surveying primary materials in Smith’s own library of more than 3,000 titles (Hiroshi Mizuta, *Adam Smith Library: A Catalogue*, OUP, 2000). According to Chapter 2 of the book, travel literatures and missionary reports of the same era were important sources of information. Based on these, it is mentioned that Smith grasped globalization developing in front of him as a contemporary context. It is not difficult to imagine that about ten percent of Smith’s original collections held by the Faculty of Economics at the University of Tokyo, where Nohara works, and the survey triggered this interest. In short, the combination of Nohara’s comprehensive reading of the texts and the Q. Skinner-style Contextualism shown in Chapter 1 are the warps and wefts of the contents of this book. Some senior Smith specialists might discover, I can imagine, various criticisms from preceding Smith researchers. However, I would like to evaluate the issue-raising boldness of the young author.

Finally, it is possible that a considerable number of Japanese readers may be dissatisfied with the book’s lesser focus on Yoshihiko Uchida and Karl Marx. Perhaps every modern reader reading it will be interested in the negative aspects of capitalist globalization, such as the history

of colonialism and the extreme income inequality shown in Piketty's *Le Capital au XXIe siècle* (2013), and then in the question to what extent Smith predicted them in examining globalization in the eighteenth-century. Thus, it will be necessary for Nohara to consider the issue comprehensively once again including David Hume who found 'civilizing power of commerce' in the eighteenth-century globalization (N. Phillipson, *Hume*, 1989, 2011) and Marx who said, 'the great civilizing influences of capital' (*Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*: 1857-58 Manuscript). I hope that the author of this book, which is representative of a new generation of Smithian studies, will elucidate the globalization of modern capitalism based on those.

DAVID CANNADINE, *Victorious Century: The United Kingdom, 1800–1906*. London: Allen Lane, 2017. xxi+601pp. ISBN 978-0141019130.

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*Victorious Century* is a work of erudition penned by one of the most respected and renowned historians of our age. This scholarly piece of work is an entertaining page-turner. Although the book is based on a rather orthodox political history, the rhythmic narrative of vicissitudes of high politics is richly supported by (not reduced to) appropriate explanations of socio-economic data and trends. Scattered throughout the 530 pages are fascinating historical anecdotes (not the evidence of historical agency) of culture such as literature, music, art, architecture and scholarly works. In addition, although the author states that this book is more of a narrative than an analytical piece of work, its overall structure of continuities and changes during the nineteenth century is indelibly inscribed on readers' minds in chapter 11 by the H.G. Wells' time-machine traveller, who, coming from the early nineteenth century, carried out observations about the UK and the Empire in the early twentieth century. Overall, *Victorious Century* is a perfect example of honoured British historical works.

This volume has two major characteristics that are hardly found in other general works of nineteenth-century Britain. The first is that it deals with so many aspects of the nineteenth century in an astonishingly seamless way. Most works on modern British history targeting the general public readership tend to focus on either domestic English history or imperial English history, thus paying very little attention to the Celtic fringe and the international context of continental Europe. In addition, these works tend to compartmentalise the histories of England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland, as well as of the Empire, into discrete sections or chapters. On the contrary, *Victorious Century* integrates such otherwise separately treated topics into a single, powerful narrative. Citing the author's own words, *Victorious Century* narrates Britain's or four nations' progress, 'politically, socially, economically and culturally, and not only domestically, but imperially and internationally as well'. In other words, this book does not have any 'by the

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way' paragraph in it. The author offers an ingenious introduction to not only the deeds of the successive prime ministers, but also those of the major personnel of each cabinet such as Foreign Secretaries, Colonial Secretaries, Chief Secretaries for Ireland and Secretaries of State for India and Scotland. These effective introductions enables the author to draw readers into the theatres of the complicated international and imperial conflicts as well as the domestic UK politics without harbouring the feeling of being diverted from the main political story. This masterly command of storytelling is a clear indication of the author's undoubted qualifications as the heir to Asa Briggs and G. M. Trevelyan.

The second characteristic that is worth noting is the insistence on the 'unpredictability' of the contemporaries of the course that British history would take. This is exhibited by the citations of Dickens and Marx at the front page and by the author's analogy at the epilogue that the British nineteenth century was like an uncontrollable tiger on which the contemporaries could not help but ride. Consequently, no positive images about Victorian Britain, such as industrialisation, imperial expansion, global hegemony, economic prosperity, political development towards democracy and scientific achievements, are taken for granted by the author. The narrative also has a lot of contradictory realities and perceptions. For instance, the widely felt anxiety of the imperial over-stretch and the arbitrary decisions of 'the men on the spot' in defiance of the intention of the 'official mind' in London are repeatedly emphasised to avoid reinforcing the linear image of imperial expansion. Another eminent example is the description of mid-century Britain as 'the varied, paradoxical, old-and-new, rich-and-poor, rural-and-urban, agrarian-and-industrial, religious-and-secular, English-and-Celtic and Protestant-and-Catholic nation'. Such deliberate treatment of historical realities, based on the exhaustive reading of secondary sources, fully guarantees its academic authenticity.

Next, four brief remarks about the volume. First are the unique characteristics of the potential and actual readers. Usually, a national history book is published for and purchased by those who belong to the very nation. For example, a general history of modern Japan written in Japanese language would be purchased by the Japanese reading public. Interestingly, however, this is not the case in British history in general and *Victorious Century* in particular. Although David Cannadine's work is a national history, it does not only deal with English people. The Welsh, the Scottish and the Irish, as well as numberless nations and ethnic groups within and without the Empire, are also included. In addition, the language used in writing the work is English, which is not only the mother tongue for one particular nation, but also the main language of communication for many nations and ethnic groups. This means that quite a broad range of non-English people are also assumed readers of this national history writing. Therefore, the value and relevance of this book must not only be gauged by the critical reviews of established English scholars, but also by the responses received from both English and non-English readers with different origins and identities in the context of post-colonial, post-Brexit and the globalised world (dis-)order of the early 21st century.

Second, by emphasising the strength of 'the men on the spot' in the formation of the Empire and the restrictions of British options in foreign affairs, this writing clearly inculcates the idea of making domestic policies in the 'official mind' in London (or in those politicians and bureaucrats in charge of ruling the UK) and, in contrast, downplays the influence of extra-parliamentary radicals, trade unionists and socialists in the formation of such policies, except Irish Nationalists and Unionists. These political dynamics seem to be paradoxical. The reviewer

wonders whether the paradox is a feature of the ‘Laissez-Faire State’ of the nineteenth century as compared to the ‘Fiscal-Military State’ of the eighteenth century, which is understood to be weaker in domestic governance and stronger in international warfare and imperial aggressions or simply a reflection of the author’s unique historical view.

Third, from the perspective of a Japanese historian of Britain, it is rather surprising that what seems to be one of the most conspicuous features of modern Britain is almost absent from the narrative; that is, philanthropy. The topic of philanthropy only appears a few times within the work; among them, three references are concerned with particular individuals (*i.e.* the seventh Earl of Shaftesbury, Angela Burdett-Coutts and Octavia Hill). The work also fails to recognise philanthropy and charity either as unique social forces, gigantic providers of infrastructure, important sources of power or the strong glue sticking the otherwise antagonistic social classes and ethnicities together in the UK and the Empire, all of which were not present in Japanese history.

Lastly, the reviewer is curious to know how the author estimates the book when he looks back at his long and fruitful career as a historian. Is it the monumental work of once in a lifetime or is it just one of the many books and articles that he has published? Whichever the case, *Victorious Century* is, without a doubt, a book that anyone interested in British history of the nineteenth century would want to read and glean from. (*Shusaku Kanazawa*)

*Victorious Century* will certainly be acclaimed as an essential standard work. Cannadine’s mature writing style enables readers to enjoy the book and reap benefits. After reading through more than five hundred pages, many readers can grasp the overall picture of the 19<sup>th</sup> century UK. This is a masterpiece by one of the few really learned and skilled historians.

Here, I will focus on the periodization of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Cannadine’s timeframe covers the period between 1800 and 1906. The 19<sup>th</sup> century began in the years of the Act of Union with the establishment of the largest ever UK, and its maintenance became the principal task of the successive policymakers. 1906 was the year of the Liberal landslide. The incoming Liberal government implemented truly interventionist policies. 1906 marked the beginning of a new phase of British politics.

Although Cannadine is too insightful to ignore or underestimate various difficulties and challenges the 19<sup>th</sup> century UK was forced to deal with, his depiction of the century impresses readers with the stability and continuity of the UK. Against the background of the on-going massive global transformation, the 19<sup>th</sup> century UK was flexible and adaptable enough to avoid revolutionary upheavals and maintain basic cohesiveness.

I would like to propose an alternative timeframe to Cannadine’s; that is, 1800–1922. In this periodization, the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was marked by the dismemberment of the largest UK in 1922, when the Irish Free State seceded. In addition, within the downsized UK, Northern Ireland, newly created in 1920, was given the right of self-determination with its own parliament and government. Thus, the continuity of constitutional arrangements and geographical territory was terminated. Moreover, soon after 1922 the Labour Party, which had replaced the Liberals as the main opposition to the Conservatives, formed the first minority government. The continuity of the two-party system since the Victorian age got to a great turning point. These facts seem to support my choice of 1922 as the 19<sup>th</sup> century’s finish line.

To use Cannadine’s words, the Anglo-Irish Union was ‘a necessary but unconsummated

marriage'. While the growth of Protestantism did much to have the sense of Britishness shared in England, Scotland and Wales, it was rather counterproductive in making Irishmen the so-called 'West Britons'. The UK could not fully accommodate Catholic Ireland and its national sentiments were never sufficiently appeased.

It should be remarked that the population of Ireland was well over 30% of that of the whole UK in 1801. In this sense, the UK contained the forces for disuniting itself, which were far from negligible. In other words, the apparent stability of the 19<sup>th</sup> century UK should be regarded as somewhat fragile. Even after 1829, when Catholic Emancipation was belatedly fulfilled, the O'Connellite Repeal movement, the Young Irelanders' 'battle of cabbage patch', Fenianism, the agitation for Home Rule led by Parnell, together with chronic agrarian disturbances, interminably posed threats to the stability of the UK.

As Cannadine points out, Ireland was given an ambiguous status in the UK. On the one hand, it occupied a position in the centre of the British Empire and numerous Irishmen made much contribution to the Empire by military service. On the other hand, it was a subordinate junior-partner of the English-dominating UK and, like colonies, governed by the Viceroy. The permanent military presence clearly showed that Ireland was not an equal constituent. A deep gulf between Ireland and the rest of the UK was plainly revealed in tragic ways by the Great Famine in the 1840s.

Needless to say, Anglo-Irish history during the 19<sup>th</sup> century was not just composed of agitations for Irish national liberation. The Anglo-Irish relationship undoubtedly had elements of collaboration. Despite its flaws and fragility, the largest UK survived for more than 120 years. However, it is undeniable that the Union ultimately failed to make the Irish majority content. Gladstone was not successful in his mission to 'pacify Ireland', nor was Home Rule 'killed with kindness'.

In dealing with the challenges raised by Ireland, those violent means, which were not totally justifiable in 'advanced' countries of the day, had to be resorted to; a series of harsh Coercion Acts and direct suppression. Symbolically enough, unlike those in the rest of the UK, policemen were always armed in Ireland. During the Irish War of Independence, brutal atrocities were openly executed especially by such quasi-paramilitaries as the 'Black and Tans' and the 'Auxiliaries', under the tacit approval of the government. The dark side of the country, which was proudly enjoying the finest civilization on the globe, was unmistakably disclosed within the UK territory.

The post-Great War UK was haunted by the fear of brutalization, unchained by the War. For instance, in *The Hope of Europe* (1921), Philip Gibbs, one of the most widely read war correspondents during the Great War, pointed out the 'distressing signs of a coarseness and cruelty of mind — in all classes — not noticeable before the war'. (p. 217) He proceeded to say that 'the social spirit has been changed in the last six years of history than in the six centuries' because of 'a convulsion which shook England to the core'. (p. 286) Even the commencement of a new world was suggested.

The new jumping-off ground might well be a line cutting across history on November 11, 1918, and dividing the old world from the new, as *Before the War and After the War*. (p. 326)

Barbarism was displayed not only in the Irish War of Independence. Many examples of brutal suppression of resistance to imperial rule, informed with racism, can be seen throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The ‘peaceable kingdom’ always had a violent face, which was usually kept under cover and not noticeable to the ordinary British citizens.

By adopting my longer timeframe 1800–1922, it may become more apparent that the stability of the 19<sup>th</sup> century UK was buttressed by the relentless exercise of violence. From my perspective, the 19<sup>th</sup> century UK looks less stable and cohesive than Cannadine portrays. His rather optimistic portrayal can be constructed only in his shorter timeframe, which excludes the Great War and the Irish Revolution. There are surely many possible timeframes of the 19<sup>th</sup> century other than Cannadine’s and mine. (*Takashi Koseki*)

HARUMI GOTO-SHIBATA, *The League of Nations and the East Asian Imperial Order, 1920–1946*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. xiii+294pp. ISBN: 978-981-15-4967-0.

Reviewed by TOMOKO AKAMI\*

Harumi Goto-Shibata is a leading scholar of the British diplomatic history in East Asia, as demonstrated in her books (in Japanese), *Opium and the British Empire, 1906–43* (2005) and *British-Japan Relations over Shanghai, 1925–1932* (2006). At the same time, she has been interested in the international oversight of empires’ dealings especially in China. Accordingly, many of her works, including the above book of 2005, have examined the League of Nations in the region, hence its relations with China, and the empires of Japan, Britain, and the US. Her latest Japanese book, *Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, the League of Nations and the British Empire* (2016), was specifically on the League. All these works have been distinguished by her masterly knowledge and rigorous examination of especially, but not exclusively the British archival sources, while she uses the diplomatic archives of Japan and the US, and League’s archives extensively. I particularly note her grasp of complex technical details of the League-related diverse subjects she deals with, and the clarity she presents them to a reader.

Although she has published in English as well, including *Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925–31* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1995), the current book, *The League of Nations and the East Asian Imperial Order, 1920–1946* (2020), is her well-awaited monograph on the League in English. It makes her valuable past and present works on the League in East Asia available to non-Japanese reading scholars. For those who are familiar with her works in Japanese, the book shows how she locates her works in the recent scholarship on the League (and the United Nations) more broadly. Below, I hope to illuminate this latter aspect as well.

### **Main theme**

The book focuses on ‘technical cooperative works’ of the League, which was defined in Article 23 in its Covenant. In Introduction (Chapter One), the two main arguments are introduced. First, it argues that ‘the League achieved quite a lot in the field of social and technical works’ in East Asia

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(p. 4). It identifies these works, and examines their achievements and limits, and their impact on the post-war (p. 7). On the last point, the book demonstrates the transition from the League's opium control scheme to the dangerous drug control of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (Chapter Ten). Second, it argues that 'those [social and technical] works [of the League] came to challenge the existing imperial order in East and Southeast Asia' (p. 4). This was, as it qualifies, however, unintended by 'the founding fathers of the League', because the empires and the League were 'rather "the guardians" of the order', and 'intended to maintain the status quo' (p. 4). The introduction, therefore, indicates that the empires were 'the founding fathers' of the League, and suggests a few factors which challenged the order. They were: the problems specific to East Asia, especially the dominance of the empires; the role of experts from small countries and the secretariat at the League; and League's oversight and publicity (pp. 4–6).

### **Structure**

The book divides the following nine chapters into Part I and Part II in a chronological order. Part I, titled as 'The League of Nations as Forums and Actors', is consisted of four chapters and deals mainly with the period before the mid-1930s. Chapter Two, 'Social and Humanitarian Issues of the League of Nations', introduces how social and humanitarian issues became a part of the League's scope and how the League began its involvement in this field in East Asia in the field of public health in mid 1920s. Half of the chapter, however, is a background introduction of Japan's stance to the League and key Japanese 'League men'. Chapter Three, 'Challenging the Imperial Order: Control of Opium', focuses on the establishment of the League's Opium Advisory Committee (OAC) and its works in East Asia, mainly dealing with the British empire and the Japanese empire. Chapter Four is titled 'Expanding the Range: Japan's Reaction to the [League's] Technical Co-operation with China', which also discusses the 'Manchurian Crisis'. Chapter Five, 'The TWC [Advisory Committee on Traffic in Women and Children] as Another Forum and Women', examines the League's TWC's dealings with Russian women refugees in China.

Part II, 'Contested Power and Authority', consists of five chapters, and deals with the period until 1946. Chapter Six is titled 'Japan's Withdrawal [from the League] and China's Request for a Seat on the Council', and Chapter Seven, 'Who Controls the Co-operation?: Technical Co-operation [of the League with China] after the Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War'. Chapter Eight, 'The Question of Empires: Co-operation in the Yunnan-Burma Borderland in 1939', examines the League's cooperation with China in epidemic control in that strategically crucial region during the Sino-Japanese War. Chapter Nine is titled 'The Limits of the League's Control of Opium', mainly focusing on the British response to the US pressure towards the end of the war. Chapter Ten, 'East Asia in the Architecture of the Post-War World: From the League to the UN Economic and Social Council', focuses on a transition from the League's OAC to the UN's Commission on Narcotic Drugs under the ECOSOC, while examining the case of the British colonial policy to and in Burma.

### **Contributions**

This book is a valuable contribution to the scholarship on the League, which is enjoying a significant renaissance, enhanced further by a publication rush to mark its centenary anniversary of 2020. This attention has not been confined to historians, as it is also evident among scholars in the disciplines of International Relations and International Law. These works re-evaluate the

League, not only as the failed first attempt of the global collective security institution, but more as an organization which played a significant role in shaping global governing norms and institutions for the following UN system. In fact, the most growing area in this 'new history' of the League is its social affairs. 'Social and technical issues' which this book deals with are: opium (and dangerous drug) control, technical cooperation with (or more precisely assistance to) China (for economic development and epidemic control), and trafficking in women. It would, therefore, fit in this growing scholarship on the League. And it has a distinct value because many of these works still focus largely on Euro-American contexts. Considering the recent publications, however, the author's claim on the status of the scholarship on League's social affairs in East Asia is probably too sweeping (pp. 2, 3).

First, the book makes a strong case for one of its arguments: the League did a lot in social and technical fields in East Asia. It shows especially that despite the orthodox view of the decline of the League in the 1930s, these League's schemes in the region continued and remained important after 1935 and during the wartime of 1937–1945, and hence a direct impact on the relevant post-war UN operations. Second, the book demonstrates that inter-imperial dynamics (namely among the British, Japanese and US empires) largely defined the nature of the above-mentioned social and technical operations of the League in East Asia. I come back to the point on the complexity of the roles of the US empire shortly.

Third, related to the second point, the book makes it clear that League's global governing norm making in opium control in East Asia was in essence an effort in reforming the relevant empires' colonial policies to and in the colonial administrations in the region. The League's limited, but important impact in reforming colonial governing norms has been argued by the others. Pedersen (2015) and Callahan (2004) demonstrated an indirect influence of the Permanent Mandate Commission (PMC), and Jerónimo (2018) argued that the League, together with International Labor Office (ILO), also influenced the colonial administrations in Africa to reform their labour policies towards the native workers. Adapting Pedersen's point, the book especially stresses the method of publicity (naming and shaming) of the League to 'reinforce' its reformist agenda (pp. 2, 5, 8), and argues that this was effective for the OAC in influencing the British colonial policies, although not the Japanese colonial policies (pp. 64, 69).

Fourth, on this inter-imperial dynamics at the OAC and its evolving commissions in the wartime, the book illuminates the significance of the non-League member, the US empire (in the forms of the governmental representatives, individual experts, or non-governmental organizations) as a strong reforming force, and in particular its effective use of publicity at these multilateral fora to pressure the British empire towards the end of the Second World War (pp. 211, 238, 252). The book is distinguished, as it claims, from many works on the development of international opium (and dangerous drug) control, because it is written from British perspectives, while most, it argues, have been written from US perspectives (p. 205). Accordingly, it elaborates that the British imperial policy makers (at London) took the US attack on British 'morally-wrong' opium policies to and by the British colonial administrations in Asia so seriously that it directed these administrations to change policies. Moreover, it argues that this was not only because they worried about the public image of the British empire, but also because they thought its no-action would damage the post-war British relations with the US and its place in global politics (pp. 239, 242).

As Pedersen also made a similar point in *The Guardians*, this episode is an important history lesson to contemporary politics: in order to get a reluctant actor (relatively powerful) to comply

with a desirable multilateral norm (be it in the field of environment, international criminal court, refugee convention, or law of sea), not only those who push such agenda need to mount supporting domestic and international public opinions, but also policy makers of this reluctant actor have to recognize a pragmatic merit in coming on board. The episode also reminds us that the days when the US government (although not all American experts or non-governmental organizations) could represent a moral force in multilateral fora have gone for some time. The US has remained outside of many significant multilateral treaties, and moreover, its soft power as a global moral force has been depleted especially, but not exclusively, by the last administration.

Fifth, while the book, therefore, suggests that the League's attempt to reform the empires' colonial policies was partially effective (hence some challenge to the imperial order) in opium control, this was not exactly the case in the League's scheme of technical assistance to ('technical cooperation' with) China. Chapters Four, Seven, and Eight, which deal with the League's Council Committee on Technical Co-operation between the League and China (TCC), suggest that the League's secretariat supported the shared interests of the major empires (the British and Japanese in the early 1930s, and the British in 1937–39) against the nationalist agenda of the Nationalist China and Ludwik Rajchman, but they also reveal more complex dynamics.

The League's 'technical assistance' to China was a comprehensive scheme. Chapter Four deals with the early to mid 1930s, while Chapters Seven and Eight examine a part of epidemic control assistance in this scheme respectively at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), and in 1939. Rajchman was central in shaping this scheme in the early to mid 1930s and in 1937–1938. He was Medical Director (1921–1938) of the League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO), the operational agency of the League's Health Committee. He became sympathetic to, was closely involved in the Nationalist China, and advocated its nationalist cause at the League in the 1930s and then beyond after he was dismissed from his post at the League. The book indicates that when he was sent by the League to lead the ground operations of epidemic and refugee control by the Flood Relief Commission in China in the crucial September, 1931, he played a decisive role in China's immediate appeal to the League against the Japanese aggression in Northeast China (Manchuria) (pp. 90–91, 93–94). He then became the League's chief technical advisor for the planning of China's National Economic Council and then for that council that was a receiving organization of the League's technical assistance scheme. He was involved in the initial setting and implementation of this comprehensive scheme in 1933–1934, mainly for economic development, but also involving the diverse areas of epidemic prevention, financial reform, and transportation infrastructure development. He was ordered to get back to the LNHO at Geneva in 1934. After the outbreak of the war with Japan in 1937, however, epidemic prevention became an urgent issue in this assistance scheme, and Rajchman was again called back. He became central in drawing the assistance scheme for China until he was dismissed in late 1938 by the League's new Secretary General, Joseph Avenol.

Chapters Four and Seven reveal conflicting views between Rajchman and the Nationalist China on one hand, which pushed for China's greater control over the scheme, and the key figures at the British imperial government and the League's secretariat on the other. The latter were often sceptical of 'political' intention of Rajchman, were concerned with the proposed expenses in the time of shrinking budget, and insisted on the overall control of the personnel and budget by the League's Secretary General. Chapter Eight examines a similar conflict, but now between the Nationalist China (and its Chinese experts) and Robert C. Robertson (British), who

led the League's epidemic prevention unit in the border area between Burma and Yunnan in 1939. It details Robertson's self-imposed action to serve the British strategic and economic interests, while working for the League. At the same time, as well as this dichotomized conflict, these chapters also reveal the views at diverse parts of the League, including the TCC, the Assembly, and the Supervisory Commission, and at the relevant ministries of the British imperial government, which were sympathetic to the China's cause and/or expressing a strong commitment to assisting China (and hence the Allied colonial interests) in its war against Japan.

Building on Iris Borowy's work (2009), the book makes a passing comment that China became the site where experts of the diverse field could experiment their expert knowledge and skills together in one comprehensive scheme (p. 196). This point is significant, because when the colonies or even mandates were in reality beyond the League's direct control, China became not only the site for these experts, but also almost the only prototype in the League's era for international development programs of the UN and its agencies for post-colonial, 'developing' countries. This presents an alternative argument to Antony Anghie's (2005) on two accounts. First, while Anghie sees the League's mandate system a prototype of the post-war multi-imperial 'development' projects by the UN for the post-colonial countries, the mandate system was administered mostly by a designated 'empire', and the League's multilateral PMC had only indirect influence. In contrast, the League's technical assistance scheme in China was the League's direct multilateral intervention, and in that sense, it was closer to the post-war model of international development programs by the UN and its agencies. Second, while experts from the major empires occupied the key positions at the relevant technical committees at the League's secretariat in Geneva, experts who led the technical assistance projects on the ground in China included prominent figures from small Eastern European countries, such as Poland and Yugoslavia. Accordingly, some were sympathetic to the nationalist and anti imperial agenda of China, which makes it difficult to characterize the League's assistance scheme in China merely as 'inter-imperial'.

### **Critical comments**

While the book makes other significant points, relevant to its major themes, it nonetheless reveals the difficulty of consolidating and editing her past and current works, especially her two Japanese books, into one. The relevance of the chapter on the League's involvement in suppressing trafficking in Russian women in China, which is from her journal article, is yet to be clear. It is suggested that this chapter shows that League's tool of publicity only was not sufficient for solving the problem of trafficking in Russian women in China, because there was no stake-holder empire on this issue. The documents of the League's conference of 1937 on trafficking in women and children in Asia, however, suggest: first, such publicity of the League had so far had an impact on the Japanese imperial government on suppressing Japanese women trafficking in Asia; and second, the biggest issue in Asia was trafficking in Chinese women and children, while that of Russian women was minor. Why this topic was included in this book, and why the focus was on Russian women, therefore, remain unclear.

Although a greater coherence of the book may have been achieved by cutting less relevant parts and more editing, one part from her Japanese book of 2005 could have been included. One of the fascinating parts of that book on opium control is her meticulous analysis of the conflicts and interactions between the British imperial metropolitan government and the British colonial

administrations in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia. Here, it reveals that the imperial metropolitan government was trying to impose ‘morally right’ measures on opium control, to which the colonial administrations resisted. This was because the revenue from opium production was significant for these administrations, and there were vested interests and customs in the local colonial societies. This part reveals that the colonial administrations in Asia were the significant independent actors in history of the League of Nations and in the process of making global governing norms and institutions, which also shaped the post-war regime. It would have been a critical section especially in Chapter Three. On a minor editing point, I wonder why the editor of the publication did not use macron for Japanese oo and uu sounds (the standard in most historical works on Japan in English), and I wonder whether this was why Amō Eiji was spelled as Amau.

Despite some of these editing concerns, the book is a significant contribution to the field of social affairs of the League of Nations. It reveals the complex dynamics of norm making process in East Asia through the detailed analysis of the interactions of especially the diverse ministries of the British metropolitan imperial government, the British colonial administrations in East Asia, and the different sections at the League of Nations, but also the other key stake holders of the Nationalist China, the Japanese empire and the US empire. It should be read widely by those who are interested in history of the League, history of the United Nations, British diplomatic history in East Asia, and Japanese and Chinese diplomatic histories.

### Reference in the text

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Reviewed by NOBUKO OKUDA\*

I would like to congratulate Professor Sato for the completion of the first sequence of his *Memories and Narratives Series*. This collection recounts the life stories of people in Leicester

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who belong to varied ethnic backgrounds. It took ten years for Professor Sato to publish all 12 volumes and it took him 20 years to accomplish interviews with 16 people: two Afro-Caribbean women, three Sikhs (a couple and a woman), two Hindus (a man and a woman), a man of mixed-heritage, a Muslim man, a Jewish woman, a Latvian man and his English wife, a second-generation Irish couple and a white Anglican couple. Each volume includes an appendix that incorporates numerous family photos and pictures of the respondents, showcasing religious and cultural events, maps and other documents. This series represents an invaluable treasure not only for historians but also for sociologists and educationists interested in multi-culturalism. It is also a priceless resource for the people who live in Leicester, enabling them to envision their own history. I am honoured to be accorded the opportunity to review the entire series<sup>1</sup>. This review will be conducted in two parts: the first part will focus on the selection of interviewees; the second part will consider the significance of the narratives for contemporary historical studies.

To first take a brief glance at the post-war history of the city, J. B. Priestley wrote in his *English Journey* in the early 1930s that '(t)he town seems to have no atmosphere of its own. ... It seemed to me to lack character, ...'<sup>2</sup> Leicester was a manufacturing city, famous for its hosiery industry. The city had had a strong Protestant tradition.<sup>3</sup> An interviewee recalled that Leicester residents had not seen many black people nor experienced any racial tension until black American soldiers were stationed near the city during the Second World War.<sup>4</sup> There were also not many commonwealth migrants in the 1950s. The textile industry began to attract Asian immigrants in the 1960s.<sup>5</sup> The most extensive change occurred when newly independent East African countries staged their Africanisation policies. Among them was included Idi Amin's declaration that all Asians must leave Uganda within 90 days. Consequently, around 20,000 East African Asians eventually settled in Leicester. The influx resulted in racial conflicts and local discrimination. At this juncture, young activists in the Labour Party seized the opportunity to build a multicultural community.<sup>6</sup> Leicester is now acknowledged as the most multi-racial city in England. The 2011 Census results revealed that 45% of its population considers itself white and native to the UK (a sum of white English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British). Of the rest, 37% identify as Asian (Indian/Pakistani/Bangladeshi/other Asian) and 6% as black (Caribbean/African/Other Black).<sup>7</sup>

Volume 1 of the series presents Elvy Morton, the first chair of the Leicester Caribbean Carnival. She was born in Nevis in 1935 and migrated to Birmingham to work as a nurse; subsequently, she moved to Leicester. She recalls her encounters with racial discrimination at work. She began to organise a carnival in Leicester after the 1981 racial riots in London. She strongly emphasises the importance of teaching Afro-Caribbean children about their history in the Caribbean Islands.

Volume 2 introduces a Jewish woman, Claire Wintram, who was born in the East End of London in 1949 and grew up in Warwickshire. Her narrative focuses on the significance of being a Jew in post-war Britain. Her father, a Polish Jew and a survivor of the Holocaust, insisted that they should not display their Jewishness because he thought that it was dangerous to be different. She has a Jewish identity, but her outlook tends to be liberal and cosmopolitan.

Volume 3 tells the life story of Jasvir Kaur Chohan, a Sikh woman born in Punjab in 1954. She migrated with her family to Leicester in 1962 and was westernised in her younger days. Her relationship with Sikhism has shifted over time. She remains active in the community and became the first female manager of a Sikh community centre.

A Sikh couple's stories are displayed in Volume 4. Sarup Singh was born in Punjab in 1940 and migrated to Britain in 1959. His life story expresses the difficulties that confronted Asian migrants in the 1960s and 1970s. He also talks extensively about his activities as a portrait painter. His wife, Gurmit Kaur, was also born in Punjab in 1947. She came to Leicester to get married. She recounts how she coped with a very different culture as an Asian woman with scant knowledge of English.

A Muslim businessman, Jaffer Kapasi makes an appearance in Volume 5. He was a victim of the Uganda Expulsion along with his family. An Ismaili belonging to the Shi'ia sect and a businessman, he represents himself as a tolerant person who advocates community cohesion and inter-faith education. He remarks on the anti-Muslim feeling in Britain after the 9/11 attacks of 2001 and the 7/7 terror incidents of 2005.

Volume 6 is dedicated to Terry Harrison, a man of mixed heritage and a person who would probably be invisible in conventional ethnic studies. He was born in 1944 to a black American soldier and a white woman. His memories of his mother are particularly impressive. He also describes the racial discrimination that prevailed in the police force in the late 1970s. Read with Volumes 1 and 10, this book divulges the severe racial discrimination faced by Britain's black population.

Another invisible minority is made perceptible in Volume 7, a couple represented by a Latvian man and his English wife. Andrejs Ozolins came to Britain in 1948 at the age of 13 to join his father who had migrated as a European Voluntary Worker. His narrative evinces a strong Latvian identity. Dulcie Ozolins was born in Gloucestershire in 1936. She is engaged in varied cultural activities of the Latvian community along with the couple's two daughters.

Ramanbhai Barber, whose life forms the text of Volume 8, is a twice-migrant. Born in Gujarat in 1945, he migrated to Kenya in 1952 to reunite with his father and brother. He then migrated to Leicester in 1964. He became a senior officer of the Leicester County Council via the British United Shoe Machinery Company. He is a highly active figure in the Hindu community and is also a founding member of the Leicester Council of Faiths, which was established in 1986.

Volume 9 concerns Nilima Devi, an Indian classical dancer born in 1953 in Gujarat. She migrated to Germany with her husband in 1979 and then to Leicester in 1980. Her account describes how she began to teach Indian classical dance in Leicester and how the dance form became popular in the city. She also reveals an interesting story about her father's consent to her marriage with a German scholar of Indian studies because of astrology and horoscopes.

In Volume 10, Dorothy Francis tenders a detailed account of her life, relating her experiences of racial discrimination and harassment at school. She mentions being strip-searched at Heathrow Airport in 1987. Born in Jamaica in 1961, she migrated to Coventry in 1966 to join her parents. At the time of the interview, she was the chief executive officer of the Co-operative and Social Enterprise Development Agency. Her narrative also reveals how she was brought up in her grandparents' house in Jamaica with other members of her extended family after her parents had migrated to Britain.

A second-generation Irish couple makes an appearance in Volume 11. Nessian Danaher was born in London and studied at the University of Leicester and has worked as a history teacher since his graduation. He is interested in multicultural education but is critical of separatist inclinations. He also talks enthusiastically about his contributions to Irish studies. His wife,

Maureen, was born near Bury in 1949. She taught at several Catholic primary schools after attending a local convent school and a Catholic teacher-training college. She is also active in the local Irish community. Nessian and Maureen describe their experience of being Irish in Britain and report the lives of their parents and grandparents in Ireland. Their accounts include Nessian's grandfather's involvement with Sinn Fein and detail anti-Irish racism.

Volume 12 is devoted to an Anglican English couple. Both husband and wife were born in Leicester. Peter Adamson was born in 1927 and joined military service during the war. He remained in the military until 1948. Since his discharge, he worked primarily as a draughtsman. His wife, Margaret, was born in Leicester in 1935. Her account unfolds the life of working-class Britons in the period between the two world wars, the air raids that occurred during the war, her experiences in the 1960s and 1970s as an employee at the Midland Bank and her involvement in the Anglican Church.

I would like to indicate the significance of interviewing people belonging to varied ethnic groups. As observed above, Sato selected interviewees who are representative of present-day Leicester, both in terms of ethnicity and gender. The series is unique because Sato has included three white ethnic groups. Conventional ethnicity studies tend to focus on non-white peoples and certainly do not encompass white indigenous Anglicans. Such exclusions have caused irritations among white populations.

In his introduction to Volume 12, Sato cites an elderly working-class woman's query about whether he believed he could understand Leicester just by interviewing migrants.<sup>8</sup> His inclusion of the indigenous couple clarifies how people of the host community regard the changes in their city. The interviews with white immigrants are also illuminating: they all experienced non-colour-based racism but apprehended their circumstances in different ways. Ozolins mentioned being called a Nazi at school but concluded, '...because the Eastern European are white they are not noticeable, and on the whole they have not suffered gross discrimination'.<sup>9</sup> On the other hand, Nessian Danaher confessed to mixed feelings: 'One of the peculiar things about the whole Irish situation is the fact that the Irish are white-skinned. ... Some older Irish people said 'No, we don't want to be classified as ethnic'. They saw it as being labelled as 'black'.<sup>10</sup>

It is very exciting for readers to note that their narratives intertwist with each other and present a nuanced history of the city. I can cite two notable examples. First, Margaret Adamson recalls vividly that a friend of her mother was alarmed that her daughter conceived a baby from a black American soldier. Black American soldiers and their offspring represented aspects of personal war-time memories for a majority of the city's population. The mixed-race children and their mothers faced contempt and discrimination as a part of their daily life for many years and those experiences have left a permanent effect on them. Terry Harrison remembers that his mother was almost ostracised by her family and by the village folk as he describes growing up with his twin sister as 'the blacks' in a white family and community.

The second example concerns two respondents who or whose immediate family members were victims of the Second World War. Both Claire Wintram's father and Andrejs Ozolins were displaced from their homelands during the war but Wintram and Ozolins obtained entirely different ideas of multi-culturalism. Wintram's father did not inform his daughter about his ordeals until she was quite grown up and he insisted that the family must hide its Jewishness from the public. This embargo seems to have influenced her identity. Although she learned Hebrew and Judaism as a child, she regards her Jewish identity as a cultural rather than religious

fact and is particularly critical of Israel. On the other hand, Ozolins is very disapproving of Russia and displays a rather separatist perspective on multi-culturalism.

Third, this series showcases the presence of diversities and differences *within* an ethnic group. Sarap Singh and his wife have maintained their Sikh identity throughout their lives. The wife mentioned that ‘I would say I have a British passport but inside I am still Asian’.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, Jasvir Kaur Chohan admits that she did not follow Sikhism after her wedding and she tried not to impose Sikh values on her children. Her memories of her younger years evince a touch of disagreement with the traditional ways of the family even though she remained obedient. The influx of East African Asians was a crucial turning point for the Sikh respondents. Singh was critical of them saying, ‘(t)hen after that Ugandan [Asian] people came, so that totally changed. Before that the Asian woman never worked, mostly like housewives [they] stayed at home. They never even thought, would ever think, to send a wife to work. Since these [Asian] people came they started to — women and every one — start to find a job in the factory. So, then our people, our Punjabi people follow them, you see. So when they go and start to work, the life is changing. Day by day the family values disappear...’.<sup>12</sup> The same influx became a blessing for Chohan, who asserted, ‘Back in the 1970s, a lot of Sikh people came from Africa, who had a more modern outlook than that of the people who had migrated from India, who still had the Indian style, the Indian ways. The people came from Africa had more western ways and they were more advanced because they had already lived in a foreign country’.<sup>13</sup> She regards the fact women started to work as a positive outcome. These differences could be attributed to the discrete genders of the interviewees and their differing experiences in Britain. Singh migrated from India at age 19 after completing his education; Chohan came to England as a child and attended local schools. Her stance could be influenced by her education and exposure to the lives of other women in Britain.

Thus, we return to the question of Sato’s selection of interviewees. Obviously, Sato observed diversities and unequal relationships *within* particular ethnic groups or faiths. Such divergences would be apt topics of exploration for prospective scholars of ethnic studies. In such an event, we cannot but notice that the participants do not encompass respondents such as an Afro-Caribbean man, or a Muslim woman, or those who are unhappy with a multicultural and multi-faith Leicester. Sato’s selection of interviewees for this series is excellent. We thus expect that he will add some more informants in his next series of Memoirs and Narratives to incorporate an even more multi-faceted image of the city.

## Notes

- 1 Some parts of the series have inspired several book reviews. For example, Colin Hyde. ‘Kiyotaka SATO, *Memories and Narrative Series 1–5*’, Research Centre for the History of Religious and Cultural Diversity, Tokyo: Meiji University, 2010–2012 *Sundai Shigaku (Sundai Historical Review)* No. 148, 2013; Yumiko Hamai. ‘Kiyotaka Sato, *Life story of Mr Terry Harrison, MBE: His Identity as a Person of Mixed Heritage*’, Research Centre for the History of Religious and Cultural Diversity, Tokyo: Meiji University, 2013) *Eastern Asian Journal of British History*, Vol. 4, 2014; Cynthia Brown. ‘Kiyotaka SATO, *Memories and Narrative series I-6–9, II-1 and Discussion Paper no. 7*’, Research Centre for the History of Religious and Cultural Diversity, Tokyo: Meiji University, 2013–2016 *Sundai Shigaku (Sundai Historical Review)* No. 163, 2016.
- 2 J.B. Priestley (1934/1977). *English Journey*, Penguin Books, p. 115.
- 3 ‘The Ancient Borough: Protestant Nonconformity’ *A History of the County of Leicester: Volume 4, the City of Leicester*. Originally published by Victoria County History, London, 1958. (British History

- Online, <https://www.british-history.ac.uk/vch/leics/vol4/pp390-394#h3-0003>; last accessed 24 January 2021)
- 4 Vol. 12, pp. 49–50. (references to this series are shown volume number and page number)
  - 5 Sarup Singh mentioned, ‘When I came in 1959 there weren’t many Asian people in Leicester. [They were] Gujaratis, a few Muslim families. A few Sikh families’. (Vol. 4, p. 20)
  - 6 Gurharpal Singh, ‘Multiculturalism in Contemporary Britain: Reflection on the ‘Leicester Model’ in *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2003. (<http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/resources/periodicals/diversities/past-issues/vol-5-no-1-2003/multiculturalism-in-contemporary-britain-reflections-on-the-leicester-model/>; last accessed 24 January 2021).
  - 7 2011 Census data for Ethnic Group Leicester, (<https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/KS201EW/view/1946157130?cols=measures>; last accessed 24 January 2021)
  - 8 Vol. 12, p. 18
  - 9 Vol. 7, p. 80.
  - 10 Vol. 11, p. 62.
  - 11 Vol. 4, p. 53.
  - 12 Vol. 4, pp. 36–37.
  - 13 Vol. 3, p. 77.